

NR

G3 OPERATIONS/PLANS - HAC

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FOR REFUGEES  
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22 AOUT 1995

HCR/RWA/REP/95/0735

Re: Repatriation of Rwandese refugees from Bujumbura

Dear General Tousignant:


In response to your letter dated 7 August 1995 accompanied with a copy of UN New York coded cable 2567 and in view of the fact that UNAMIR will not be in a position to avail an aircraft to carry out this operation, I would like to inform you that, although it is a rather expensive endeavour, UNHCR decided to charter an aircraft to repatriate some 2,200 refugees currently in Bujumbura. The operation will hopefully start on 25th August. There will be approximately five flights a day from Bujumbura. Each flight will carry 50 people.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

  
W. R. Urasa  
Representative

Major General G. C. Tousignant  
Force Commander  
UNAMIR  
Kigali, Rwanda

  
23/8


1. TSOR

2. For info pl

DAC

DCos(ops)

- 63 (Air)
- 63 (Plans)

  
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673 PLANS

PLAN 2-2 S  
3-  
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Clerk -

**Inter-Office Memorandum**

From: A/COS

To: ED  
CAO  
COS  
CHAO  
DCOS Ops  
DCOS Sp  
FMO

Info: Lists A, B, D, E & F

Date: 4 July 95

Subject: **UNAMIR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE COORDINATION**

Reference: SRSG Meeting with FC and Staff on 3 July 95.

1. As discussed at the referenced meeting, the recent increase in requests for humanitarian assistance from UNAMIR by outside agencies has highlighted the need for a coordinated provision of humanitarian assistance. This would require both a central focal point for that coordination as well as informed and active participation by all elements of UNAMIR.

2. Accordingly, it was decided that the UNAMIR Chief Humanitarian Assistance Officer (CHAO) with the Humanitarian Assistance Cell (HAC) would be the UNAMIR focal point for all outside assistance. Furthermore, the HAC would be advised and guided by the UNAMIR Humanitarian Assistance Advisory Group (UHAAG) which will meet under the chairmanship of the CHAO on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays in the UNAMIR Conference Room at 0930 hrs, commencing 7 July 95. The UHAAG will assess all requests for humanitarian assistance and determine which agencies would be most willing, able and capable to provide such support. The referenced meeting agreed in part that the UHAAG membership should be as follows:

- a. CHAO (Chairman);
- b. Political Advisor to be appointed by the SRSG;

- c. Civilian Administrator to be appointed by the CAO;
- d. Medical Operations Officer to be appointed by the FMO;
- e. PAffO;
- f. Operations Officer to be designated by G3 Ops;
- g. Logistics Officer to be designated by DCOS Sp;
- h. G3 Engr/FEO: and
- i. Minutes Clerk from HAC (alternatively Ops).

3. Therefore, in accordance with the new procedure, henceforth the HAC should receive all requests for assistance from Government Agencies, Departments and Officials as well as UN Agencies and NGO's and would initially process and further evaluate, staff, implement, coordinate and monitor those requests. Consequently, no UNAMIR official, staff or agency should commit any UNAMIR resources until the request is properly staffed by HAC and the UHAAG.

4. It is kindly requested that all members be appointed or designated soonest by the action addressees and made available to attend the inaugural meeting on 7 July.



CRN 428  
P3/17 20/38POTENTIAL OPERATIONS TO CLEAR REFUGEE CAMPS IN ZAIRELOGISTIC CONSIDERATIONSBACKGROUND

1. Outline planning is now under way to consider military options for the clearance of the camps holding Rwandan refugees in Zaire. It is envisaged that any such operation will be mounted by troops separate from those now in UNAMIR. While the command and control arrangements for such an operation have yet to be determined, it is already clear that there will need to be a degree of coordination of the logistics to support both this new force and the current UNAMIR and, at one end of the range of logistic options, is the obvious possibility that the support of the 2 forces may be totally integrated.

2. It is well documented that the current level of support for UNAMIR is, at best, precariously hand-to-mouth and, in some areas wholly inadequate. If implemented, Op RONDAVAL - which is wholly complementary to operations within the camps in Zaire - will place increasing demands upon the existing system. The addition of the requirement to support another substantial force, acting far from the logistic centre of gravity of UNAMIR, possibly engaged in operations under Chapter VII and in a hostile and demanding environment would inevitably overstretch existing capabilities, paralyzing the operation of both forces.

3. Experience within UNAMIR shows that it is not possible to rely even on equipment fundamentally necessary to the achievement of the mission being provided through UN sources within 150 days. It is clearly not too early to start considering the logistic implications of mounting such an operation, even though G3 planning has not yet started in earnest; indeed, logistic considerations could well have a marked influence on the operational plan.

AIM

4. The aim of this paper is to consider the logistic implications of the proposed operations in Zaire.

POSSIBLE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

5. While outline operational concepts have been identified, no decision has been made as to which option should be adopted, let alone any work on the development of a plan being carried out. But, while all of the options which have been identified imply a substantial logistic task, one option is logistically significantly more complex than the others; as this represents the reasonable worst case, and to simplify the task of analysis, this option has been adopted for examination.

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6. Under this option, it is proposed that the Force will consist of up to 4 battalions (or equivalent) - 2 mechanized and the remainder with integral troop carrying vehicles sufficient to move the entire unit - plus appropriate support elements. The Force is likely to be augmented by selected Zairian forces who may, for example, be allocated L of C duties.

7. The mechanized battalions will move into selected camps with the aim of eliminating the power currently wielded by the agencies of the former Government of Rwanda which, it is assessed, is the major factor in preventing the majority of refugees from returning home.

8. After an appropriate period, the mechanized elements will move on to other camps, leaving more lightly equipped forces (one battalion) to maintain the newly imposed security. This process will continue until all the camps have been dealt with.

9. The political imperative is for the camps in the Goma area to be addressed first. In order to prevent a large scale movement of refugees, particularly those who wish to cause trouble to the BBGNU within Rwanda, into Burundi, it may well be that further forces (probably a battalion, perhaps augmented by light armoured reconnaissance vehicles) would deploy into the south of Zaire to act as a cut off group.

10. No role has been identified, thus far, for UN Military Observers or Civ Pol in the early stages of the operation. While they may have a role in the latter stages, their support is not considered further.

#### ASSUMPTIONS

11. Timescale. Both for political reasons and in order to achieve surprise (thus preventing the flight of troublemakers) it is likely that the operation will be mounted at short notice). It follows that it will be essential for units to arrive as formed, fully equipped bodies with adequate integral logistic support elements. Even if it is planned that Zairian forces are to be used in certain roles, their immediate availability cannot be assumed. For all aspects of the operation within Zaire, the Force must initially plan on being totally self-contained.

12. Political Cooperation. It is implicit in the planning of this operation that full cooperation is granted by both the Zairian and Rwandan authorities. In logistic terms, for example, the operation must be guaranteed freedom of passage across borders to allow the support of deployed forces. It is not inconceivable that even first line support will cross national boundaries. Although less important, the full cooperation of the Ugandan authorities would be of great assistance.

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13. Coordination of Logistic Effort. Whatever the eventual command and control relationship between UNAMIR and the forces deployed in Zaire, there will be a need for effective coordination of the logistic support for both forces. Kigali will inevitably be the focus of activity for the support of the new operation although it is not implicit that all support need flow through Kigali if suitable alternative facilities exist. In this context, the airport at Goma is capable of receiving all types of aircraft while that at Cyangugu is C-130 capable. It is believed that while Goma can accept all types of aircraft, its total daily capacity is limited and it may not be possible to assume its use for the arrival of all materiel into theatre. Security of the Goma airfield must be established at the start of the operation.

14. Humanitarian Assistance. The operation has the aim of encouraging refugees to move from their present locations and, if successful, will be comparatively short (15-30 months). There is already considerable humanitarian assistance available in the area from UN agencies and NGOs. The proposed force should not have any planned role in the provision of humanitarian assistance to refugees, except in such instances as rapid evacuation of casualties to where assistance from a more appropriate source is available. This has implications for the amount of logistic support which must be provided.

15. Support to Other Agencies. It is been a feature of UNAMIR operations that the Force receives a constant stream of requests for the diversion of scarce resources to other UN agencies. The logistic support planning for the military aspects of the Zaire operation cannot predict what support will be requested by these agencies, many of whom are already well established in the area, and it is assumed that no materiel or other administrative support will be provided to them.

16. Contractor Support. Contractors can provide elements of the necessary support for this operation. While they have the inherent disadvantage that they cannot mobilize as quickly as military forces, Brown & Root have shown the ability to react well once their firm base is established. Contractor support can not be ruled out.

#### APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM

17. There is not yet any indication of how the operation will be mounted and, consequently, it is not practicable to consider a matching logistic deployment plan. At this stage it is only possible to identify the requirements for the mature logistic situation; this will be valuable in identifying the required force structure but will also act as an aide-memoire when considering logistics for various mounting options.

18. Because force structures are not defined, it will only be possible to develop very rough calculations as to the size of the

logistic task. It cannot be over-emphasised that any figures which follow are only estimates, but should be in the right order of magnitude.

#### OUTLINE MATURE LOGISTIC CONCEPT

19. Given the distance between Kigali and Goma, more particularly, the time taken to travel between these locations, and the nature of the operations to be conducted, it is not practicable to provide second line support from Kigali. A Forward Maintenance Area (FMA) is essential. Reconnaissance (planned within the next couple of days) will be necessary to confirm its practicability, but the natural choice would be adjacent to Goma airfield. It should be noted that this is within Zaire, with all the concomitant problems that may arise; in particular a strong force will be required to protect the FMA and guarantee the integrity of the operation. Suitable troops should be included in the ORBAT of the Force, rather than misemploying forces whose primary task is within the camps.

20. In principle, all stocks for the Zaire force arriving in theatre should be delivered, by strategic transport, direct to Goma - only exceptionally should they transit through Kigali.

21. The FMA should hold 7-30 days stock of combat items; this will be equivalent to ?? tons. Note: Direction is required here but the calculations below have assumed 30 days. Note that higher reserve levels, once in place, mean that there is less need for guaranteed daily replenishment and, hence, greater risks can be taken in the design of the resupply system.

22. The southern element of the force will require its own, parallel FMA. Again, there is the natural choice of basing it adjacent to the airfield at Cyangugu. Initially, this FMA will be smaller than the one to the North, but as the operation progresses and forces move southward, its dependency will increase. Furthermore, as this FMA may be in Rwanda, there is the possibility that UNAMIR troops in Sector 4 could draw their routine support from it rather than looking to Kigali; this could improve the level of support provided to those forces from its present level. As the airfield cannot accept anything larger than a C-130, it cannot be considered a strategic airhead. It will need to be determined whether this FMA is to be supported from Goma or Kigali - the necessary resources do not currently exist to support it from Kigali but it would be a difficult operation to establish 2 FMAs simultaneously, with one being a satellite of the other. It may be that the compromise would be for the southern FMA to be established through Kigali - strategic airlift into Kigali, cross-load onto smaller aircraft and fly to Cyangugu - but the cargo handling and movement control capability at Kigali International Airport would need to be boosted substantially before this could be considered viable. For subsequent replenishment, routine air re-supply (from either of the strategic airheads - Kigali and Goma) should not be

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the primary means of support - although an emergency capability must exist - and there is no suitable road Goma-Cyangugu. The following options exist:

a. By Road - Kigali-Cyangugu. This is the only practicable option for support to be provided from UNAMIR. The additional capability would need to be provided - **it cannot be met from current UNAMIR resources.** In addition to the transport itself, there will be a requirement for Engineer support to maintain the road (some 200km); its rebuilding is the subject of EU aid, which indicates its condition, but the rebuild itself will not take place in time for this operation. The need for route defence to ensure integrity of support will also need to be considered.

b. By Water - Goma-Cyangugu. It is possible that re-supply could be carried out using commercial barges on Lake Kivu. While overall capacity is limited, it is certainly adequate to support the southern element of the Force.

#### G1 MATTERS

23. Reinforcements. Given the proximity of the 2 forces, it may be appropriate to consider the extent to which UNAMIR could initially establish a reception area at Goma prior to the arrival of the first of the new Force. This clearly has implications for concurrent UNAMIR operations and will need to be considered in conjunction with the G3 staff. Points to be considered include: transit accommodation; rations and water; UN Identity Cards and Driving Permits; issue of UN accoutrements; arrival briefing; etc. Depending upon the precise nature of the reception assistance provided by UNAMIR, it may be necessary to review the UNAMIR mandate and obtain clearance from governments providing contingents to UNAMIR.

24. Discipline - General. Deploying forces will need instruction on a whole range of topics of the kind normally covered by SOPs. It has taken a considerable time for UNAMIR to develop its SOPs, despite being provided with UN Model SOPs as a basis on which to work. One advantage of linking the 2 forces in some way is that the troops operating in Zaire could come under the umbrella of the UNAMIR SOPs.

25. Provost. In addition to routine disciplinary tasks and the conduct of such investigations as may become necessary, it must be expected that, in addition to the traffic the operation itself generates and the considerable volume of humanitarian activity in the area, substantial numbers of refugees will be on the roads. There will be a clear requirement for route signing and route clearance. In addition, there may be a requirement to hold persons removed from the camps for a limited period (Note: there will be a requirement for the Force to be given guidance on the Force's commitment to the investigation of war crime related matters,

apprehension of suspects, who should be detained and their subsequent handling and disposal.) A Military Police presence in the area of the camps may be one factor in giving the refugees confidence to leave the camps. It is assessed that a Provost Company of some 75, highly mobile, personnel will be required.

26. Interpreters. There will be a need for a generous scale of interpreters, some of whom must be attached to contingents immediately they arrive.

27. Welfare. A large element of the new Force will be essentially mobile. This implies that many of the items traditionally associated with welfare may not be appropriate but, equally, with troops working in a warm base, other aspects may become more significant. There is currently no UNAMIR PX contract onto which the new Force could be blistered. Regardless of UN contract procedures, it may be appropriate to engage a contractor for a limited period without competition. More work needs to be carried out in this area.

#### MEDICAL

28. It is considered that the medical system to support the Force could most economically be provided by integration with that of UNAMIR. For planning purposes, it is considered that surgery should all be carried out in Kigali but circumstances may dictate that some forward surgical capability will be required.

29. Level One/Two Capability. Each battalion must include an integral Level One (Regimental Aid Post) capability. This includes enough ambulances (wheeled or tracked or both) to support evacuation tasks within the battalion AOR and to the evacuation LZ. Given a reliable aero-medical evacuation (AME) capability, the requirement for Level 2 assets decreases significantly as casualties can be evacuated to Kigali within an acceptable time. Guaranteed, night capable, AME facilities are not currently available within UNAMIR and, unless they are provided simultaneously with the Force, it will be necessary to establish a Level 2 facility within the FMA, based on 5 beds and a resuscitation capability.

30. Level Three Capability. The current Australian Medical Support Force within UNAMIR has the capability to support up to 60 beds, which is equivalent to a force level of 7,000 troops; this will decrease to 45 beds on rotation in Feb 95. The timing of the operation will thus impact upon the number of additional troops required to provide the necessary medical support. An additional point to note is that troops operating under Chapter VII require greater capacity within the medical organization; this point will need to be addressed in due course.

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G4 MATTERS

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LOGISTIC ENGINEERING

31. The Force will need engineering support in the following areas:

- a. Maintain mobility in the AOR, particularly route maintenance.
- b. EOD. It is assessed that Former Rwandan Government Forces (FRGF) have the capability to deploy nuisance mines, booby traps etc and some, probably limited, EOD capability will be necessary.
- c. Production and storage of potable water.
- d. Construction of working and living accommodation and facilities such as bulk fuel installations. This will principally be within the HQ and both FMA complexes, where field defences will also be required. Because of the mobile nature of their task, the battalions will need to bring sufficient tentage to accommodate themselves but they may require assistance in areas such as sanitation.

32. Battalions will ideally include an engineer element; this is essential for the battalion to be deployed to the South. For Force tasks, it is assessed that one engineer squadron/company, including plant and construction capability, will be required.

33. If the Kigali-Cyangugu road is to be a main supply route (see the Outline Logistic Concept), a further squadron/company will be required to maintain the road between these points.

TRANSPORT & MOVEMENTS

34. Air Transport. It should be noted that FRGF are assessed to have a limited low level air defence capability. Assuming that this does not impede air transport operations, it is considered that the following assets are required to guarantee the necessary support for the Force:

- a. Operational, in-theatre air lift - two C-130 or equivalent.
- b. Tactical air lift - two medium lift helicopters.
- c. One terminal troop; it must have the capability to handle ISO containers at each airhead.
- d. One movement control section.
- e. G3 (Plans) to be asked to advise on the desirability of

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including an air dispatch capability for the middle phases of the operation.

f. Casevac requirements are covered under Medical.

35. Road Transport. It is considered that the following road transport and related assets are required to guarantee the necessary support for the Force:

- a. One composite squadron headquarters.
- b. One medium troop.
- c. One heavy troop (to include 20 ton trailer capability).
- d. One fuel tanker troop, with equipment suitable for bulk refuelling - to be employed on second line duties.
- e. One water tanker troop.
- f. Given the reliability of fuel contractor's deliveries to UNAMIR, it may be appropriate for the Force to have the capability to collect fuel from a distant contractor's location. This would require an additional fleet of large tankers with a total capacity of some 100,000 litres.
- g. If the Kigali-Cyangugu road is to be a main supply route (see the Outline Logistic Concept), a further 30x10 tonne trucks, with 20 tonne trailers, based in Kigali, will be required.

36. Additional Equipment. In order that transport assets can be operated efficiently, it will be necessary to ensure that each FMA has a minimum of 2x2.5 tonne rough terrain fork lift trucks.

37. Transport & Movement Coordination. There is a requirement for a movement control troop. Additionally, up to 4 military movements staff might be required in Force HQ.

#### SUPPLY

38. While other options have been considered, in the scenario covered by this paper, only one course is considered realistic:

One second line supply company located in Goma, which serves as the principal point of entry, with a battalion support group (BSG) detached to support the southern battalion. Resupply into Goma is predominantly by strategic airlift, with onward southward movement by barge whenever possible.

Although they will not be the primary means of distribution, air transport and medium lift helicopters are considered essential and an air drop capability might be considered.



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39. The following are considered prerequisites for successful Supply support of the operation:

- a. Dedicated second line supply organizations as follows:
  - (1) a supply company;
  - (2) a combat supplies platoon;
  - (3) a local purchase organization, located in the area of operation and the ability to operate in Uganda (Kampala) and Kenya (Nairobi).

b. Contingents must deploy into theatre with:

- (1) Stocks. 90 days stocks of: combat rations; general stores; repair parts; medical stores; ammunition (including explosives);

Note: I would want to review this requirement, particularly in respect of combat rations, but any commitment by the UN on this matter will inevitably reduce UNAMIR's own integral sustainability.

It is not essential that contingents actually carry this materiel - but it must be committed to them by their own nations, and delivered into theatre by those nations under their own arrangements

- (2) Letters of Assis. LOAs for: replacement of major items of equipment; the provision of all necessary replacements parts to meet both stock replenishment demands and unscaled items required for the repair of unserviceable equipments; ammunition.

- (3) First Line Capabilities. Appropriate equipment and skills to permit first line:

- (a) Bulk refuelling.

- (b) Distribution of potable and non-potable water.

c. To achieve the speed of surprise required for this operation, contingents must be able to deploy immediately on arrival. Therefore, they must arrive self-sufficient in tentage, sleeping equipment, field kitchens, camp stores, generators, refrigeration and vehicles.

#### CLASSES OF SUPPLY

40. The requirements for a force of 4,000 personnel for each of the supply commodities are as follows:

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a. Class 1 - Rations.

- (1) Contingents deploy with 90 days - to be reviewed.
- (2) The Force holding 20,000 for 3 month consumption.
- (3) Force Reserve 26,000 (one month with contingents and one month at combat supply platoon).
- (4) Fresh Ration delivery to commence within one month.
- (5) Force requirements for water - 420,000 litres/month. (based on 3 litres/person/day).
- (6) Force Requirements: packaged water 3 months 1,260,000 litres.
- (7) Force Reserve packaged water 840,000 litres (one month with unit, one month with combat supply platoon).

b. Class 2 - General Stores.

- (1) Contingents deploy with 90 days.
- (2) Supply Company holdings 90 days. (sourced locally in Uganda or Kenya by local purchase)
- (3) Consumption one month - 140,000 tons. Based on 1.1 kg per person per day.
- (4) Stocks at supply company 420,000 tons (90 days).

c. Class 3 - Petrol Oils and Lubricants.

- (1) Planning figures for one month's consumption:
 

Diesel	- 800,000 lt.
Gasoline	- 90,000 lt.
Jet A1	- 200,000 lt.
Oils and Greases	- 50,000 kg.
- (5) Required Force Reserve Holding - 3 months stock:
 

Diesel	- 1.5 million lt.
Gasoline	- 200,000 lt.
Jet A1	- 400,00 lt.
Oils and Greases	-

d. Class 4 - Defence and Construction Stores.

- (1) Concertina Barbed Wire - 2500 initially, then 500 per month.

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(2) Barbed Wire per month.	1500 initially, then 120
(3) Sand Bags 10,500 per month.	130,000 initially, then
(4) 8' Post Picket per month.	10,000 initially, then 800
(5) 6' Post Picket 2,900 per month.	36,000 initially, then
(6) 2' Post Picket 7,500 per month.	90,000 initially, then
(7) CG1 6' per month.	4,000 initially, then 350
(8) Tie Wire (5 KG) per month.	5,000 initially, then 400
(9) Timber 4" X 2" X 7'	70,000
(10) <u>Totals.</u>	TBC tons.

e. Class 5 - Ammunition:

- (1) Contingents arrive with 90 days holdings.
- (2) LCM required with each contingent home nation for resupply for all nations.

f. Class 6 - Welfare and Personal Demand Items. See Under G1 - Welfare.

g. Class 7 - Principal Items. Management of Principal items will be virtually nil, as there will be very few replacement items to manage. Contingents must arrive with all the equipment they need and replacement must be arranged through pre-negotiated LOAs.

h. Class 8 - Medical Stores.

- (1) Contingents arrive with 90 days stocks.
- (2) Replenishment stocks demanded through, and procured by, the medical element supporting the force. (It should be noted that the commercial markets in Kenya and Uganda are currently unable to support the existing UNAMIR requirement.)
- (3) An LOA with the country providing the medical facility may be appropriate.

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(4) For planning purposes, assume .5 kg/person/day.  
Force requirements = 2 ton per day.

- i. Class 9 - Repair Parts. Covered under Maintenance.
- j. Class 10 - Project Stores. Project Stores should be procured by local purchase or through HQ UNAMIR (CBMS).

#### MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY OF REPLACEMENT PARTS

41. Conditions. In addition to the assumptions covering the whole paper, the following conditions are considered essential to the successful maintenance support of the operation:

- a. Tradesmen must be thoroughly conversant with the operation and maintenance of equipment used by the deployed force.
- b. All tradesmen must deploy with complete tools and equipment necessary to provide the required level of support in a field environment.
- c. Maintenance elements must deploy with their full complement of vehicles, equipment and administration necessary to conduct field operations.
- d. Contingents must deploy with a full 90 days stocking level of repair parts, both first and second line.
- e. An LOA must be in place between UNNY and each contributing nation, prior to deployment, covering repair parts. The LOA should cover a period of at least 90 days.

42. The following options for maintenance support have been identified:

- a. Option 1. An existing, formed, military second line workshop (including repair, recovery and repair parts elements) deploys as part of an FMA located in Goma. Mobile elements could be detached to support operations as the battalions move from camp to camp. It may be difficult to find one workshop that has experience with all deployed equipment particularly if there is a mix of US, UK and former Soviet equipment in the force. This option has distinct command and control advantages but is unlikely to satisfy the conditions listed in the preceding paragraph.
- b. Option 2. Each contingent deploys with a second line maintenance element that would largely be brigaded into a maintenance organisation within the FMA. This would require a pre-defined command and control structure and the explicit, advanced agreement of the contributing countries to release their tradesmen, and associated repair parts support, on



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arrival. An overall command and control element would need to deploy as part of one of the contingents and its status would need to be agreed by all parties in advance. This would have the inherent advantage that its procedures and personalities would already be in place and could be augmented by other contributing nations. This option would satisfy all of the conditions listed above.

c. Option 3. Contingents deploy with an integral second line element which remains under the control of the parent contingent. The second line element would then be responsible for the provision of all second line support, including the provision of repair parts. It is unlikely that mobile units will want a slow and cumbersome second line tail following it around the camps.

d. Option 4. A contractor (ie Brown & Root) is tasked with the second and third line maintenance support of the force. This is impracticable, given the probable reduced notice to move and the lead time associated with the deployment of Brown & Root personnel. If this option were adopted, experience indicates that it would be appropriate to authorize Brown & Root, in advance, to procure any necessary tools and replacement parts if the operation is not to be jeopardized.

e. Limited Contractor Support. Some use of Brown & Root is not necessarily ruled out by the selection of one of the other options; they could be used to augment military capability or to provide specialist support, as required.

43. To satisfy the conditions listed above, it is considered that Option 2 is the best solution, with the command and control element being provided by one of the contributing countries. It must be re-iterated that, unless all of the conditions laid down in paragraph 2 are met, the Force may experience difficulties in maintaining itself in a mobile environment.

#### MAPS AND CHARTS

44. UNAMIR has had to work with inadequate mapping and charting of Rwanda and there is no reason to suppose that the situation for the new force will be any different. It is essential that the Force is provided with an adequate range and scale of maps and charts.

#### LOGISTIC COMMAND & CONTROL

45. There will clearly be a need for the normal G1/G4 staff within Force HQ. Given the inevitable interdependence between the Force and UNAMIR, it will be necessary to establish Logistic Los in Kigali, perhaps as part of a wider liaison organization.

46. There will also be a need for some command and control element as part of the FMA, for local administration, coordination etc - ie

a HQ FMA, in both areas. If one country takes the lead in providing logistic support troops, it might well provide a logistic support regimental HQ which would be ideal for this task.

#### LOGISTICS FOR FORCE HEADQUARTERS

47. In order to guarantee the smooth and rapid establishment of an effective operational headquarters, it is essential that a formed Headquarters unit be deployed, perhaps a squadron, including all administrative and logistic elements normally integral to such a field organization. It must be prepared to provide all aspects of routine support to all headquarters staff, regardless of nationality or contingent.

48. UNAMIR is itself short of much of the equipment which is required to establish a working headquarters. In particular, UNAMIR would be unable to provide vehicles, radios, photocopiers (and consumables) or computer equipment. The Force Headquarters must arrive self-contained in these, as in other, respects.

49. Depending on locations, it may be that the commander could assume responsibility for all local administrative matters, including that for the Goma FMA.

#### CONCLUSIONS

50. There is, as yet, insufficient information available to allow any detailed planning for operations in Zaire or to consider how the logistic support for such an operation might be mounted. A number of assumptions have been made and the results are, in some cases, sensitive to changes in these assumptions.

51. Detailed coordination of logistics between the Force and UNAMIR is essential.

52. There is a requirement for two FMAs to be established, one in the Goma area and another to the South, perhaps close to Cyangugu. Ideally, both would be located adjacent to airfields but the practicability of this needs to be confirmed by reconnaissance.

53. As far as possible, the requirements for the new Force should not transit through Kigali but, rather, should be flown in direct to the Goma area.

54. It is possible to begin to estimate the manpower and materiel requirements to support the Force, additional to any support which might be possible from UNAMIR. It is currently estimated that it will be impossible to provide logistic support for the force with less than 1,100 troops, including an element for the defence of the FMA but exclusive of the Force HQ itself; depending upon circumstances, the manpower requirement could rise to some 1,750. Work will continue to develop and refine the estimates contained in this paper.

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P7/17

LOGISTIC OPERATIONS IN ZAIRE - MANPOWER SUMMARY

Function	Sub-Function	Best Case	Worst Case
HQ FMA		20	20
Provost		75	75
Medical	In Goma	16	40
	In Kigali	18	36
Engr		150	150
	Kli-Cy Road	Nil	100
Air Tpt	2x C-130	40	50
	2x Med Hel	30	45
	Terminal + Mov Con	60	70
	Air Dispatch	Nil	12
Rd Tpt	Basic Task	260	270
	Kli-Cy	Nil	70
	Fuel Import	Nil	50
Tpt & Mov Coord		12	12
Supply	(incl C Sups)	120	160
Maint Wksp		100	120
FMA Defence		250	500
TOTALS		1,151	1,780



## OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: BARIL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: ANYIDHO, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 8 December 1994

NUMBER: MIR 2710

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE PEACE KEEPING OPERATION FOR THE RWANDAN REFUGEE CAMPS

## References:

- A. MIR 2300 dated 4 Nov 94.
- B. MIR 2322 dated 7 Nov 94.
- C. UNAMIR fax F/O 3051 dated 9 Nov 94.
- D. MIR 2408 dated 14 Nov 94.
- E. UNATIONS 3787 dated 18 Nov 94.
- F. UNATIONS 4025 dated 2 Dec 94.

UNAMIR  
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02

1. Thank you for your offer for UNAMIR to contribute further to the staffing of the plan for a possible operation in the Zairian refugee camps. Much advice has been already been provided at References A to D, copies of which are enclosed for ease of reference.

2. Paragraphs 18-25 of Reference E gave command guidance and framed in broad terms a concept of operations. There is to be a 2 phase operation to isolate the Former Government Forces and their political and militia elements from the remainder of the refugees in order to ensure the security of international relief workers, and provide protection for the storage and delivery of humanitarian assistance. In Phase One, 2 mechanised battalions are to enter camp sites and establish secure areas, by disarming the Disruptive Elements (DEs) and isolating them in holding areas. Once security has been achieved, they are to hand over responsibility for security to a locally trained force, and continue to the next site. In Phase Two, area security is to be provided by motorised units, operating at Company Group level, which will assume responsibility for a number of camps that were cleared in Phase One. Safe passage is to be provided for refugees to the border where UNAMIR Rwanda forces will assume responsibility for security during transit to and after arrival at home communes.

3. Mission. From Reference E I have deduced the following mission:

*"To create security conditions conducive to the voluntary repatriation of refugees, in order to encourage the return of Rwandan people from refugee camps in Zaire."*

4. Limitations. Limitations on the Mission are:

- a. The size of the assigned force is yet to be confirmed.
- b. The Mandate is yet to be formulated.
- c. ROE has not been established.
- d. I have been directed to initiate the operation in North Kivu.

5. Specified Tasks and Troops Required. Reference E specified the following tasks, from which a Troops to Task calculation has been drawn:



a. Provide Security for International Aid Workers. Currently there are over 70 NGO bodies in the Goma area, with a total expatriate strength of approximately 1000 souls. If benign security conditions persist, area protection in the form of vehicle and foot patrols will suffice. It will be a single company task. Should the situation deteriorate and the requirement for the aid workers to operate continue, this task alone will occupy one battalion. CRN 428 2/38

b. Provide Security for the Storage and Delivery of Humanitarian Supplies. There are over 30 storage sites and approximately 600 NGO personnel, delivering to 6 camps. In benign conditions this is a company task. In a deteriorated situation, a static guardforce will be required in addition to escorts, raising the requirement for troops to a 4 company battalion and an additional company.

c. Establish Screening Procedures to keep Weapons Outside the HPZ. For this task not to produce a heavy manpower bill, the DEs must be removed during the Phase One. The task can then be achieved by local security forces.

d. Provide Safe Passage for Refugees to the Rwandan Border. In benign conditions this will be a platoon task. In a deteriorated situation, protected vehicle escort convoys would be required. This would raise the manning cost to one mechanised company.

6. Implied Tasks. From those tasks the following implied tasks have been determined and information to assist:

a. Gain information on disruptive elements (DEs). This task should be given to the agency charged with the selection and training of the local security force. Additional technical assistance should be sought from member countries. See Reference A Paragraph 1.a.

b. Search for and confiscate weapons. Additional search training will be required for infantry troops. Detection equipment will be needed for search teams.

c. Apprehend DEs. The mandate for the Force must clearly define what activities are illegal, to allow the separation of DEs. The camp leaders can be expected to claim a legitimate right to exercise their authority over their people. If they remain within the law, their political influence may be extremely difficult to overcome.

d. Establish cage system. This will require a military guard force of up to one company, with some spare capacity.

e. Provide escort for DEs move away from HPZ. This will require up to one motorised company, with some spare capacity.

f. Provide EOD capability. This will require an EOD capability for each of the 2 mechanised battalions for detection and disposal of UXO.

g. Provide medical support. This task will require a first, second and third line medical capability. First line should be organic to the battalions, the remainder will be an additional Force Troops requirement. See Reference C.

h. Provide Protection for UNAMIR Troops and Materiel. The troops will self-protect. Materiel protection will require 250 - 500 troops. See Reference C.

- i. Participate in Coordination of Humanitarian Activity. This will be a function of the Zairian operation FC's staff. CRN 428
- j. Coordinate Repatriation. This will be a function of the FC's staff, in conjunction with UNAMIR and Rwandan agencies. 3/38
- k. Provide Escorts to Border. See Paragraph 4.d. above. It will require a mechanised force of between a platoon and a company.
- l. Provide Security for Safe Corridors in Rwanda including the Coordination of Welcome Centres and Transport. This will be a UNAMIR Rwanda task.
- m. Coordinate C<sup>2</sup> with UNAMIR Rwanda. This will be a responsibility of UNAMIR FC's staff who will coordinate with the Zairian operation.
- n. Coordinate Log Sp. with UNAMIR Rwanda. This will be a responsibility of UNAMIR FC's staff who will coordinate with the Zairian operation.
- o. Produce Public Information plan. This will be a function of the Zairian operation FC's staff, in consultation with SRSg.
- p. Traffic Control. This will require an MP capability to coordinate vehicle and personnel traffic flow. See Reference C.

7. Factors.

a. Enemy/Ground.

(1) Numbers. The size of the problem relative to my strength forces me to phase my operation.

(2) Weapons. It is not considered likely that the RGF will mount a conventional military operation against UN forces, therefore I do not need conventional force ratios to achieve my mission. They are likely, however, to assist DEs in the provision of weapons, so I should be prepared to encounter RPG, MMG, grenades, small arms, mines and booby traps.

(3) Tactics. It is likely, that the enemy will either escape quickly, or use small scale actions to disrupt my activity, and tie down my forces. To counter this I must channelise and block the enemy from the outset, and maximise an overt presence and an effective reactive capability.

(4) Civil Disturbance. The enemy is likely to incite local civil disturbance, to maintain control, therefore I require crowd control equipment and my troops must be trained appropriately. Sound understanding and strict adherence to the ROE will be essential.

(5) Ground. The ground is flat, but the volcanic rock is extremely damaging to wheeled vehicles when moving off-road. Within the camps the access roads are extremely narrow. The 6 camps are extremely large (Katale has 250,000 occupants) and are not separated by any definable geographic feature. I must divide them into tactical sectors and subsectors according to the size of the manoeuvre elements. I must also consider the best disposition and force requirement to establish the HPZ. I must plan a mix of wheeled and tracked vehicles, and establish

a traffic flow system within camps. This will be a task for an MP Unit. I must plan additional ES to deal with wheel and track maintenance. I must have engineer defence stores to establish effective boundaries within my AORs.

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4/38

b. Operational Security. Operational surprise will not be achievable due to its impracticality. Since the operation has to be conducted sequentially tactical surprise will also be unlikely, as the enemy will easily deduce what my successive objectives are to be. I can, however, plan small deception operations, to assist me to maintain the initiative, and keep the enemy off balance. I can also achieve limited surprise by concealing the precise timings of my operations. Area security can be afforded by the motorised battalion operating in a screen or guard role. The training agency for the local security force should be given the task of assisting in my surveillance plan.

c. Time. I have been given between 24-30 months to conduct the operation which requires the pacification of 870,000 refugees in North Kivu, and 370,000 in the South. Given a 20% planning margin, my operation will require to neutralise camp areas to the total of 35,500 refugees per month to achieve the task in 30 months. I cannot achieve this with the force available to me. The situation may change as the operation develops, and camps increasingly "melt down", but if they do not I will need additional time.

d. Logistics. To support the Zairian operation a logistic service battalion will be required, since there will be a requirement for forward support. Since logistics will assume such importance, the selection of a fully capable unit will be vital. For stocks, sustainability and tasks see Reference C.

8. Constraints. Appropriate ROE is a vital precondition of deployment. See Reference D Paragraph 20.a.

9. Additional Concepts to be Developed. Prior to the plan being developed there are a number of additional concepts that require consideration. These have not been explored in this paper since they are, in the main, dependant on the size of the force, but are included for your consideration.

a. Task Organisation.

b. Concept of Manoeuvre.

- (1) How mission is to be achieved.
- (2) Effect to be imposed on DEs, and for how long.
- (3) Force posture.
- (4) Axis of effort.
- (5) Determination of Objectives and Phases.

c. C<sup>2</sup> Arrangements.

- (1) Tactical missions.
- (2) Command relationships.
- (3) Provision of Rear Link Communications.

(4) Locations of CPs.

d. Rear Area Operations.

e. Employment of Tactical Reserves. Note that UNAMIR will supply the reserve at the operational level.

f. Employment of Helicopters. Note that UNAMIR has no spare capacity.

g. Logistic Concept. See Reference C.

h. Engineer Concept.

i. Withdrawal Concept/Contingency Plans.

j. Liaison/Coordination Concept.

k. DE/Detainee Handling Concept.

l. Public Information/Psyops Concept.

m. Military Information Collection Concept.

n. Operational Deployment Concept.

10. Early Selection of Commander. While fully understanding the difficulties that the Secretary General has experienced in securing offers of troops from member countries, I restate the importance of the early nomination of the Force Commander for the Zairian part of the operation, to allow his input to planning and the formulation of a mandate and ROE.

11. Best regards.

UN RESTRICTED

①


To : FHQ (Ops)

From : MILOB GP HQ

Date : 08 Dec 94

Sub : SITUATION IN GOMA AREA CAMPS AS AT 081200 HRS DEC 94.

Attached please find a copy on the above mentioned subject for your information.

  
M NAIN HASSAN  
Sqn Ldr  
For CMO

② G3 Plans  
Pls hold for UNNY planning Tm.

  
DCOS Ops  
10.12

UN RESTRICTED



**TO: MILOB HQ KIGALI**

**INFO: HQ UNAMIR KIGALI // FC / DCOS //** ✓  
**CO TUNBAT**

**FROM: COMD HQ MILOB SECTOR 5**

**SUBJ: SITUATION IN GOMA AREA CAMPS AS AT 081200 HRS DEC 94**

**1. MILOB Sector 5 HAC TM LDR met today with A/Director UNHCR GOMA and Senior Protection Officer to discuss the current situation in Goma and the area of the camps**

**GOMA SITUATION**

**2. Investigation of the recent incidents in the area of KATALE CAMP is now complete. A total of 27 Rwandese are known to have been killed in this incident with some 77 wounded. This serious incident has caused not only a general heightening of tension in the region but has led to some friction between the local Zaire government ( which did not sanction the military handling of the affair ) and Zaire civilians in this region. The mayor of GOMA is scheduled to meet 08 Dec 94 with the A/Director UNHCR Goma to discuss what steps may be taken to prevent such problems in the future.**

**3. The Zaire army has further increased tensions by ordering, apparently unilaterally, Rwandese refugees living outside of current "official" camps to move. UNHCR Goma confirms that the refugees were given no clear direction to move into the sponsored camps. That they are doing so is strictly a function of their seeking some form of protection under the umbrella of the UN and NGO aid agencies there. At this time an estimated 120,000 persons are in the process of moving from their former locations in the "unofficial" camps and other areas of concentration. The Zaire army is yet to take any steps to provide security to these persons despite requests from UNHCR Goma through the local government.**

**4. UNHCR Goma has initiated steps to assist in the movement of these persons to the established camps. In addition to the problems of providing transport, UNHCR notes the following problems:**

- a. as camp populations are increased ( KATALE camp is expected to double in size ) there has been no agreement reached with the Zaire government to establish new camp boundries i.e. increase the physical size of the camps. Overcrowding in the camps has in the past led directly to security incidents.**
- b. the introduction of the "new" populations into the camps changes the nature of those camps i.e. new chefs de commune ( many not yet under the influence of the current camp "leadership", etc. Again, an increase in violent incidents is possible and probable.**

5. Most pressing concerns vis-a-vis security in the Goma area camps at this time continue to be:

- a. security of UN/NGO staffs in Goma;
- b. security of UN/NGO staffs working in the camps; and
- c. prevention of security incidents among camp populations.

**PROPOSAL FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF A  
MILITARY LIASON OFFICE IN ZAIRE**

6. UNHCR GOMA discussed a proposal currently under discussion between that office and Geneva concerning the establishment of a "Military Liason Office" in Zaire. The purpose of this office would be to provide an interface between UNHCR and the Zaire military / garde civil that is both creditable and knowledgeable. Possible organization and status of this office was discussed in general terms. UNHCR GOMA views the likelihood of a UN or multi-national military/police intervention in the Zaire camps as being remote at this time. They therefor view the introduction of a military liason office as a workable immediate solution to their daily problems with the Zaire military.

7. Finally, A/Director UNHCR GOMA expressed some concern with the passage of information and the accuracy of that information through various channels to the SRSG in Kigali. The Chief Protection Officer expressed her satisfaction with the present close cooperation with MILOB Sector 5 and with the mutual exchange of information of mutual interest. The regular meetings of the UNHCR GOMA Protection/Security staff and MILOB Sector 5 continue to be an effective medium for this exchange.

8. The A/Director closed the meeting by again requesting the opportunity to directly discuss the Goma situation and other concerns directly with the Force Commander at an early opportunity.



**AM Austdal**  
**LCol**  
**Comd MILOB Sector 5**

5000.11 (PLANS)

UNAMIR SENDING CODE CABLE

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CRN 428 6/38

TO: BARIL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
FROM: TOUSIGNANT, UNAMIR, KIGALI  
DATE: 4 November 1994  
NUMBER: MIR 2300  
SUBJECT: SECURITY IN THE RWANDESE REFUGEE CAMPS

*J. Tousignant*

Reference:

A. UNAMIR fax 2125 dated 3 Oct 94 (Force Structure Appreciation).

1. Thank you for UNATIONS 3613, which was a copy of the minutes of your meeting on 1 Nov. The notes indicate a most positive attitude which I welcome. Let me state clearly at the outset that this military plan will come to nothing if the security situation within Rwanda is not addressed. That must remain the key to the unlocking of the regional crisis. With regard to the Secretariat's continuing work on security in the Rwandese camps, I consider that option (a) - a peacekeeping force - should be favoured, with an inclusion of limited support from option (b) - Zairian forces. Option (c) - funding and equipment support to Tanzania, should also be pursued. The 2 areas which will affect this plan at a strategic level are intelligence and logistics.

a. Intelligence. The difficulties in the collection of intelligence cannot be overstressed. Work must begin now. No collection means should be discounted. This will break new ground for the UN and will require hard bargaining to secure agreement, but there is an immediate need to recruit an agency capable of sophisticated collection and analysis. The use of technical means, cash inducement, infiltration and straight observation will all be necessary.

b. Logistics. The operation will stand or fall on its logistic support. If the experience of UNAMIR is used as a yardstick, its success is unlikely: 5 full months after the second UNAMIR resolution (SC 925/1994 dated 8 Jun) I remain short of troops, weapons and



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equipment, and woefully short of daily maintenance items. For this future operation to work the logistics must be on the ground before D Day. Troops must be self sufficient, either by bringing their own equipment or being provided a complete issue by a donor country, with time to train with it, before Day 1.

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2. My comments below refer to the Paragraphs in your document.

1. No comment.

2. Zairian forces must be involved in the UN military operation. The issue is one of finding a suitable task for them. I feel that they would be best used in Lines of Communication duties, Rear Area Security etc. My recce team will testify that some among the Zairian forces were respected by the refugees, so with appropriate selection and training, a useful force may be available. This, of course, will incur a time penalty. The C2 of Zairian forces within the AOR requires detailed consideration. All Zairian forces within AOR must be OPCON to the UN FC of the Zairian mission.

3.

a. Gendarmerie. While the use of Gendarmerie could be included in a plan, I feel their influence would be extremely marginal, in the short to medium term. The Rwandan gendarmerie is a heavily attrited force, having been in the front line during both the 90 and the 94 campaigns, hence few remain. Of that number, how will acceptable individuals be identified and selected? How reliable will they be and how heavily will they be infiltrated by ex-govt agencies. How long will their training take?

b. Chapter 6 Peacekeeping Force.

(1) The first principle to confirm is that the operation will be conducted with the full compliance and support of the Zairian and Tanzanian governments. That given, I agree with the concept of a force working within Chapter 6, since there are no warring factions. But within Chapter 6 an appropriate mandate must be developed to allow the FC sufficient elbow room to deal with any deterioration of the

situation. The prospective FC should be involved from the earliest stage in the development of the mandate. I am also very willing to offer assistance from my staff to assist in its development. GRN 428 8/38

(2) The UN agencies and NGOs must support the operation since they will be required to adjust the flow and type of aid to encourage refugee withdrawal to their communes.

(3) Note that in the Zairian/Tanzanian peacekeeping operation there may be difficulty in aligning the political priorities which influence the decision on which camp is to be tackled first, with the practicalities of the military task in achieving them: geography, logistics and threat will be significant factors.

(4) But the overarching requirement remains the establishment of a satisfactory security situation within Rwanda, since only this will encourage the Rwandan people to return to their communes in peace.

c. UNAMIR's Responsibilities to Refugees. UNAMIR will willingly take responsibility for the refugees when they recross into Rwanda.

d. Op RONDAVAL. We are currently developing a plan for the return of DPs to their homes. It was briefed by me to the Vice President today (Fri 4 Nov) and will be presented by SRSG to the Secretary General on Tue 8 Nov. Its start date is currently planned to be 1 Mar 95. In essence it is a joint BBGNU/UN/NGO operation which utilises all the resources available from the international community, coordinated by a central Task Force in Rwanda. Op RONDAVAL can work in synergy with the refugee return: they are complementary and can be conducted simultaneously. This will, however, have a significant effect on the logistic demands on my force.

4. Your notes leave unaddressed the parent body or providing countries of the "international security personnel". I can think of no commercial security firm capable of mounting an operation as envisaged;

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their position in international law is also untested. My appreciation delivered at the Reference indicates the size of force needed for the task, so I believe that an international civpol of 600 would be insufficient. It would be unable to match any increased threat, and would bring with it concomitant logistic, C2 and training concerns. Experience here suggests that the operation would take nearer to 4-6 months to be established, vice 4-6 weeks. CRN 428  
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5. Refer to my comment above at Sub-paragraphs 3.b. and 3.d.

6. I fully support the issue of provision of funds to allow the BBGNU to restart their administrative machinery. To address the issue of reintegration of the armies I strongly advise a training programme, run by member states and including officer and NCO training. This has been a feature of the reconciliation process of many former adversaries within Africa. What prevents UN forces from participating in the reconciliation process in this area?

7. Agree. See Brig Gen Anyidoho's Zairian technical recce report.

8. Refer to my appreciation at the Reference. I believe that the combat strength required for this limited mission should be 3 battalions, 2 of which should be mechanised. In addition there needs to be engineer, signals, transport, mechanical repair, aviation, medical, logistics and movement control, all at squadron size. Add a staff and civpol and the force should number 4000. With only 2 battalions, the figure would reduce to 3000.

9. My staff were unable to enlighten me as to the military concept of bubble operations. They remain submerged in their thick soup of conventional military practice and await, breathless, for this oxygen of inspiration.

10.

a. C2 within the Region. I would expect SRSg to be made the political supremo of the regional operation. The C2 of the Tanzanian operation requires to be linked to that of the operations in Zaire and Rwanda, since they are mutually supporting. There needs to be a military cell (I suggest collocated with UNAMIR) to coordinate SRSg's direction into

military language. (S)

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b. Location of Logistic and Mounting Bases for Operations.

The Tanzanian operation should be mounted from that country. For Zaire, a full military estimate will obviously be required, however I include some preliminary considerations. The Zairian operation is influenced by the requirement to begin the operation in the South, to start on the smaller of the 2 problem areas, and to prevent leakage of militia into Burundi. Bukavu airstrip cannot take aircraft larger than C130 equivalents, which suggests that Kigali should be used as the primary airhead for troop arrival and logistic support. This would require an additional logistic cell in Kigali, and some expeditionary accommodation. Road improvements to the Zairian border are being staffed at present. Given the road improvement, road movement could complement air transport from Kigali to Bukavu. This would require additional transport assets to be provided. As the operation advances into Goma, the logistic chain would take advantage of its better airstrip.

11. Refer to my comment at Sub-paragraph 8.

12. Chapter 6 is adequate, given an appropriate mandate. Refer to Sub-paragraph 3.b. above. The considerable requirement for equipment, movement and planning support cannot be overstressed. I welcome the US government's offer of assistance in these areas. A complete shopping list is required at the earliest stage, to allow an appreciation of the scale of the requirement, and to give contributing states the opportunity to contribute where they feel best suited.

3. Force Reduction within UNAMIR. I have expressed that the security situation within Rwanda is crucial to this plan. I am currently under remit to reduce my force to its mandated ceiling of 5500, which is approximately my current strength. At present I find that I have to juggle forces to produce a deployable reserve, even before I am asked to deal with the return of 2 million persons in an increasingly more tense security situation, from 3 points of the compass. To achieve the reduction to the mandated ceiling it will be necessary to reduce to 5 battalions and 3 companies, a loss of one battalion. Within the overall reduction I may lose Frafbatt, a francophone battalion. As such its importance in presentational terms is significant. It

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will assume even greater significance as the cultural mix of the population alters with the return of the Hutus. I ask you to reconsider the force reduction, to raise my ceiling to approximately 6000, and also to pursue the possibility of replacing or rotating Frafbatt with another francophone battalion of similar strength. This would allow me to maintain a force structure of 6 battalions and 3 companies.

4. Best regards.

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
FROM: TOUSIGNANT, UNAMIR, KIGALI  
DATE: 7 November 1994  
NUMBER: MIR 2322  
SUBJECT: WORKING PAPER FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S CONSULTATIONS  
IN GENEVA - UNAMIR OBSERVATIONS  
References:

- A. MIR 2300 dated 4 Nov 94 (Security in Rwandese Refugee Camps).  
B. UNATIONS 3659 dated 4 Nov 94 (Working Paper).

1. Thank you for your Reference B, which I assume was transmitted prior to your receipt of my Reference A. The rapidly deteriorating security situation in the Goma camps is now giving the Zairian operation a dynamic of its own. The operation may now need to be conducted in 2 separate phases: an initial security operation, mounted in the near future, which seeks to wrest control of the camps from the hostile elements and take control of the aid distribution system; and a subsequent operation to return the refugees to Rwanda.

2. At Reference A I have addressed many of the points which you raise, and so do not intend to restate them. I will, however, restate that the military plan will stand and fall on intelligence and logistics, and that ultimately it is the security situation within Rwanda that will predicate any decision on the part of the refugees to leave their camps. My comments below refer to the paragraphs in Reference B.

Paragraph 5. There are additional significant factors of a more pragmatic nature that deter the refugees' return:

a. There has been little tangible evidence of improvement in security within Rwanda.

b. The lack of a police force or judiciary, a land commission, tools seeds and hoes in sufficient quantity, and basic materials for the refurbishment of housing in the communes have all influenced the refugees to stay.

c. There is a dearth of hard evidence to prove the sincerity of the BBGNU's statements of reconciliation with former government officials.

Not taken  
Paragraph 6. You may wish to add as a concluding sentence " The conditions demanded of the leaders could be addressed by a plan that UNAMIR is presently offering: a joint BBGNU/UN/NGO operation which utilises all the resources available from the international community, coordinated by a central Task Force in Rwanda."

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Not taken  
Paragraphs 8, 9, 10 and 11. The analysis on which the threat assessment is based in these paragraphs is sound but I must stress that it is based on unsubstantiated information. Please consider adding "This underscores the need for a sophisticated and detailed intelligence operation which should be initiated at the earliest opportunity."

Paragraph 14. The current position with regard to the UNAMIR radio station is that UNAMIR has staffed its request through BBGNU for permission to transmit, but a licence has not yet been granted. A decision whether or not to acknowledge BBGNU authority in this area is pending. Technical engineering and initial programme production work is complete. Programmes could be transmitted within the Kigali area immediately. Providing that planned installations of repeaters are conducted to schedule, coverage to Zaire and throughout Rwanda could be achieved within 3 weeks.

Paragraph 15.

Not taken  
a. Troops to Task to achieve missions given for Operations in 30,000-strong Camps. My staff has estimated that a battalion of 800 could be expected to carry out the missions given only within an AOR bounded by a 1.5 km square, depending on terrain. This will make it unlikely that camps of 30,000 inhabitants could be considered a single battalion task. It also places most linear camps beyond the scope of one battalion. The analysis is as follows: given a bayonet strength within the battalion of 600 and a 50% factor for self protection, reserve and relief, the 24/7 operating force would be 300. The requirement to escort NGOs, guard sites, maintain a patrolling presence and a quick response force, seriously reduces the numbers available for an effective cordon, thus limiting the size of the AOR. This will slow the operation.

Not taken  
b. Operational Command. Because UNAMIR is identified by the refugees as part of the problem and as such has lost impartiality in their eyes, the UN Zairian force should be seen to be a separate mission. But for SRSG to command both, and for a myriad of operational reasons which I need not rehearse to a military

reader, the missions must be linked, although they will operate under different mandates. I propose that I, as SRSg's military advisor, be made FC of the joint operation and operate from Kigali with a small staff, retain OPCON of all forces, and retain centralised command of an element of logistics. Both UNAMIR and the Zairian operation should be commanded each by a brigadier general, operating from Zaire and Kigali respectively. This will provide the separation which is necessary for presentational reasons, but maintain the sound principal of unity of command. 1

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c. Logistic Support. Refer to Paragraph 1.b. of Reference A. Logistical support to the present UNAMIR operation is of critical concern to me. I struggle to support my force, quite literally scraping the barrel day by day, and I remain unacceptably short of daily maintenance items. I strongly recommend that you do not consider the operation without first establishing a robust logistic system based on conventionally established military criteria of sustainability and expenditure rates. To support the Zairian operation a logistic service battalion will be required, since I envisage the requirement for forward support. Since logistics will assume such importance, the selection of a fully capable unit is vital. This will limit your choice of which nations to approach with this request. To avoid delay to the operation logistic requirements that involve long lead times should be identified soonest and ordered. The need for mapping and imagery will be significant and should not be overlooked. To facilitate planning, my staff has begun a logistic estimate.

As a result

#### Paragraph 16.

a. Selection of UN Forces. This enterprise will be one of the most difficult low-intensity operations yet attempted. Your stated requirement in this Paragraph that the force is to be well trained and equipped is welcomed. Ideally the force should come from a single nation, but I accept the obvious difficulties in this. Within the infantry battalions however, the option of a composite force should be discounted. Cohesiveness and common, practiced, operating procedures will both be vital characteristics of the force.

a. Selection of Tracked or Wheeled APCs. A terrain assessment should be conducted before a choice is made between the procurement of wheeled or tracked APCs. UNAMIR has experienced severe problems with tyre wear when operating wheeled APCs in the



volcanic areas of Rwanda, caused by lava rock. While I would prefer to operate wheeled APCs inside camps rather than tracked vehicles, because they look and sound less aggressive to refugees, the terrain should influence the decision. Within the limitations of restricted access of UNAMIR to Goma and the camps, if you wish I will task my staff to investigate this problem. CMT  
4  
CR  
157

b. Choice of Initial Operating Area. Your paper indicates that you plan to begin the operation in the northern camps. In this most difficult enterprise the scheme of manoeuvre is crucial to success. It will be influenced by many factors and so requires to be subjected to the command estimate process. I have some initial observations:

(1) The option of a discrete northern operation would demonstrate the resolve of the UN to act quickly, and may deal with the immediate problem. It may also serve to allow an escape route into Burundi for the hostile elements, which could result in a transfer of the problem, rather than its solution. It also places an untried force at the heart of a most difficult and unique military problem where from Day 1 it has to operate against the toughest and best organised threat.

(2) A southern option would begin the operation in the south around Bukavu, where the camps are smaller and less militant. Early success there would send signals to the refugees in the north who may then gain confidence to challenge the influence of the hostile elements even before any military operation reached Goma. It would also seal the Burundi border, removing one avenue of escape. It would not, however, tackle the most immediate and deteriorating security situation in Goma at the outset.

(3) A combined operation, where forces are inserted north and south simultaneously, must also be considered. A small southern force could prevent or reduce the spillage of refugees into Burundi.

All options have merit, and so I suggest that a decision is withheld until a full military estimate is conducted.

c. Screening Procedures.

(4) Criteria. The first 2 military tasks given in your Paragraph 15 (protect NGO personnel and materiel) could be conducted without any screening of the population. It is the third task (assist the safe passage of refugees to Rwanda) that produces the further implied task of screening the population. The criteria for separation must fall within international law and be clearly expressed to the military commander. Thus, it may be legitimate to separate any armed element, and anyone whose name appears on a list, of alleged genocide perpetrators. It becomes much more difficult to support the separation of personnel on grounds of their political persuasion, or merely from reports that an individual has been seen assisting in the day to day organisation of the refugee camp. So the separation of hostile elements will be a most complex issue. CRW 3  
SAFE  
CRW 4  
16/3

(5) Implications. The concept of screening implies a requirement for sound intelligence. It also implies that the force must anticipate and be equipped to deal with violence: the hostile elements are most unlikely to allow themselves to be separated from the population that provides them their power and their sanctuary from the process of law. The screening process will produce an additional caging and guarding requirement as the hostile elements are separated from innocent refugees. Not addressed

d. Choice of Indigenous Security Forces. Who to select as a police force is a thorny issue. The established command structure within the camps has been thoroughly compromised by hostile elements. A "sheriff" approach which allows communes to elect their own policeman may also perpetuate the undesirable element and reinforce the current hierarchy. The system currently exploited of using paid "scouts" who operate in protection gangs is workable in the short term, but cannot be considered as a nucleus for a responsible future civic force in Rwanda. It may be necessary to remove a number of screened citizens from the camps at the beginning of the operation for gendarmerie training in Rwanda, returning them to their communes about 3 months later as policemen, while in the interim relying for security within the camps on Zairian Army, civpol and scout groups. Not to be done

3. To summarise, you rightly state that the groups would object to being moved from the camps. But of greater significance is that, under all options, that prior to movement they must be separated. They know that, once

separated, they will be a greatly weaker force, and so will fight. The finesse in this operation lies in the separation of the groups (the distance and period of separation are secondary issues) so I cannot overstate the sophistication that we will need to employ to ensure we succeed.

4. Best regards.



From: Col K P O'Kelly  
DCOS (Sp)  
HQ UNAMIR

①

40001/LOG-34

Extn: 11109


To: MA to FC  
MA to DFC/COS/CMO  
DCOS (Ops)  
DCMO  
Chief HAC

Date: 8 Nov 94

Subject: ZAIRE


1. I have continued to work on the paper I circulated this morning and now enclose a further copy which will form the basis of the discussion tomorrow.

2. There are no major changes, but the new draft includes an estimate of the total logistic manpower requirement. The detail which supports this calculation is not given in the paper, but I also enclose a table which illustrates the working.

  
K P O'KELLY  
Col  
DCOS (Sp)

② G3 Plans

1. For your review, esp 40.d.
2. Pls return/discuss.

  
DCOS ops  
9.11

③ DCOS OPS

1. Para 34 TAC(SR) a/cft.
2. Possibility of AD capability is agreed
3. See note at para 40d.

  
G3 Plans  
10/11

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POTENTIAL OPERATIONS TO CLEAR REFUGEE CAMPS IN ZAIRE

LOGISTIC CONSIDERATIONS

BACKGROUND

1. Outline planning is now under way to consider military options for the clearance of the camps holding Rwandan refugees in Zaire. It is envisaged that any such operation will be mounted by troops separate from those now in UNAMIR. While the command and control arrangements for such an operation have yet to be determined, it is already clear that there will need to be a degree of coordination of the logistics to support both this new force and the current UNAMIR and, at one end of the range of logistic options, is the obvious possibility that the support of the 2 forces may be totally integrated.

2. It is well documented that the current level of support for UNAMIR is, at best, precariously hand-to-mouth and, in some areas wholly inadequate. If implemented, Op RONDAVAL - which is wholly complementary to operations within the camps in Zaire - will place increasing demands upon the existing system. The addition of the requirement to support another substantial force, acting far from the logistic centre of gravity of UNAMIR, possibly engaged in operations under Chapter VII and in a hostile and demanding environment would inevitably overstretch existing capabilities, paralyzing the operation of both forces.

3. Experience within UNAMIR shows that it is not possible to rely even on equipment fundamentally necessary to the achievement of the mission being provided through UN sources within 150 days. It is clearly not too early to start considering the logistic implications of mounting such an operation, even though G3 planning has not yet started in earnest; indeed, logistic considerations could well have a marked influence on the operational plan.

AIM

4. The aim of this paper is to consider the logistic implications of the proposed operations in Zaire.

POSSIBLE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

5. While outline operational concepts have been identified, no decision has been made as to which option should be adopted, let alone any work on the development of a plan being carried out. But, while all of the options which have been identified imply a substantial logistic task, one option is logistically significantly more complex than the others; as this represents the reasonable worst case, and to simplify the task of analysis, this option has been adopted for examination.

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6. Under this option, it is proposed that the Force will consist of up to 4 battalions (or equivalent) - 2 mechanized and the remainder with integral troop carrying vehicles sufficient to move the entire unit - plus appropriate support elements. The Force is likely to be augmented by selected Zairian forces who may, for example, be allocated L of C duties.
7. The mechanized battalions will move into selected camps with the aim of eliminating the power currently wielded by the agencies of the former Government of Rwanda which, it is assessed, is the major factor in preventing the majority of refugees from returning home.
8. After an appropriate period, the mechanized elements will move on to other camps, leaving more lightly equipped forces (one battalion) to maintain the newly imposed security. This process will continue until all the camps have been dealt with.
9. The political imperative is for the camps in the Goma area to be addressed first. In order to prevent a large scale movement of refugees, particularly those who wish to cause trouble to the BBGNU within Rwanda, into Burundi, it may well be that further forces (probably a battalion, perhaps augmented by light armoured reconnaissance vehicles) would deploy into the south of Zaire to act as a cut off group.
10. No role has been identified, thus far, for UN Military Observers or Civ Pol in the early stages of the operation. While they may have a role in the latter stages, their support is not considered further.

ASSUMPTIONS

11. Timescale. Both for political reasons and in order to achieve surprise (thus preventing the flight of troublemakers) it is likely that the operation will be mounted at short notice). It follows that it will be essential for units to arrive as formed, fully equipped bodies with adequate integral logistic support elements. Even if it is planned that Zairian forces are to be used in certain roles, their immediate availability cannot be assumed. For all aspects of the operation within Zaire, the Force must initially plan on being totally self-contained.
12. Political Cooperation. It is implicit in the planning of this operation that full cooperation is granted by both the Zairian and Rwandan authorities. In logistic terms, for example, the operation must be guaranteed freedom of passage across borders to allow the support of deployed forces. It is not inconceivable that even first line support will cross national boundaries. Although less important, the full cooperation of the Ugandan authorities would be of great assistance.

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13. Coordination of Logistic Effort. Whatever the eventual command and control relationship between UNAMIR and the forces deployed in Zaire, there will be a need for effective coordination of the logistic support for both forces. Kigali will inevitably be the focus of activity for the support of the new operation although it is not implicit that all support need flow through Kigali if suitable alternative facilities exist. In this context, the airport at Goma is capable of receiving all types of aircraft while that at Cyangugu is C-130 capable. It is believed that while Goma can accept all types of aircraft, its total daily capacity is limited and it may not be possible to assume its use for the arrival of all materiel into theatre. Security of the Goma airfield must be established at the start of the operation.

14. Humanitarian Assistance. The operation has the aim of encouraging refugees to move from their present locations and, if successful, will be comparatively short (15-30 months). There is already considerable humanitarian assistance available in the area from UN agencies and NGOs. The proposed force should not have any planned role in the provision of humanitarian assistance to refugees, except in such instances as rapid evacuation of casualties to where assistance from a more appropriate source is available. This has implications for the amount of logistic support which must be provided.

15. Support to Other Agencies. It is been a feature of UNAMIR operations that the Force receives a constant stream of requests for the diversion of scarce resources to other UN agencies. The logistic support planning for the military aspects of the Zaire operation cannot predict what support will be requested by these agencies, many of whom are already well established in the area, and it is assumed that no materiel or other administrative support will be provided to them.

16. Contractor Support. Contractors can provide elements of the necessary support for this operation. While they have the inherent disadvantage that they cannot mobilize as quickly as military forces, Brown & Root have shown the ability to react well once their firm base is established. Contractor support can not be ruled out.

APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM

17. There is not yet any indication of how the operation will be mounted and, consequently, it is not practicable to consider a matching logistic deployment plan. At this stage it is only possible to identify the requirements for the mature logistic situation; this will be valuable in identifying the required force structure but will also act as an aide-memoire when considering logistics for various mounting options.

18. Because force structures are not defined, it will only be possible to develop very rough calculations as to the size of the

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logistic task. It cannot be over-emphasised that any figures which follow are only estimates, but should be in the right order of magnitude.

OUTLINE MATURE LOGISTIC CONCEPT

19. Given the distance between Kigali and Goma, more particularly, the time taken to travel between these locations, and the nature of the operations to be conducted, it is not practicable to provide second line support from Kigali. A Forward Maintenance Area (FMA) is essential. Reconnaissance (planned within the next couple of days) will be necessary to confirm its practicability, but the natural choice would be adjacent to Goma airfield. It should be noted that this is within Zaire, with all the concomitant problems that may arise; in particular a strong force will be required to protect the FMA and guarantee the integrity of the operation. Suitable troops should be included in the ORBAT of the Force, rather than misemploying forces whose primary task is within the camps.

20. In principle, all stocks for the Zaire force arriving in theatre should be delivered, by strategic transport, direct to Goma - only exceptionally should they transit through Kigali.

21. The FMA should hold 7-30 days stock of combat items; this will be equivalent to ?? tons. **Note: Direction is required here but the calculations below have assumed 30 days. Note that higher reserve levels, once in place, mean that there is less need for guaranteed daily replenishment and, hence, greater risks can be taken in the design of the resupply system.**

22. The southern element of the force will require its own, parallel FMA. Again, there is the natural choice of basing it adjacent to the airfield at Cyangugu. Initially, this FMA will be smaller than the one to the North, but as the operation progresses and forces move southward, its dependency will increase. Furthermore, as this FMA may be in Rwanda, there is the possibility that UNAMIR troops in Sector 4 could draw their routine support from it rather than looking to Kigali; this could improve the level of support provided to those forces from its present level. As the airfield cannot accept anything larger than a C-130, it cannot be considered a strategic airhead. It will need to be determined whether this FMA is to be supported from Goma or Kigali - the necessary resources do not currently exist to support it from Kigali but it would be a difficult operation to establish 2 FMAs simultaneously, with one being a satellite of the other. It may be that the compromise would be for the southern FMA to be established through Kigali - strategic airlift into Kigali, cross-load onto smaller aircraft and fly to Cyangugu - but the cargo handling and movement control capability at Kigali International Airport would need to be boosted substantially before this could be considered viable. For subsequent replenishment, routine air re-supply (from either of the strategic airheads - Kigali and Goma) should not be



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the primary means of support - although an emergency capability must exist - and there is no suitable road Goma-Cyangugu. The following options exist:

a. By Road - Kigali-Cyangugu. This is the only practicable option for support to be provided from UNAMIR. The additional capability would need to be provided - **it cannot be met from current UNAMIR resources.** In addition to the transport itself, there will be a requirement for Engineer support to maintain the road (some 200km); its rebuilding is the subject of EU aid, which indicates its condition, but the rebuild itself will not take place in time for this operation. The need for route defence to ensure integrity of support will also need to be considered.

b. By Water - Goma-Cyangugu. It is possible that re-supply could be carried out using commercial barges on Lake Kivu. While overall capacity is limited, it is certainly adequate to support the southern element of the Force.

G1 MATTERS

23. Reinforcements. Given the proximity of the 2 forces, it may be appropriate to consider the extent to which UNAMIR could initially establish a reception area at Goma prior to the arrival of the first of the new Force. This clearly has implications for concurrent UNAMIR operations and will need to be considered in conjunction with the G3 staff. Points to be considered include: transit accommodation; rations and water; UN Identity Cards and Driving Permits; issue of UN accoutrements; arrival briefing; etc. **Depending upon the precise nature of the reception assistance provided by UNAMIR, it may be necessary to review the UNAMIR mandate and obtain clearance from governments providing contingents to UNAMIR.**

24. Discipline - General. Deploying forces will need instruction on a whole range of topics of the kind normally covered by SOPs. It has taken a considerable time for UNAMIR to develop its SOPs, despite being provided with UN Model SOPs as a basis on which to work. One advantage of linking the 2 forces in some way is that the troops operating in Zaire could come under the umbrella of the UNAMIR SOPs.

25. Provost. In addition to routine disciplinary tasks and the conduct of such investigations as may become necessary, it must be expected that, in addition to the traffic the operation itself generates and the considerable volume of humanitarian activity in the area, substantial numbers of refugees will be on the roads. There will be a clear requirement for route signing and route clearance. In addition, there may be a requirement to hold persons removed from the camps for a limited period (**Note: there will be a requirement for the Force to be given guidance on the Force's commitment to the investigation of war crime related matters,**

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apprehension of suspects, who should be detained and their subsequent handling and disposal.) A Military Police presence in the area of the camps may be one factor in giving the refugees confidence to leave the camps. It is assessed that a Provost Company of some 75, highly mobile, personnel will be required.

26. Interpreters. There will be a need for a generous scale of interpreters, some of whom must be attached to contingents immediately they arrive.

27. Welfare. A large element of the new Force will be essentially mobile. This implies that many of the items traditionally associated with Welfare may not be appropriate but, equally, with troops lacking a firm base, other aspects may become more significant. There is currently no UNAMIR PX contract onto which the new Force could be blistered. Regardless of UN contract procedures, it may be appropriate to engage a contractor for a limited period without competition. More work needs to be carried out in this area.

MEDICAL

28. It is considered that the medical system to support the Force could most economically be provided by integration with that of UNAMIR. For planning purposes, it is considered that surgery should all be carried out in Kigali but circumstances may dictate that some forward surgical capability will be required.

29. Level One/Two Capability. Each battalion must include an integral Level One (Regimental Aid Post) capability. This includes enough ambulances (wheeled or tracked or both) to support evacuation tasks within the battalion AOR and to the evacuation LZ. Given a reliable aero-medical evacuation (AME) capability, the requirement for Level 2 assets decreases significantly as casualties can be evacuated to Kigali within an acceptable time. Guaranteed, night capable, AME facilities are not currently available within UNAMIR and, unless they are provided simultaneously with the Force, it will be necessary to establish a Level 2 facility within the FMA, based on 5 beds and a resuscitation capability.

30. Level Three Capability. The current Australian Medical Support Force within UNAMIR has the capability to support up to 60 beds, which is equivalent to a force level of 7,000 troops; this will decrease to 45 beds on rotation in Feb 95. The timing of the operation will thus impact upon the number of additional troops required to provide the necessary medical support. An additional point to note is that troops operating under Chapter VII require greater capacity within the medical organization; this point will need to be addressed in due course.

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G4 MATTERS

LOGISTIC ENGINEERING

31. The Force will need engineering support in the following areas:

- a. Maintain mobility in the AOR, particularly route maintenance.
- b. EOD. It is assessed that Former Rwandan Government Forces (FRGF) have the capability to deploy nuisance mines, booby traps etc and some, probably limited, EOD capability will be necessary.
- c. Production and storage of potable water.
- d. Construction of working and living accommodation and facilities such as bulk fuel installations. This will principally be within the HQ and both FMA complexes, where field defences will also be required. Because of the mobile nature of their task, the battalions will need to bring sufficient tentage to accommodate themselves but they may require assistance in areas such as sanitation.

32. Battalions will ideally include an engineer element; this is essential for the battalion to be deployed to the South. For Force tasks, it is assessed that one engineer squadron/company, including plant and construction capability, will be required.

33. If the Kigali-Cyangugu road is to be a main supply route (see the Outline Logistic Concept), a further squadron/company will be required to maintain the road between these points.

TRANSPORT & MOVEMENTS

34. Air Transport. It should be noted that FRGF are assessed to have a limited low level air defence capability. Assuming that this does not impede air transport operations, it is considered that the following assets are required to guarantee the necessary support for the Force:

- a. Operational, in-theatre air lift - two C-130 or equivalent. \* TAC (SR) STOL AC
- b. Tactical air lift - two medium lift helicopters.
- c. One terminal troop; it must have the capability to handle ISO containers at each airhead.
- d. One movement control section.
- e. G3 (Plans) to be asked to advise on the desirability of

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including an air dispatch capability for the middle phases of the operation.

f. Casevac requirements are covered under Medical.

35. Road Transport. It is considered that the following road transport and related assets are required to guarantee the necessary support for the Force:

a. One composite squadron headquarters.

b. One medium troop.

c. One heavy troop (to include 20 ton trailer capability).

d. One fuel tanker troop, with equipment suitable for bulk refuelling - to be employed on second line duties.

e. One water tanker troop.

f. Given the reliability of fuel contractor's deliveries to UNAMIR, it may be appropriate for the Force to have the capability to collect fuel from a distant contractor's location. This would require an additional fleet of large tankers with a total capacity of some 100,000 litres.

g. If the Kigali-Cyangugu road is to be a main supply route (see the Outline Logistic Concept), a further 30x10 tonne trucks, with 20 tonne trailers, based in Kigali, will be required.

36. Additional Equipment. In order that transport assets can be operated efficiently, it will be necessary to ensure that each FMA has a minimum of 2x2.5 tonne rough terrain fork lift trucks.

37. Transport & Movement Coordination. There is a requirement for a movement control troop. Additionally, up to 4 military movements staff might be required in Force HQ.

SUPPLY

38. While other options have been considered, in the scenario covered by this paper, only one course is considered realistic:

One second line supply company located in Goma, which serves as the principal point of entry, with a battalion support group (BSG) detached to support the southern battalion. Resupply into Goma is predominantly by strategic airlift, with onward southward movement by barge whenever possible.

Although they will not be the primary means of distribution, air transport and medium lift helicopters are considered essential and an air drop capability might be considered.

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39. The following are considered prerequisites for successful Supply support of the operation:

- a. Dedicated second line supply organizations as follows:
  - (1) a supply company;
  - (2) a combat supplies platoon;
  - (3) a local purchase organization, located in the area of operation and the ability to operate in Uganda (Kampala) and Kenya (Nairobi).
- b. Contingents must deploy into theatre with:
  - (1) Stocks. 90 days stocks of: combat rations; general stores; repair parts; medical stores; ammunition (including explosives);

**Note:** I would want to review this requirement, particularly in respect of combat rations, but any commitment by the UN on this matter will inevitably reduce UNAMIR's own integral sustainability.

It is not essential that contingents actually carry this materiel - but it must be committed to them by their own nations, and delivered into theatre by those nations under their own arrangements

- (2) Letters of Assist. LOAs for: replacement of major items of equipment; the provision of all necessary replacements parts to meet both stock replenishment demands and unscaled items required for the repair of unserviceable equipments; ammunition.
- (3) First Line Capabilities. Appropriate equipment and skills to permit first line:
  - (a) Bulk refuelling.
  - (b) Distribution of potable and non-potable water.

c. To achieve the speed of surprise required for this operation, contingents must be able to deploy immediately on arrival. Therefore, they must arrive self-sufficient in tentage, sleeping equipment, field kitchens, camp stores, generators, refrigeration and vehicles.

CLASSES OF SUPPLY

40. The requirements for a force of 4,000 personnel for each of the supply commodities are as follows:

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a. Class 1 - Rations.

- (1) Contingents deploy with 90 days - to be reviewed.
- (2) The Force holding 20,000 for 3 month consumption.
- (3) Force Reserve 26,000 (one month with contingents and one month at combat supply platoon).
- (4) Fresh Ration delivery to commence within one month.
- (5) Force requirements for water - 420,000 litres/month. (based on 3 litres/person/day).
- (6) Force Requirements packaged water 3 months 1,260,000 litres.
- (7) Force Reserve packaged water 840,000 litres (one month with unit, one month with combat supply platoon)

b. Class 2 - General Stores.

- (1) Contingents deploy with 90 days.
- (2) Supply Company holdings 90 days. (sourced locally in Uganda or Kenya by local purchase)
- (3) Consumption one month - 140,000 tons. Based on 1.1 kg per person per day.
- (4) Stocks at supply company 420,000 tons (90 days).

c. Class 3 - Petrol Oils and Lubricants.

- (1) Planning figures for one month's consumption:

Diesel	- 800,000 lt.
Gasoline	- 90,000 lt.
Jet A1	- 200,000 lt.
Oils and Greases	- 50,000 kg.
- (5) Required Force Reserve Holding - 3 months stock:

Diesel	- 1.5 million lt.
Gasoline	- 200,000 lt.
Jet A1	- 400,00 lt.
Oils and Greases	-

d. Class 4 - Defence and Construction Stores.

- (1) Concertina Barbed Wire - 2500 initially, then 500 per month.

Should  
be X2

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(2) Barbed Wire	1500 initially, then 120 per month.
(3) Sand Bags	130,000 initially, then 10,500 per month.
(4) 8' Post Picket	10,000 initially, then 800 per month.
(5) 6' Post Picket	36,000 initially, then 2,900 per month.
(6) 2' Post Picket	90,000 initially, then 7,500 per month.
(7) CGI 6'	4,000 initially, then 350 per month.
(8) Tie Wire (5 KG)	5,000 initially, then 400 per month.
(9) Timber 4" X 2" X 7'	70,000
(10) <u>Totals.</u>	TBC tons.

e. Class 5 - Ammunition:

- (1) Contingents arrive with 90 days holdings.
- (2) LOA required with each contingent home nation for resupply for all natures.

f. Class 6 - Welfare and Personal Demand Items. See Under G1 - Welfare.

g. Class 7 - Principal Items. Management of Principal items will be virtually nil, as there will be very few replacement items to manage. Contingents must arrive with all the equipment they need and replacement must be arranged through pre-negotiated LOAs.

h. Class 8 - Medical Stores.

- (1) Contingents arrive with 90 days stocks.
- (2) Replenishment stocks demanded through, and procured by, the medical element supporting the force. (It should be noted that the commercial markets in Kenya and Uganda are currently unable to support the existing UNAMIR requirement.)
- (3) An LOA with the country providing the medical facility may be appropriate.

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- (4) For planning purposes, assume .5 kg/person/day.  
Force requirements = 2 ton per day.

- i. Class 9 - Repair Parts. Covered under Maintenance.
- j. Class 10 - Project Stores. Project Stores should be procured by local purchase or through HQ UNAMIR (CBMS).

MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY OF REPLACEMENT PARTS

41. Conditions. In addition to the assumptions covering the whole paper, the following conditions are considered essential to the successful maintenance support of the operation:

- a. Tradesmen must be thoroughly conversant with the operation and maintenance of equipment used by the deployed force.
- b. All tradesmen must deploy with complete tools and equipment necessary to provide the required level of support in a field environment.
- c. Maintenance elements must deploy with their full complement of vehicles, equipment and administration necessary to conduct field operations.
- d. Contingents must deploy with a full 90 days stocking level of repair parts, both first and second line.
- e. An LOA must be in place between UNNY and each contributing nation, prior to deployment, covering repair parts. The LOA should cover a period of at least 90 days.

42. The following options for maintenance support have been identified:

- a. Option 1. An existing, formed, military second line workshop (including repair, recovery and repair parts elements) deploys as part of an FMA located in Goma. Mobile elements could be detached to support operations as the battalions move from camp to camp. It may be difficult to find one workshop that has experience with all deployed equipment particularly if there is a mix of US, UK and former Soviet equipment in the force. This option has distinct command and control advantages but is unlikely to satisfy the conditions listed in the preceding paragraph.
- b. Option 2. Each contingent deploys with a second line maintenance element that would largely be brigaded into a maintenance organisation within the FMA. This would require a pre-defined command and control structure and the explicit, advanced agreement of the contributing countries to release their tradesmen, and associated repair parts support, on



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arrival. An overall command and control element would need to deploy as part of one of the contingents and its status would need to be agreed by all parties in advance. This would have the inherent advantage that its procedures and personalities would already be in place and could be augmented by other contributing nations. This option would satisfy all of the conditions listed above.

c. Option 3. Contingents deploy with an integral second line element which remains under the control of the parent contingent. The second line element would then be responsible for the provision of all second line support, including the provision of repair parts. It is unlikely that mobile units will want a slow and cumbersome second line tail following it around the camps.

d. Option 4. A contractor (ie Brown & Root) is tasked with the second and third line maintenance support of the force. This is impracticable, given the probable reduced notice to move and the lead time associated with the deployment of Brown & Root personnel. If this option were adopted, experience indicates that it would be appropriate to authorize Brown & Root, in advance, to procure any necessary tools and replacement parts if the operation is not to be jeopardized.

e. Limited Contractor Support. Some use of Brown & Root is not necessarily ruled out by the selection of one of the other options; they could be used to augment military capability or to provide specialist support, as required.

43. To satisfy the conditions listed above, it is considered that Option 2 is the best solution, with the command and control element being provided by one of the contributing countries. It must be re-iterated that, unless all of the conditions laid down in paragraph 2 are met, the Force may experience difficulties in maintaining itself in a mobile environment.

MAPS AND CHARTS

44. UNAMIR has had to work with inadequate mapping and charting of Rwanda and there is no reason to suppose that the situation for the new force will be any different. It is essential that the Force is provided with an adequate range and scale of maps and charts.

LOGISTIC COMMAND & CONTROL

45. There will clearly be a need for the normal G1/G4 staff within Force HQ. Given the inevitable interdependence between the Force and UNAMIR, it will be necessary to establish Logistic Los in Kigali, perhaps as part of a wider liaison organization.

46. There will also be a need for some command and control element as part of the FMA, for local administration, coordination etc - ie

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a HQ FMA, in both areas. If one country takes the lead in providing logistic support troops, it might well provide a logistic support regimental HQ which would be ideal for this task.

LOGISTICS FOR FORCE HEADQUARTERS

47. In order to guarantee the smooth and rapid establishment of an effective operational headquarters, it is essential that a formed Headquarters unit be deployed, perhaps a squadron, including all administrative and logistic elements normally integral to such a field organization. It must be prepared to provide all aspects of routine support to all headquarters staff, regardless of nationality or contingent.

48. UNAMIR is itself short of much of the equipment which is required to establish a working headquarters. In particular, UNAMIR would be unable to provide vehicles, radios, photocopiers (and consumables) or computer equipment. The Force Headquarters must arrive self-contained in these, as in other, respects.

49. Depending on locations, it may be that the commander could assume responsibility for all local administrative matters, including that for the Goma FMA.

CONCLUSIONS

50. There is, as yet, insufficient information available to allow any detailed planning for operations in Zaire or to consider how the logistic support for such an operation might be mounted. A number of assumptions have been made and the results are, in some cases, sensitive to changes in these assumptions.

51. Detailed coordination of logistics between the Force and UNAMIR is essential.

52. There is a requirement for two FMAs to be established, one in the Goma area and another to the South, perhaps close to Cyangugu. Ideally, both would be located adjacent to airfields but the practicability of this needs to be confirmed by reconnaissance.

53. As far as possible, the requirements for the new Force should not transit through Kigali but, rather, should be flown in direct to the Goma area.

54. It is possible to begin to estimate the manpower and materiel requirements to support the Force, additional to any support which might be possible from UNAMIR. It is currently estimated that it will be impossible to provide logistic support for the force with less than 1,100 troops, including an element for the defence of the FMA but exclusive of the Force HQ itself; depending upon circumstances, the manpower requirement could rise to some 1,750. Work will continue to develop and refine the estimates contained in this paper.

LOGISTIC OPERATIONS IN ZAIRE - MANPOWER SUMMARY

Function	Sub-Function	Best Case	Worst Case
HQ FMA		20	20
Provost		75	75
Medical	In Goma	16	40
	In Kigali	18	36
Engr		150	150
	Kli-Cy Road	Nil	100
Air Tpt	2xC-130	40	50
	2xMed Hel	30	45
	Terminal + Mov Con	60	70
	Air Dispatch	Nil	12
Rd Tpt	Basic Task	260	270
	Kli-Cy	Nil	70
	Fuel Import	Nil	50
Tpt & Mov Coord		12	12
Supply	(incl C Sups)	120	160
Maint Wksp		100	120
FMA Defence		250	500
TOTALS		1,151	1,780

UNAMIR FORCE HQ  
OUTGOING FACSIMILE

TO: BARIL UNATIONS NEW YORK	FROM: TOUSIGNANT FORCE COMMANDER UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA
FAX: (212) 963-9070	FAX: 1-212-963-3090
ATTN:	DRAFTED BY: O'KELLY DCOS (SP)
INFO:	INTERNAL:
SUBJECT: LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR OPERATIONS IN ZAIRE	
NUMBER OF PAGES, INCLUDING THE COVER: TWO PLUS FOURTEEN	

1. I ATTACH A PAPER WHICH CONSIDERS THE LOGISTIC SUPPORT WHICH MIGHT BE NECESSARY WHEN UN FORCES MOUNT AN OPERATION TO RELEASE THE REFUGEE CAMPS IN ZAIRE FROM THE GRIP WHICH THE FORMER RWANDAN GOVERNMENT FORCES CURRENTLY EXERCISE.

2. INEVITABLY, AT THIS STAGE, SUCH A PAPER CAN ONLY BE SPECULATIVE AND THIS ONE IS BASED ON ONLY ONE - PERHAPS THE WORST CASE - SCENARIO. IT HAS BEEN NECESSARY TO MAKE A NUMBER OF ASSUMPTIONS AND SOME OF THE DETAIL CONTAINED IN THE PAPER IS SENSITIVE TO CHANGES ON THOSE ASSUMPTIONS. BUT A NUMBER OF SIGNIFICANT POINTS EMERGE AND I BELIEVE THAT THEY WILL BE VALID ACROSS A WIDE RANGE OF MILITARY OPTIONS.

3. FIRST, AND MOST IMPORTANTLY, YOU ARE AWARE OF MY GREAT CONCERNS ABOUT THE FRAGILITY OF THE LOGISTIC SUPPORT AVAILABLE TO UNAMIR AND THE LENGTH OF TIME THAT IT HAS TAKEN FOR MANY IMPORTANT EQUIPMENTS TO BE PROVIDED TO MY FORCE. I WOULD NOT WISH ANY COMMANDER TO FEEL AS VULNERABLE IN THIS REGARD AS I DO NOW. IN ORDER THAT THIS SITUATION IS NOT REPEATED IN ZAIRE:

A. WHILE LOGISTIC COORDINATION BETWEEN THE TWO FORCES WILL BE VITAL, IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR THE NEW FORCE TO RELY ON ANY SUBSTANTIAL DEGREE OF SUPPORT FROM THE RESOURCES NOW IN PLACE TO SUPPORT UNAMIR.

B. ALL FORCES MUST ARRIVE FULLY EQUIPPED TO PERFORM THEIR TASK AND WITH GUARANTEES FROM CONTRIBUTING NATIONS AS TO, FOR EXAMPLE, CONTINUING SPECIAL TO EQUIPMENT SUPPORT.

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CMO E/DIA

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C. A SUFFICIENT LOGISTIC SUPPORT ORGANIZATION MUST BE PROVIDED FOR THE FORCE.

D. ADEQUATE RESERVES MUST BE HELD, WELL FORWARD. ALTHOUGH THE CALCULATIONS IN THE PAPER ARE BASED ON 30 DAYS STOCK HOLDING, THE MANPOWER BILL IS MORE A FUNCTION OF THROUGHPUT THAN HOLDINGS. INDEED, GREATER RISKS CAN BE TAKEN ON THE MANPOWER IF ADEQUATE STOCKS ARE HELD EASILY ACCESSIBLE TO THE FORCE.

4. SECONDLY, THERE WILL INEVITABLY BE A SUBSTANTIAL LOGISTIC MANPOWER BILL TO BE MET. THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE SUPPORT ORGANIZATION WILL NEED TO WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER FROM THE VERY START. THERE WILL BE NO TIME FOR THEM TO LEARN HOW TO WORK TOGETHER. THIS SUGGESTS THAT THE MAJORITY OF THE LOGISTIC SUPPORT ORGANIZATION SHOULD COME FROM ONE COUNTRY, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, AND ESSENTIALLY FROM COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE EXPERIENCE OF WORKING TOGETHER.

5. YOU WILL NOTE FROM THE PAPER THAT WE ESTIMATE THE MANPOWER BILL AS BETWEEN 1100 AND 1800, INCLUDING TROOPS FOR THE DEFENCE OF LOGISTIC INSTALLATIONS.

POTENTIAL OPERATIONS TO CLEAR REFUGEE CAMPS IN ZAIRELOGISTIC CONSIDERATIONSBACKGROUND

1. Outline planning is now under way to consider military options for the clearance of the camps holding Rwandan refugees in Zaire. It is envisaged that any such operation will be mounted by troops separate from those now in UNAMIR. While the command and control arrangements for such an operation have yet to be determined, it is already clear that there will need to be a degree of coordination of the logistics to support both this new force and the current UNAMIR and, at one end of the range of logistic options, is the obvious possibility that the support of the 2 forces may be totally integrated.

2. It is well documented that the current level of support for UNAMIR is, at best, precariously hand-to-mouth and, in some areas wholly inadequate. If implemented, Op RONDAVAL - which is wholly complementary to operations within the camps in Zaire - will place increasing demands upon the existing system. The addition of the requirement to support another substantial force, acting far from the logistic centre of gravity of UNAMIR, possibly engaged in operations under Chapter VII and in a hostile and demanding environment would inevitably overstretch existing capabilities, paralyzing the operation of both forces.

3. Experience within UNAMIR shows that it is not possible to rely even on equipment fundamentally necessary to the achievement of the mission being provided through UN sources within 150 days. It is clearly not too early to start considering the logistic implications of mounting such an operation, even though G3 planning has not yet started in earnest; indeed, logistic considerations could well have a marked influence on the operational plan.

AIM

4. The aim of this paper is to consider the logistic implications of the proposed operations in Zaire.

POSSIBLE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

5. While outline operational concepts have been identified, no decision has been made as to which option should be adopted, let alone any work on the development of a plan being carried out. But, while all of the options which have been identified imply a substantial logistic task, one option is logistically significantly more complex than the others; as this represents the reasonable worst case, and to simplify the task of analysis, this option has been adopted for examination.

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6. Under this option, it is proposed that the Force will consist of up to 4 battalions (or equivalent) - 2 mechanized and the remainder with integral troop carrying vehicles sufficient to move the entire unit - plus appropriate support elements. The Force is likely to be augmented by selected Zairian forces who may, for example, be allocated L of C duties.

7. The mechanized battalions will move into selected camps with the aim of eliminating the power currently wielded by the agencies of the former Government of Rwanda which, it is assessed, is the major factor in preventing the majority of refugees from returning home.

8. After an appropriate period, the mechanized elements will move on to other camps, leaving more lightly equipped forces (one battalion) to maintain the newly imposed security. This process will continue until all the camps have been dealt with.

9. The political imperative is for the camps in the Goma area to be addressed first. In order to prevent a large scale movement of refugees, particularly those who wish to cause trouble to the BBGNU within Rwanda, into Burundi, it may well be that further forces (probably a battalion, perhaps augmented by light armoured reconnaissance vehicles) would deploy into the south of Zaire to act as a cut off group.

10. No role has been identified, thus far, for UN Military Observers or Civ Pol in the early stages of the operation. While they may have a role in the latter stages, their support is not considered further.

#### ASSUMPTIONS

11. Timescale. Both for political reasons and in order to achieve surprise (thus preventing the flight of troublemakers) it is likely that the operation will be mounted at short notice). It follows that it will be essential for units to arrive as formed, fully equipped bodies with adequate integral logistic support elements. Even if it is planned that Zairian forces are to be used in certain roles, their immediate availability cannot be assumed. For all aspects of the operation within Zaire, the Force must initially plan on being totally self-contained.

12. Political Cooperation. It is implicit in the planning of this operation that full cooperation is granted by both the Zairian and Rwandan authorities. In logistic terms, for example, the operation must be guaranteed freedom of passage across borders to allow the support of deployed forces. It is not inconceivable that even first line support will cross national boundaries. Although less important, the full cooperation of the Ugandan authorities would be of great assistance.

13. Coordination of Logistic Effort. Whatever the eventual command and control relationship between UNAMIR and the forces deployed in Zaire, there will be a need for effective coordination of the logistic support for both forces. Kigali will inevitably be the focus of activity for the support of the new operation although it is not implicit that all support need flow through Kigali if suitable alternative facilities exist. In this context, the airport at Goma is capable of receiving all types of aircraft while that at Cyangugu is C-130 capable. It is believed that while Goma can accept all types of aircraft, its total daily capacity is limited and it may not be possible to assume its use for the arrival of all materiel into theatre. Security of the Goma airfield must be established at the start of the operation.

14. Humanitarian Assistance. The operation has the aim of encouraging refugees to move from their present locations and, if successful, will be comparatively short (15-30 months). There is already considerable humanitarian assistance available in the area from UN agencies and NGOs. The proposed force should not have any planned role in the provision of humanitarian assistance to refugees, except in such instances as rapid evacuation of casualties to where assistance from a more appropriate source is available. This has implications for the amount of logistic support which must be provided.

15. Support to Other Agencies. It is been a feature of UNAMIR operations that the Force receives a constant stream of requests for the diversion of scarce resources to other UN agencies. The logistic support planning for the military aspects of the Zaire operation cannot predict what support will be requested by these agencies, many of whom are already well established in the area, and it is assumed that no materiel or other administrative support will be provided to them.

16. Contractor Support. Contractors can provide elements of the necessary support for this operation. While they have the inherent disadvantage that they cannot mobilize as quickly as military forces, Brown & Root have shown the ability to react well once their firm base is established. Contractor support can not be ruled out.

#### APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM

17. There is not yet any indication of how the operation will be mounted and, consequently, it is not practicable to consider a matching logistic deployment plan. At this stage it is only possible to identify the requirements for the mature logistic situation; this will be valuable in identifying the required force structure but will also act as an aide-memoire when considering logistics for various mounting options.

18. Because force structures are not defined, it will only be possible to develop very rough calculations as to the size of the



logistic task. It cannot be over-emphasised that any figures which follow are only estimates, but should be in the right order of magnitude.

#### OUTLINE MATURE LOGISTIC CONCEPT

19. Given the distance between Kigali and Goma, more particularly, the time taken to travel between these locations, and the nature of the operations to be conducted, it is not practicable to provide second line support from Kigali. A Forward Maintenance Area (FMA) is essential. Reconnaissance (planned within the next couple of days) will be necessary to confirm its practicability, but the natural choice would be adjacent to Goma airfield. It should be noted that this is within Zaire, with all the concomitant problems that may arise; in particular a strong force will be required to protect the FMA and guarantee the integrity of the operation. Suitable troops should be included in the ORBAT of the Force, rather than misemploying forces whose primary task is within the camps.

20. In principle, all stocks for the Zaire force arriving in theatre should be delivered, by strategic transport, direct to Goma - only exceptionally should they transit through Kigali.

21. The FMA should hold 7-30 days stock of combat items; this will be equivalent to ?? tons. **Note: Direction is required here but the calculations below have assumed 30 days. Note that higher reserve levels, once in place, mean that there is less need for guaranteed daily replenishment and, hence, greater risks can be taken in the design of the resupply system.**

22. The southern element of the force will require its own, parallel FMA. Again, there is the natural choice of basing it adjacent to the airfield at Cyangugu. Initially, this FMA will be smaller than the one to the North, but as the operation progresses and forces move southward, its dependency will increase. Furthermore, as this FMA may be in Rwanda, there is the possibility that UNAMIR troops in Sector 4 could draw their routine support from it rather than looking to Kigali; this could improve the level of support provided to those forces from its present level. As the airfield cannot accept anything larger than a C-130, it cannot be considered a strategic airhead. It will need to be determined whether this FMA is to be supported from Goma or Kigali - the necessary resources do not currently exist to support it from Kigali but it would be a difficult operation to establish 2 FMAs simultaneously, with one being a satellite of the other. It may be that the compromise would be for the southern FMA to be established through Kigali - strategic airlift into Kigali, cross-load onto smaller aircraft and fly to Cyangugu - but the cargo handling and movement control capability at Kigali International Airport would need to be boosted substantially before this could be considered viable. For subsequent replenishment, routine air re-supply (from either of the strategic airheads - Kigali and Goma) should not be

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the primary means of support - although an emergency capability must exist - and there is no suitable road Goma-Cyangugu. The following options exist:

a. By Road - Kigali-Cyangugu. This is the only practicable option for support to be provided from UNAMIR. The additional capability would need to be provided - **it cannot be met from current UNAMIR resources.** In addition to the transport itself, there will be a requirement for Engineer support to maintain the road (some 200km); its rebuilding is the subject of EU aid, which indicates its condition, but the rebuild itself will not take place in time for this operation. The need for route defence to ensure integrity of support will also need to be considered.

b. By Water - Goma-Cyangugu. It is possible that re-supply could be carried out using commercial barges on Lake Kivu. While overall capacity is limited, it is certainly adequate to support the southern element of the Force.

#### G1 MATTERS

23. Reinforcements. Given the proximity of the 2 forces, it may be appropriate to consider the extent to which UNAMIR could initially establish a reception area at Goma prior to the arrival of the first of the new Force. This clearly has implications for concurrent UNAMIR operations and will need to be considered in conjunction with the G3 staff. Points to be considered include: transit accommodation; rations and water; UN Identity Cards and Driving Permits; issue of UN accoutrements; arrival briefing; etc. Depending upon the precise nature of the reception assistance provided by UNAMIR, it may be necessary to review the UNAMIR mandate and obtain clearance from governments providing contingents to UNAMIR.

24. Discipline - General. Deploying forces will need instruction on a whole range of topics of the kind normally covered by SOPs. It has taken a considerable time for UNAMIR to develop its SOPs, despite being provided with UN Model SOPs as a basis on which to work. One advantage of linking the 2 forces in some way is that the troops operating in Zaire could come under the umbrella of the UNAMIR SOPs.

25. Provost. In addition to routine disciplinary tasks and the conduct of such investigations as may become necessary, it must be expected that, in addition to the traffic the operation itself generates and the considerable volume of humanitarian activity in the area, substantial numbers of refugees will be on the roads. There will be a clear requirement for route signing and route clearance. In addition, there may be a requirement to hold persons removed from the camps for a limited period (**Note: there will be a requirement for the Force to be given guidance on the Force's commitment to the investigation of war crime related matters,**

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apprehension of suspects, who should be detained and their subsequent handling and disposal.) A Military Police presence in the area of the camps may be one factor in giving the refugees confidence to leave the camps. It is assessed that a Provost Company of some 75, highly mobile, personnel will be required.

26. Interpreters. There will be a need for a generous scale of interpreters, some of whom must be attached to contingents immediately they arrive.

27. Welfare. A large element of the new Force will be essentially mobile. This implies that many of the items traditionally associated with welfare may not be appropriate but, equally, with troops lacking a firm base, other aspects may become more significant. There is currently no UNAMIR PX contract onto which the new Force could be blistered. Regardless of UN contract procedures, it may be appropriate to engage a contractor for a limited period without competition. More work needs to be carried out in this area.

#### MEDICAL

28. It is considered that the medical system to support the Force could most economically be provided by integration with that of UNAMIR. For planning purposes, it is considered that surgery should all be carried out in Kigali but circumstances may dictate that some forward surgical capability will be required.

29. Level One/Two Capability. Each battalion must include an integral Level One (Regimental Aid Post) capability. This includes enough ambulances (wheeled or tracked or both) to support evacuation tasks within the battalion AOR and to the evacuation LZ. Given a reliable aero-medical evacuation (AME) capability, the requirement for Level 2 assets decreases significantly as casualties can be evacuated to Kigali within an acceptable time. Guaranteed, night capable, AME facilities are not currently available within UNAMIR and, unless they are provided simultaneously with the Force, it will be necessary to establish a Level 2 facility within the FMA, based on 5 beds and a resuscitation capability.

30. Level Three Capability. The current Australian Medical Support Force within UNAMIR has the capability to support up to 60 beds, which is equivalent to a force level of 7,000 troops; this will decrease to 45 beds on rotation in Feb 95. The timing of the operation will thus impact upon the number of additional troops required to provide the necessary medical support. An additional point to note is that troops operating under Chapter VII require greater capacity within the medical organization; this point will need to be addressed in due course.

G4 MATTERS

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LOGISTIC ENGINEERING

31. The Force will need engineering support in the following areas:

- a. Maintain mobility in the AOR, particularly route maintenance.
- b. EOD. It is assessed that Former Rwandan Government Forces (FRGF) have the capability to deploy nuisance mines, booby traps etc and some, probably limited, EOD capability will be necessary.
- c. Production and storage of potable water.
- d. Construction of working and living accommodation and facilities such as bulk fuel installations. This will principally be within the HQ and both FMA complexes, where field defences will also be required. Because of the mobile nature of their task, the battalions will need to bring sufficient tentage to accommodate themselves but they may require assistance in areas such as sanitation.

32. Battalions will ideally include an engineer element; this is essential for the battalion to be deployed to the South. For Force tasks, it is assessed that one engineer squadron/company, including plant and construction capability, will be required.

33. If the Kigali-Cyangugu road is to be a main supply route (see the Outline Logistic Concept), a further squadron/company will be required to maintain the road between these points.

TRANSPORT & MOVEMENTS

34. Air Transport. It should be noted that FRGF are assessed to have a limited low level air defence capability. Assuming that this does not impede air transport operations, it is considered that the following assets are required to guarantee the necessary support for the Force:

- a. Operational, in-theatre air lift - two C-130 or equivalent.
- b. Tactical air lift - two medium lift helicopters.
- c. One terminal troop; it must have the capability to handle ISO containers at each airhead.
- d. One movement control section.
- e. G3 (Plans) to be asked to advise on the desirability of

including an air dispatch capability for the middle phases of the operation.

f. Casevac requirements are covered under Medical.

35. Road Transport. It is considered that the following road transport and related assets are required to guarantee the necessary support for the Force:

a. One composite squadron headquarters.

b. One medium troop.

c. One heavy troop (to include 20 ton trailer capability).

d. One fuel tanker troop, with equipment suitable for bulk refuelling - to be employed on second line duties.

e. One water tanker troop.

f. Given the reliability of fuel contractor's deliveries to UNAMIR, it may be appropriate for the Force to have the capability to collect fuel from a distant contractor's location. This would require an additional fleet of large tankers with a total capacity of some 100,000 litres.

g. If the Kigali-Cyangugu road is to be a main supply route (see the Outline Logistic Concept), a further 30x10 tonne trucks, with 20 tonne trailers, based in Kigali, will be required.

36. Additional Equipment. In order that transport assets can be operated efficiently, it will be necessary to ensure that each FMA has a minimum of 2x2.5 tonne rough terrain fork lift trucks.

37. Transport & Movement Coordination. There is a requirement for a movement control troop. Additionally, up to 4 military movements staff might be required in Force HQ.

#### SUPPLY

38. While other options have been considered, in the scenario covered by this paper, only one course is considered realistic:

One second line supply company located in Goma, which serves as the principal point of entry, with a battalion support group (BSG) detached to support the southern battalion. Resupply into Goma is predominantly by strategic airlift, with onward southward movement by barge whenever possible.

Although they will not be the primary means of distribution, air transport and medium lift helicopters are considered essential and an air drop capability might be considered.

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39. The following are considered prerequisites for successful Supply support of the operation:

- a. Dedicated second line supply organizations as follows:
- (1) a supply company;
  - (2) a combat supplies platoon;
  - (3) a local purchase organization, located in the area of operation and the ability to operate in Uganda (Kampala) and Kenya (Nairobi).

- b. Contingents must deploy into theatre with:

- (1) Stocks. 90 days stocks of: combat rations; general stores; repair parts; medical stores; ammunition (including explosives);

Note: I would want to review this requirement, particularly in respect of combat rations, but any commitment by the UN on this matter will inevitably reduce UNAMIR's own integral sustainability.

It is not essential that contingents actually carry this materiel - but it must be committed to them by their own nations, and delivered into theatre by those nations under their own arrangements

- (2) Letters of Assis. LOAs for: replacement of major items of equipment; the provision of all necessary replacements parts to meet both stock replenishment demands and unscaled items required for the repair of unserviceable equipments; ammunition.

- (3) First Line Capabilities. Appropriate equipment and skills to permit first line:

- (a) Bulk refuelling.
- (b) Distribution of potable and non-potable water.

- c. To achieve the speed of surprise required for this operation, contingents must be able to deploy immediately on arrival. Therefore, they must arrive self-sufficient in tentage, sleeping equipment, field kitchens, camp stores, generators, refrigeration and vehicles.

#### CLASSES OF SUPPLY

40. The requirements for a force of 4,000 personnel for each of the supply commodities are as follows:

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a. Class 1 - Rations.

- (1) Contingents deploy with 90 days - to be reviewed.
- (2) The Force holding 20,000 for 3 month consumption.
- (3) Force Reserve 26,000 (one month with contingents and one month at combat supply platoon).
- (4) Fresh Ration delivery to commence within one month.
- (5) Force requirements for water - 420,000 litres/month. (based on 3 litres/person/day).
- (6) Force Requirements packaged water 3 months 1,260,000 litres.
- (7) Force Reserve packaged water 840,000 litres (one month with unit, one month with combat supply platoon)

b. Class 2 - General Stores.

- (1) Contingents deploy with 90 days.
- (2) Supply Company holdings 90 days. (sourced locally in Uganda or Kenya by local purchase)
- (3) Consumption one month - 140,000 tons. Based on 1.1 kg per person per day.
- (4) Stocks at supply company 420,000 tons (90 days).

c. Class 3 - Petrol Oils and Lubricants.

- (1) Planning figures for one month's consumption:
 

Diesel	- 800,000 lt.
Gasoline	- 90,000 lt.
Jet A1	- 200,000 lt.
Oils and Greases	- 50,000 kg.
- (5) Required Force Reserve Holding - 3 months stock:
 

Diesel	- 1.5 million lt.
Gasoline	- 200,000 lt.
Jet A1	- 400,00 lt.
Oils and Greases	-

d. Class 4 - Defence and Construction Stores.

- (1) Concertina Barbed Wire - 2500 initially, then 500 per month.

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(2) Barbed Wire per month.	1500 initially, then 120
(3) Sand Bags 10,500 per month.	130,000 initially, then
(4) 8' Post Picket per month.	10,000 initially, then 800
(5) 6' Post Picket 2,900 per month.	36,000 initially, then
(6) 2' Post Picket 7,500 per month.	90,000 initially, then
(7) CGI 6' per month.	4,000 initially, then 350
(8) Tie Wire (5 KG) per month.	5,000 initially, then 400
(9) Timber 4" X 2" X 7'	70,000
(10) <u>Totals.</u>	TBC tons.

e. Class 5 - Ammunition:

- (1) Contingents arrive with 90 days holdings.
- (2) LOA required with each contingent home nation for resupply for all nations.

f. Class 6 - Welfare and Personal Demand Items. See Under G1 - Welfare.

g. Class 7 - Principal Items. Management of Principal items will be virtually nil, as there will be very few replacement items to manage. Contingents must arrive with all the equipment they need and replacement must be arranged through pre-negotiated LOAs.

h. Class 8 - Medical Stores.

- (1) Contingents arrive with 90 days stocks.
- (2) Replenishment stocks demanded through, and procured by, the medical element supporting the force. (It should be noted that the commercial markets in Kenya and Uganda are currently unable to support the existing UNAMIR requirement.)
- (3) An LOA with the country providing the medical facility may be appropriate.



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40. For planning purposes, assume .5 kg/person/day.  
Force requirements = 2 ton per day.

- i. Class 9 - Repair Parts. Covered under Maintenance.
- j. Class 10 - Project Stores. Project Stores should be procured by local purchase or through HQ UNAMIR (CBMS).

#### MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY OF REPLACEMENT PARTS

41. Conditions. In addition to the assumptions covering the whole paper, the following conditions are considered essential to the successful maintenance support of the operation:

- a. Tradesmen must be thoroughly conversant with the operation and maintenance of equipment used by the deployed force.
- b. All tradesmen must deploy with complete tools and equipment necessary to provide the required level of support in a field environment.
- c. Maintenance elements must deploy with their full complement of vehicles, equipment and administration necessary to conduct field operations.
- d. Contingents must deploy with a full 90 days stocking level of repair parts, both first and second line.
- e. An LOA must be in place between UNNY and each contributing nation, prior to deployment, covering repair parts. The LOA should cover a period of at least 90 days.

42. The following options for maintenance support have been identified:

- a. Option 1. An existing, formed, military second line workshop (including repair, recovery and repair parts elements) deploys as part of an FMA located in Goma. Mobile elements could be detached to support operations as the battalions move from camp to camp. It may be difficult to find one workshop that has experience with all deployed equipment particularly if there is a mix of US, UK and former Soviet equipment in the force. This option has distinct command and control advantages but is unlikely to satisfy the conditions listed in the preceding paragraph.
- b. Option 2. Each contingent deploys with a second line maintenance element that would largely be brigaded into a maintenance organisation within the FMA. This would require a pre-defined command and control structure and the explicit, advanced agreement of the contributing countries to release their tradesmen, and associated repair parts support, on

arrival. An overall command and control element would need to deploy as part of one of the contingents and its status would need to be agreed by all parties in advance. This would have the inherent advantage that its procedures and personalities would already be in place and could be augmented by other contributing nations. This option would satisfy all of the conditions listed above.

c. Option 3. Contingents deploy with an integral second line element which remains under the control of the parent contingent. The second line element would then be responsible for the provision of all second line support, including the provision of repair parts. It is unlikely that mobile units will want a slow and cumbersome second line tail following it around the camps.

d. Option 4. A contractor (ie Brown & Root) is tasked with the second and third line maintenance support of the force. This is impracticable, given the probable reduced notice to move and the lead time associated with the deployment of Brown & Root personnel. If this option were adopted, experience indicates that it would be appropriate to authorize Brown & Root, in advance, to procure any necessary tools and replacement parts if the operation is not to be jeopardized.

e. Limited Contractor Support. Some use of Brown & Root is not necessarily ruled out by the selection of one of the other options; they could be used to augment military capability or to provide specialist support, as required.

43. To satisfy the conditions listed above, it is considered that Option 2 is the best solution, with the command and control element being provided by one of the contributing countries. It must be re-iterated that, unless all of the conditions laid down in paragraph 2 are met, the Force may experience difficulties in maintaining itself in a mobile environment.

#### MAPS AND CHARTS

44. UNAMIR has had to work with inadequate mapping and charting of Rwanda and there is no reason to suppose that the situation for the new force will be any different. It is essential that the Force is provided with an adequate range and scale of maps and charts.

#### LOGISTIC COMMAND & CONTROL

45. There will clearly be a need for the normal G1/G4 staff within Force HQ. Given the inevitable interdependence between the Force and UNAMIR, it will be necessary to establish Logistic Los in Kigali, perhaps as part of a wider liaison organization.

46. There will also be a need for some command and control element as part of the FMA, for local administration, coordination etc - ie

P 14/17

a HQ FMA, in both areas. If one country takes the lead in providing logistic support troops, it might well provide a logistic support regimental HQ which would be ideal for this task.

#### LOGISTICS FOR FORCE HEADQUARTERS

47. In order to guarantee the smooth and rapid establishment of an effective operational headquarters, it is essential that a formed Headquarters unit be deployed, perhaps a squadron, including all administrative and logistic elements normally integral to such a field organization. It must be prepared to provide all aspects of routine support to all headquarters staff, regardless of nationality or contingent.

48. UNAMIR is itself short of much of the equipment which is required to establish a working headquarters. In particular, UNAMIR would be unable to provide vehicles, radios, photocopiers (and consumables) or computer equipment. The Force Headquarters must arrive self-contained in these, as in other, respects.

49. Depending on locations, it may be that the commander could assume responsibility for all local administrative matters, including that for the Goma FMA.

#### CONCLUSIONS

50. There is, as yet, insufficient information available to allow any detailed planning for operations in Zaire or to consider how the logistic support for such an operation might be mounted. A number of assumptions have been made and the results are, in some cases, sensitive to changes in these assumptions.

51. Detailed coordination of logistics between the Force and UNAMIR is essential.

52. There is a requirement for two FMAs to be established, one in the Goma area and another to the South, perhaps close to Cyangugu. Ideally, both would be located adjacent to airfields but the practicability of this needs to be confirmed by reconnaissance.

53. As far as possible, the requirements for the new Force should not transit through Kigali but, rather, should be flown in direct to the Goma area.

54. It is possible to begin to estimate the manpower and materiel requirements to support the Force, additional to any support which might be possible from UNAMIR. It is currently estimated that it will be impossible to provide logistic support for the force with less than 1,100 troops, including an element for the defence of the FMA but exclusive of the Force HQ itself; depending upon circumstances, the manpower requirement could rise to some 1,750. Work will continue to develop and refine the estimates contained in this paper.

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LOGISTIC OPERATIONS IN ZAIRE - MANPOWER SUMMARY

Function	Sub-Function	Best Case	Worst Case
HQ FMA		20	20
Provost		75	75
Medical	In Goma	16	40
	In Kigali	18	36
Engr		150	150
	Kli-Cy Road	Nil	100
Air Tpt	2xC-130	40	50
	2xMed Hel	30	45
	Terminal + Mov Con	60	70
	Air Dispatch	Nil	12
Rd Tpt	Basic Task	260	270
	Kli-Cy	Nil	70
	Fuel Import	Nil	50
Tpt & Mov Coord		12	12
Supply	(incl C Sups)	120	160
Maint Wksp		100	120
FMA Defence		250	500
TOTALS		1,151	1,780

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
 FROM: KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI  
 DATE: 14 November 1994  
 NUMBER: 2408  
 SUBJECT: REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF RWANDESE REFUGEES

CAN Y28  
 35/38

References:

- A. MIR 2300 dated 4 Nov 94 (Security in Rwandese Refugee Camps).
- B. UNATIONS 3659 dated 4 Nov 94 (Working Paper).
- C. MIR 2322 dated 7 Nov 94 (UNAMIR observations on Working Paper).
- D. UNAMIR Fax F/O 3051 dated 9 Nov 94 (Logistic Support for Operations in Zaire).
- E. UNATIONS 3730 dated 11 Nov 94 (Report on the Situation of the Rwandese Refugees).

1. Thank you for your Reference E. My comments refer to the paragraphs in that document.

Paragraph 10. Add as a final sentence "*There are additional significant factors that deter the refugees' return: there is a dearth of tangible evidence to prove the sincerity of the BBGNU's statements of reconciliation with former government officials; there has been a deterioration in security within Rwanda; there remains no effective civil police force or judiciary; there is no land commission to determine conflicting property claims; there is an insufficiency of tools seeds and hoes in the home commune areas; and basic materials for the refurbishment of housing is not evident in quantity.*"

Paragraph 11.

Paragraph 15. In this paragraph the reader can become confused between the situation within the military camps and that within the refugee camps. You may wish to insert as a new beginning to Sentence 3 "*However, inside the refugee camps, it is difficult to determine...*".

Paragraph 19. Add as a final sentence "*Control of radios within the refugee camps has been opposed and restricted by the hostile elements, and so consideration must also be given to the distribution of portable radios, to facilitate the public information campaign.*"

Paragraph 20.



a. I feel that the peacekeeping force from the outset should operate under the authority of Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. I was originally of the opinion that a robustly framed Chapter 6 operation was feasible, since we had the compliance of the Zairian authorities. I now feel that, since there will be resistance to our mission which only force will overcome, our earlier concept of peace assistance must give way to one of peace enforcement. There will be no time for a commander to wait for UN high-level negotiation to allow him to continue his task if opposed. To facilitate this requirement, insert a new fourth sentence ***"To undertake these tasks against the wishes of the hostile elements in the camps, violence is to be expected. The peacekeeping force must be given authority under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter to use appropriate and necessary force to conduct its tasks"***.

b. The final sentence, which nominates UNAMIR the responsibility to provide logistic support to the Zairian operation, does not recognise or address UNAMIR's current serious logistic problems to support its own operation. The need for logistic infrastructure enhancement must be made explicit. Add as a final sentence ***"To support the Zairian operation a logistic service battalion will be required, since there will be a requirement for forward support. Since logistics will assume such importance, the selection of a fully capable unit will be vital."***

c. Delete the single line at subsection heading III.c) "Action under Chapter 7" between Paragraphs 27 and 28, since Chapter 7 operations are now introduced earlier in the text.

Paragraph 21. There needs to be a preparatory phase, prior to the First Phase, during which time the Zairian military and paramilitary forces are trained and equipped. This phase could be begun well before the main external military force had been defined to allow immediate cooperation and employability of the Zairian force.

Paragraph 21.

a. In the first sentence, remove the tautological phrase *(provided with some protected vehicles)*. The "well trained and equipped mechanised battalions" must arrive fully equipped with the complete scale of armoured vehicles. The armoured vehicles will provide protection to UN troops and assurance to the refugees.

b. I restate my comment at Reference C where I addressed your Paragraph 15. A battalion will not be capable of taking on a camp of 30,000 refugees. I wrote:

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Troops to Task to achieve missions given for Operations in 30,000-strong Camps. My staff has estimated that a battalion of 800 could be expected to carry out the missions given only within an AOR bounded by a 1.5 km square, depending on terrain. This will make it unlikely that camps of 30,000 inhabitants could be considered a single battalion task. It also places most linear camps beyond the scope of one battalion. The analysis is as follows: given a bayonet strength within the battalion of 600 and a 50% factor for self protection, reserve and relief, the 24/7 operating force would be 300. The requirement to escort NGOs, guard sites, maintain a patrolling presence and a quick response force, seriously reduces the numbers available for an effective cordon, thus limiting the size of the AOR. This will slow the operation.

Change the second sentence to read "Each battalion would establish secure areas, systematically and progressively taking control of the camps. Their rate of progress will be determined by level of consent of the refugees, the population density, and local terrain constraints. Thus, at an early stage, significant areas would come under the protection of the peacekeeping force."

Paragraph 23. By defining a timescale of 30 days for the First Phase, you deny the commander an opportunity to exploit any improving situation or react appropriately to any deterioration. He may be able to close down some camps in, for example, 20 days, so should not be constrained: similarly, it may take longer than 30 days. The First Phase should be determined by size of population that can be taken on and refugee activity, and not to a strict timeline. If the Zairian selection and training is begun expeditiously, as recommended above, there will be no requirement for the external UN force to train them concurrent with conducting their initial camp operation.

Paragraph 25.

a. Paragraph 25 would be better placed after Paragraph 26, then

renumbered.

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b. Refer to my Logistic Estimate at Reference D which outlined the significant manpower bill for support. Change the opening sentence to read "Under this option, it is estimated that a force of 4,800 all ranks would be required."

c. Refer to my comments at Reference C where I discussed your Paragraph 16. Add a third sentence "For military considerations, the simultaneous operation is preferred".

Paragraph 28. Refer to Paragraph 3 of Reference C. I disagree with your premise that the first option does not involve separation. All operations will involve separation. I restate from the Reference:

*To summarise, you rightly state that the groups would object to being moved from the camps. But of greater significance is that, under all options, that prior to movement they must be separated. They know that, once separated, they will be a greatly weaker force, and so will fight. The finesse in this operation lies in the separation of the groups (the distance and period of separation are secondary issues) so I cannot overstate the sophistication that we will need to employ to ensure we succeed.*

Paragraph 30. Add to the first sentence " Should it be decided to undertake the *institutionalised* separation of..."

Paragraph 34. Add a final sentence "Existing plans which call for the reduction in strength of UNAMIR to its mandated ceiling of 5,500 by April 1995 may now require reconsideration. The requirements for security within Rwanda during the period, and for UNAMIR to provide command and logistic support to the Zairian operation, mitigate against a force reduction within UNAMIR."

2. The capability of the RPA to continue to provide security within Rwanda throughout the repatriation is most significant. To prevent a re-infiltration by Interahamwe the RPA must be adequately trained in counter-insurgency techniques. At the moment they lack expertise across the board in the conduct of low intensity operations. This should be addressed by means of a request to a member country to provide bilateral military training assistance.

3. Best regards.





UNAMIR - MINUAR

TO: HQ UNAMIR KIGALI // COS //

FROM: COMD MILOB SECTOR 5 GISENYI

DATE: 20 NOV 94

SUBJ: RECONNAISSANCE OF GOMA AREA REFUGEE CAMPS

1. Attached is report of subject reconnaissance conducted 14 - 16 Nov 94 by Sector 5 HAC team.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "AM Austdal".

AM Austdal  
LCol

Attachments: 1

② HQ UNAMIR OR

1. Copies to FC, DFC, DCOS Sp, DCOS Ops, G3 Plans and G2.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "DCOS Ops".

DCOS Ops  
24.11

**GOMA AREA REFUGEE CAMPS:  
GENERAL RECONNAISSANCE AND TERRAIN  
ESTIMATE**

Map Ref: Joint Operations Graphic (Air) SA 35-4 / 35 - 8  
(1:250,000)

**GENERAL**

1. While UNHCR reports 6 x Goma Area camp areas, for military planning purposes the Goma area camps can be discussed in four general groups:

a. MUGUNGA CAMP ( GOMA Area Camps )

Incl:

MUGUNGA ( primary )  
ZURO  
KITUKO  
NDOSHO  
BULENGO  
HIMBI  
MUGAMBIRO

Area population approximately 200,000 including estimated 23,000 FAR.

b. KIBUMBA CAMP

Incl:

KIBUMBA ( primary )

Area population approximately 210,000. Small (300) FAR presence.

c. KATALE CAMP

Incl:

KATALE ( primary )  
RUGARI  
KARENGERA  
KAHINDO  
RUBARE

Area population approximately 230,000. Small FAR

presence.

d. RUTSHURU / JOMBA CAMPS

Incl:

RUTSHURU  
BUHUNDA  
KIHALI  
MABUNGO  
REMER  
RANGIRA  
KIBANDA  
KABINDI  
KINYONI  
KITUMAINI  
BUGUSA

Area population approximately 50-80,000. Small FAR (500) presence.

2. Camps listed at sub-para a.- c. are "official camps" and are administered by UN agencies and NGOs. Camps listed in sub-para d. are "unofficial camps" and receive aid from a limited number of NGOs only. There is no UN presence at these camps.

3. UN policy for the camps remains provision of emergency humanitarian assistance only. No assistance supporting "permanency" such as aid to schools, hard accommodation, etc. is provided. Construction of road networks in the primary camps and in some cases construction of central market place sites are seen to be control measures and are related to security. An example of this is the construction of a market place site on the western edge of the MUGUNGA camp. The aim is to negate the requirement for FAR (concentrated at ZURO camp) to enter MUGKUNGA to utilize the markets presently located there.

4. Although incidents of shooting and killing occur routinely in the camps, the overall security situation at this time is generally good in terms of the safety of aid workers. I observed aid workers moving freely and unescorted through all camps. All are aware, however, that the security situation could change rapidly and without warning as has been evidenced by a number of potentially dangerous situations in the past. As all routes through camp areas are controlled by refugee "camp authorities" aid workers can be held in camps or prevented from entering camps. Presently all aid workers conduct operations in the camps in daylight hours only. While international aid workers may not yet be directly targeted there is a danger that they could become accidental victims of an incident in or around the camps. A comprehensive security plan for UN/NGOs has been prepared by UNHCR protection staff and submitted to UNNY for comment approval in the past week.

5. Control within all camps is exercised by several layers of "local government" ( cell chefs, committee sociale, etc ). "Security" is provided by a force known as "La Jeune-es." Elements of this group that were observed could be identified by beret headdress and whistles worn around their necks. Civilian dress is worn. No arms were observed but it was reported by several UNHCR Field Officers and others that small arms and grenades have been seen to be carried covertly by this force during some recent incidents. Whistle signals are used for communications.

6. The term "La Jeune-es" seems to be applied generically to all former members of the RGF and militia including Interhamwe. The use of the terms FAR, RGF and Interhamwe appears to be discouraged in the camps.

7. FAR observed appeared to be in good condition i.e. well fed and physically fit. Most do not wear uniforms but can be identified by military footwear and accoutrements. FAR bivouacs did not seem to be organized on military lines. No defenses were evident. Only TCV (3-TON) vehs and busses were seen.

8. Zaire military / police presence in the area of the camps appears to be limited to small police posts ( Garde Civil or Gendarmie ) located at edges of main camps. On several occasions these personnel have reportedly responded to incidents inside the camps but in general they do not enter the camps or conduct patrols. Larger concentrations (coy size ?) of Zaire military or Garde Civil are found at:

- a. GOMA (military and Garde Civil);
- b. RUGARI (military); and
- c. RUTSHURU (Garde Civil)

UNHCR Security and Protection Officers note that there are many problems experienced with Zaire military and police. UNAMIR is aware of this situation. When observed during this recce Zaire troops and Garde Civil appeared very disorganized and poorly equipped. This was noticeable even at the HQ position visited near KATALE camp. At KITUMAINI camp the local Garde Civil commander asked (a UNHCR Field Officer) for UN assistance in disarming FAR and militia at that camp. He said that Garde Civil could not do this.

#### INSPECTION OF CAMP AREAS

9. Goma area camps were inspected 14/15/16 November 94 by Sect 5 MILOB HAC team. Fol factors were evaluated:

- a. Terrain incl route infrastructure and going;

- b. Gen sit incl presence / posns of FAR; and
- c. Factors effecting possible deployment of secur force.

10. Principle UNHCR Fd Offrs were interviewed at all camps to provide insight into local sit and concerns. UNHCR Secur / Protection Offrs were interviewed to provide info on present sit and concerns.

#### **MUGUNGA AREA CAMPS**

11. **Gen.** MUGUNGA is a large and densely populated camp loc immed WEST of GOMA. Population is gen civilian but presence of militia is probable. Population is estimated to be 200,000. Camp is currently being developed by UNHCR with an aim of easing density of population. Developments include an expanded road network on perimeter of the camp and construction of market area and food distribution point to the WEST of the present camp centre. NGOs move freely within the camp and situation appears gen calm at this time.

12. **FAR.** FAR elements in this area are concentrated immed WEST of this camp at ZURO. Note that FAR elements presently use the MUGUNGA camp market. It is hoped that FAR presence in the camp will be reduced when new market is established WEST of camp and outside of camp boundaries. Most FAR now wear civ dress to gain access to food distribution. Possible identifiers include age, bearing and the wearing of military boots with other accoutrements (berets, belts, etc.)

13. **Gen Terrain.** Camps in this area are situated on a bed of volcanic rock. Terrain is gen difficult for movement by vehs of all types off road. Movement on foot is restricted by the extremely dense concentration of makeshift dwellings. Vegetation in the camp proper is non-existent, but perimeter areas are covered with a dense, low brush. Several high features surround the camps offering good points of observation over the area.

14. **Roads.** Main EAST/WEST road (GOMA - SAKE) is paved 2-lane. This route is in good condition and facilitates high speed movement through the area. Terrain NORTH and SOUTH of the road is gen non-passable to wh vehs allowing road to be easily blocked. MUGUNGA camp is circled by a newly constructed perimeter road and intersected by several newly constructed tracks. In all cases these have been scraped out of the lava bed and in some areas are very rough. Rubber tired vehs will be likely to experience rapid tire wear and failure. Tracked vehs will be prone to thrown tracks as large stones lodge between track and road wheels on turns. If cross-country movement is necessary only tracked vehs will be suitable. This movement will be very slow.

15. **Obstacles to Movement.** Dwellings covering the area, though

dense, are of flimsy construction and will pose no obstacle to cross-country movement. However, the loose composition of the surface terrain (pumice rock) will likely cause some reduced mobility for tracks and wheels on even slight inclines. Also present in the camp are many small walls constructed of lava stone reinforced with cribbing and in some cases cement. A high power line parallels the EAST/WEST road through the camp. This will be an obstacle to helicopters.

16. **Factors Effecting Deployment of UN Troops.** Any troops positioned in this area will face the same infrastructure difficulties currently faced by the refugees. Lack of available water, difficulty in constructing sanitation facilities, etc. The concentration of camps in this area will restrict development of any large base camp. Lake KIVU is obvious water source for resupply of deployed personnel in this sector. GOMA AIRPORT could be utilized as LOG BASE as was done by French OP TURQUOISE force.

#### KIBUMBA AREA CAMPS

17. **Gen.** KIBUMBA is a very large camp that sprawls for approximately 5 kms on the EAST side of the GOMA - RUTSHURU road. This camp lies very close to and immediately WEST of the RWANDA - ZAIRE border and 15 kms NORTH of GOMA. The terrain is generally open with no vegetation. The camp is overlooked by a high ridgeline on the RWANDA - ZAIRE border. Ground to the WEST of the camp, including the main road, also overlooks the camp. Several high features lie within the area of the camp.

18. **FAR.** FAR presence in the camp is estimated to be 3 - 500. These soldiers appear to be concentrated at the SOUTH end of the camp site. There is a heavy militia presence in the camp.

19. **Gen Terrain.** The terrain is gen flat and open. Density of dwellings is medium to heavy. There are few obstacles to movement within the camp itself. Off-road movement would be possible for tracked vehs but would be very slow due to undulating nature of the ground.

20. **Roads.** Main GOMA - RUTSHURU road is paved two-lane and facilitates fast movement. Terrain adjacent to road is gen open and could be crossed by tracked vehs. There is a good system of secondary tracks including a perimeter track inside the camp itself. Surface is earth over volcanic rock.

21. **Obstacles to Movement.** There are few obstacles to movement by tracked within the camp. There is no significant vegetation in the camp area. The ground WEST of the main GOMA - RUTSHURU road rises steeply to VOLCAN NYIRAGONGO and is heavily wooded. It is impassable to veh movement and in poor weather is an obstacle to air/helicopter ops.

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22. **Factors Effecting Deployment of UN Troops.** This area offers many sites for large scale deployments on commanding ground. Proximity of GOMA (15 kms) is an important factor for logistic planning. There is good potential for isolating this camp if required.

#### **KATALE AREA CAMPS**

23. **Gen.** The KATALE/KAHINDO camps sprawl for approximately 15 kms through a narrow volcanic valley 35 kms NORTH of GOMA. The camps have been constructed on a lava plateau. Viewed from the ground the camps have a somewhat "lunar" appearance.

24. **FAR.** There is limited FAR presence in this camp. There is a heavy militia presence.

25. **Gen Terrain.** Terrain is extremely difficult for movement, with undulating ground cross-hatched with deep fissures (some emitting toxic volcanic gasses) and patches of thick scrub brush. In low areas deep swamps/small lakes have formed. Dominating ground to the EAST is very steep and covered with banana plantations or thick jungle. Ground to WEST of camps is generally covered with thick scrub. Off road movement is impossible for all types of vehs and is difficult and slow for foot movement.

26. **Roads.** The main GOMA-RUTSHURU road running NORTH/SOUTH is paved 2-lane as far as RUTSHURU. This road runs through the valley bottom or along the EAST side of the valley and is very restricted. It could be easily blocked. Roads NORTH and EAST of RUTSHURU are narrow dirt tracks through heavy jungle. While heavy lift vehs travelling from UGANDA now utilize these routes they are very difficult, especially during rainy seasons. However, with basic maintenance these routes offer alternative supply lines. Roads within the camps are under construction. A perimeter road around KATALE camp will be completed within 2 weeks. All areas of the camps are connected by a system of foot trails.

27. **Obstacles to Movement.** The volcanic rock and gen nature of the terrain is an obstacle to all veh movement. Field Officers interviewed noted that on average a pair of boots lasts only one month in these camps.

28. **Factors Effecting Deployment of UN Troops.** Troops deployed to this area must be completely self-contained. All construction including digging of latrines is extremely difficult. Resupply line from GOMA will be very vulnerable. Note that there is an unmarked airstrip located near the SOUTH end of KATALE camp, EAST of the main road. This is a grass strip 1100 m x 100 m which is suitable

for helicopters and possibly as a site for a small log base. It is presently occupied by a platoon and HQ of Zaire Garde Civil.

#### **RUTSHURU/JOMBA AREA CAMPS**

29. **Gen.** Camps in this area are small (avg pop. 5,000) and are situated in clear areas surrounded by heavy jungle. Limited support to refugees is provided by local missions and some NGOs. Populations essentially "live off the land."

30. **FAR.** There is some militia presence in all camps. FAR presence appears to be confined to KITUMAINI camp (200). Zaire Garde Civil post there noted that FAR regularly conducts armed patrols in the region, covering the approaches to routes through the VOLCANO PARK (Karisimbi Region).

31. **Gen Terrain.** Area is thick rain forest with ground generally rising towards the volcano peaks in the SOUTHEAST. Thick canopy prevents roads from drying completely during the rainy season. There are a number of small rivers in the area, several running close to the principle roads. A number of mission schools provide the only hard accommodation. Most dwellings are of mud-hut type.

32. **Roads.** EAST-WEST road running through RUTSHURU is the primary route in the region. It is a dirt single lane road which is difficult in rainy seasons. Secondary tracks run through the many banana plantations along this road, offering limited by-pass options at some points.

33. **Obstacles to Movement.** Jungle is impassable to vehicles. Main route is difficult to wheeled vehs in rainy season. All routes are easily blocked.

34. **Factors Effecting Deployment of UN Troops.** Mission schools provide the best sites for firm base locations. A good hospital is located near KIBANDA ( EAST of RUTSHURU). Troops deployed to this area must be self-sufficient. Supply lines from GOMA are very vulnerable. Possible routes through UGANDA could be considered in logistic planning. Engineer and recovery resources must be considered.

#### **CONCLUSIONS**

35. The following are principle conclusions taken from this reconnaissance:

- a. Terrain analysis shows a requirement for deployed units to have a mixed track / wheel capability. This is especially true for RRF units;




- b. Units deployed at or near camps must be prepared for difficulty in the establishment of basic infrastructure i.e. latrines, camp drainage, field defenses. A good engineering capability should be a high priority in force structure planning.
- d. Log planning including resupply of deployed sub-units must make contingency for units becoming isolated in their AOs. Alternate supply routes into ZAIRE via UGANDA should be considered.


JS McComber  
Major  
HAC Tm Ldr Gisenyi

**Attachments:**

Map JOG SA 35-4/8 1:250,000 (annotated)







# LEGENDE

ROUTE PRINCIPALE	—————	NOM DU CAMP	KATALE
ROUTE SECONDAIRE	- - - - -	COURS D'EAU	~~~~~
LIMITE D'ETAT	—————	PONT	X
LIMITE DU LAC KIVU	—————	NOM DE LA ZONE	RUTSHURU
CAMP DES REFUGIES	●●●●●	POMPES AU LAC	⊙
		ADDUCTION D'EAU	.....

Major Refugee Concentrations  
Goma, Zaire



## Security Council

Distr.  
GENERAL

S/PRST/1994/75  
30 November 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

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### STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

At the 3472nd meeting of the Security Council, held on 30 November 1994, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "The situation concerning Rwanda", the President of the Security Council made the following statement on behalf of the Council:

"The Security Council has considered carefully the report of the Secretary-General dated 18 November 1994 on the security in the Rwandese refugee camps (S/1994/1308), particularly those located in Zaire. It is gravely concerned at the situation described in the Secretary-General's report.

"The Security Council condemns the actions being taken by the former Rwandan leaders, and by former government forces and militias to prevent, in some cases by force, the repatriation of the refugees in the camps. It also condemns the ongoing interference by these groups and individuals in the provision of humanitarian relief, and is deeply concerned that this interference has already led to the withdrawal of some non-governmental agencies responsible for the distribution of relief supplies within the camps.

"The Security Council is alarmed at the indications that these same groups and individuals may be preparing for an armed invasion of Rwanda. It deplores the fact that food distributed by relief agencies for those in the camps is apparently being misappropriated for this purpose. The Council condemns all such actions. It warns these persons, many of whom may have been implicated in the genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law which were unleashed on Rwanda in April 1994, that their actions will only reinforce the determination of the international community to ensure that such persons are brought to justice. The Council also stresses once again the responsibilities of neighbouring countries for ensuring that their territories are not used to destabilize the situation inside Rwanda.

"The Security Council notes the statement in the Secretary-General's report of 18 November 1994 that the first step towards promoting the repatriation of refugees must be a determined effort by the international



community to reduce intimidation of prospective returnees and to improve security in the Rwandese refugee camps, especially those in Zaire. The Security Council attaches equal importance to the Secretary-General's observation that any operation to achieve this would be futile without parallel efforts to promote national reconciliation and reconstruction in Rwanda. The Council stresses the imperative of reinvigorating the political process to provide a framework for any action taken to address security in the camps and the repatriation of Rwandese refugees to Rwanda. The framework should include a mechanism for sustaining a dialogue between the Government of Rwanda, refugee representatives and the United Nations.

"The Security Council considers that the options described in the Secretary-General's report raise complex issues which require further elucidation. The Council requests the Secretary-General to consult potential troop contributors to assess their willingness to participate in a possible peace-keeping operation modelled along the lines described in paragraphs 18 to 25 of the Secretary-General's report, namely to create secure areas within large camp sites, providing safe conditions for the refugees in those areas. The Council requests the Secretary-General to provide a detailed description of the objectives, rules of engagement and costs of such an operation as soon as possible. The Council further requests the Secretary-General to continue to explore as appropriate all possible means of addressing the problems in the camps. The Council will be giving further urgent consideration of this question in the light of the additional information it receives from the Secretary-General.

"The Security Council encourages the Secretary-General to assess the taking, on an interim basis, of initial measures aimed at providing immediate assistance to the Zairian security forces in protecting humanitarian operations in the camps, including the possibility of deploying security experts, from member Governments or through contract arrangements, to train and monitor the local security forces. The Council also requests the Secretary-General to consider what steps need to be taken to address the question of security in the refugee camps in Tanzania and Burundi. However, the Council is concerned that the use of local security forces without international involvement may not prove to be an effective approach to the security problems in the camps.

"The Security Council recognizes that, in the wake of the events that have overtaken Rwanda, the Government needs immediate and major financial assistance, particularly in the establishment of security conditions inside the country, the maintenance of law and order, the administration of justice, economic and social rehabilitation and national reconciliation for all Rwandese.

"The Security Council notes the deployment of 60 human rights officers in the country and the steps taken by UNAMIR to promote the re-establishment of civil administration throughout the country and looks forward to full deployment. The Council also welcomes the fact that procedures are being instituted, with the cooperation of the Government of Rwanda, to make operational the International Tribunal for Rwanda established in resolution 955 (1994).

/...

"The Security Council reminds States that, in accordance with resolution 925 (1994), the Secretary-General has established a trust fund which could serve as a useful conduit for contributions to meet the immediate needs of the Government of Rwanda. It calls upon the international community to provide the resources needed for the Rwanda Emergency Normalization Plan, the forthcoming UNDP-sponsored round-table meeting and the consolidated inter-agency appeal.

"The Security Council welcomes the Secretary-General's intention to work with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to address the wider problems of the subregion.

"The Security Council notes that preparations are under way for the convening in Bujumbura in the near future of a regional conference on assistance to refugees, returnees and displaced persons in the Great Lakes region, sponsored by the OAU and endorsed by the General Assembly in resolution 49/7. It also notes the Secretary-General's view that the United Nations and OAU should jointly convene at a later stage a broader conference to address a range of political and other issues, including national reconciliation, in order to identify long-term solutions to ensure peace, security and development in the subregion. Given the urgent need to take forward the political process as part of an overall strategy, including action on security in the camps and conditions inside Rwanda, the Council requests the Secretary-General to consider how preparations for this conference can be accelerated.

"The Security Council will remain seized of the matter."

-----

COPY  
FILE 5000.11 (PLANS)

FC for comments.

UNITED NATIONS  
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES  
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: GAREKHAN, KITTANI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 18 OCTOBER 1994

NO: MIR

SUBJECT: REPORT OF THE UN TECHNICAL TEAM ON THE  
SECURITY SITUATION IN THE RWANDESE REFUGEE  
CAMPS IN ZAIRE

NO OF PAGES: ~~65~~ 7

1. On 17 October, I conveyed the report prepared under the guidance of Brig. Gen. H.K. Anyidoho after the joint commission's visit to Zaire where they visited a) the refugee camps in Goma and Bukavu, b) the likely sites for new camps in the interior of Zaire and c) Kinshasa, where further discussions took place between the teams. The joint commission, composed of 7 UN staff members and 10 Zairian officials, visited Zaire from 26 September to 11 October 1994. At the outset, I would like to commend the joint commission for the expeditious and thorough manner in which the report has been prepared. I give below my comments regarding the report.

2. Before focussing on the main elements of the report, I shall preface my comments with the following observations:

- a) While the report focusses on the narrow issue of the separation of camps, my comments encompass the broader spectrum of resolving the overall issue of refugee return in which the separation of camps is an important factor but not necessarily the only one.
- b) You will note that on several political issues the report rightly does not offer a definitive opinion. For instance, on the question of whether the former FAR would willingly move to alternative camps or resist by force is left open. My recommendations are based on the worst case scenarios, though it does not mean that I necessarily subscribe to them.
- c) In my assessment, I have taken into account the opinions expressed to me by the Governor of North Bukavu, UN agencies' and NGO's representatives during my recent visit to refugee camps in Goma.
- d) The report represents the findings and assessment of our team. It is not a joint report which will be finalized in a few days. This report must, therefore, be treated as confidential.

3. Introduction - Reasons for the stalling of refugee return.

I agree with the report's assessment that the reasons for the stalling of refugee return is intimidation in the refugee camps by the Interahamwe, on the one hand, and harassment, even atrocities, to returning refugees in Rwanda, on the other. It follows that both symptoms need to be addressed in a synchronized manner in order to meet the primary objective of an early return of refugees to Rwanda.

4. Categories and number of refugees.

The report has followed the same categorization that I had indicated in my code cable MIR 1850 of 21 Sep 1994. It agrees also with my initial assessment that category c) (Interahamwe) is the most dangerous and influential element in the camps and that they are difficult to differentiate because they operate in civilian clothes and can melt away in the crowds. The number in each category is, however, different from my earlier assessment. I accept the figures arrived at by the technical team. They are summarized as follows:



Categories	Initial estimates	Joint commission estimates
a) Political leaders	50 families	228 political leaders, 1,000 dependents. Total: approx. 1,200
b) Army	16,000 army, 65,000 dependents. Total: approx. 80,000	50,000 of whom 30,000 would seek re-settlement in new camps
c) Interahamwe	Figures not estimated	Figures not estimated
d) The ordinary citizens	1 million	850,000 in North Kivu (Goma), 336,000 in South Kivu (Bukavu) Total: 1.186,000

5. The main points that emerge from the report relating categories and numbers are:

- a) The number of army personnel to be re-settled (30,000) is much less than the figure initially estimated (80,000).
- b) The army is roughly divided equally in North and South Kivu provinces (16,000 each) and those in south Kivu are already in organized, separated camps. The army elements in North Kivu are more mixed with the civilian population, are more active politically and less disciplined. The joint commission endorses our assessment that the army has played a less negative role than category (c) in coercing the refugee population in the camps.

6. The report concludes that there is growing consultation and cooperation among the political leaders, the military and the Interahamwe and that there is increasing control by these elements in the camps. The UN agencies and the NGO's could not prevent this development and have, in the main, acquiesced in its consolidation since it provides an element of order in the distribution of humanitarian aid.

7. The sites.

The technical team visited several sites and agreed that the following sites were the more suitable, in order of priority:

.../...

- i) Lokandu
- ii) Irebu
- iii) Kongolo.

8. The technical team described in considerable detail the general logistic and other difficulties that would need to be overcome in order to move the refugees to these new camps. The following factors emerged as important:

- i) It would not be possible or advisable to re-settle all refugees in one large camp because apart from the logistic problems, the refugees would overwhelm the local population. Each camp should have a refugee population of between 5-10,000.
- ii) The camps would require considerable infrastructure preparation (airfields, roads, permanent structures, etc.) which would take at least two months from the date of commissioning.
- iii) The protection of the camps would require one battalion each.
- iv) All the likely camps are at a considerable distance from existing camps and there would be no possibility of a link-up in the future.

9. Financial and logistic requirements for opening of new camps

The joint commission's report gives an estimate of the financial and logistic cost of opening the new camps. Although the actual number of persons to be transferred is lower than initially estimated, the financial and logistic cost of the move (US 200 m) is forbidding, almost prohibitive. Nevertheless, the Zairian government appears intent on opening up the camps - perhaps more for financial reasons than to resolve the refugee problem of the border. Accordingly, it would be desirable not to reject outright, at this stage, the opening of camps in order to carry the Zairians whole heartedly in the overall operation.

.../...

10. The Security angle.

The security angle is the most important element in the operation. In reviewing the need to provide effective security in the camps and in the transfer of new camps, the joint commission has come to the following broad conclusions:

- a) As a first step, a UN force exuding commitment, power and strength, must establish control in the camps weakening the hold of the Interahamwe.
- b) This force must be separate from UNAMIR and should consist of well-trained commando battalions. Ideally, it should be a one-country force or a combination of countries, preferably French speaking.
- c) The need for intelligence as also secrecy and surprise is important. Violence should be expected and the force should have the power (Chapter VII) to meet armed resistance.
- d) The primary trial of strength and will would be expected in the first phase, i.e. immediately after the arrival of security forces in the region. The transfer to camps would follow in a subsequent phase.
- e) The Zairian forces should not be relied upon to front the operation. They should be used for back-up purposes.
- f) Additional battalions would be required in the camps (one each), as also civilian police.

11. The above is a summary of the joint commission's conclusions which I endorse. However, my discussions in Goma led me to the following additional reflections:

- a) The primary issue of controlling the coercive power of the political elements in the camps would be resolved in the early phase of a UN-force's deployment in the region. At best the very presence of a UN force would lead to Interahamwe ceding control of the camps. At worst, the force would need to have a showdown with the political elements.

- b) The separation of the military to new camps may not even be necessary if the Interahamwe's control can be suppressed, because the army is mainly in separate camps already (especially in South Kivu) and does not act as a primary negative factor in the intimidatory process. However, it would be necessary to carry through with the separation process - perhaps in one camp only - in order to retain the Zairian government's support (as the transfer is seen as an economic fillip to the government) and to lower Interahamwe morale in the camps.
- c) The need to neutralize Interahamwe is of paramount importance. An intelligence operation to identify the Interahamwe elements would need to be discreetly taken in hand immediately, so that they are apprehended and kept in a high-security detention camp. This raid needs to be mounted with careful planning and an element of surprise.
- d) The need for a synchronized, simultaneous effort on the part of BBGNU to reassure refugees of fair treatment, a welcoming return, safe conduct to their homes and proper settlement must be ensured.

12. Conclusions.

- a) The report underlines the fact that the high cost of the operation to separate the camps lies in the human force back-up rather than on logistics. Thus, the greater the anticipated resistance, the higher the cost.
- b) There is a valid assumption that there would be violent resistance to separation and hence the cost would be prohibitive, even to open one camp.
- c) The key to a successful operation to nullify the pernicious influence of the Interahamwe lies in speed and surprise. The UN, by definition, is not capable of mounting such an operation. Instead, either a single country force or a private security firm would have to carry out the operation.
- d) Tanzania, definitely, and Zaire, probably, have the internal military capability to warrant such an operation, provided they have the political will to do so. Indications are that Tanzania is not inclined and that President Mobutu has reservations.

- e) While the suppression of political (Interahamwe) intimidation is a factor, a more effective solution for refugee return is for the Rwandese government to banish fear from the minds of refugees by adopting appropriate reassuring and welcoming attitudes towards them. The government must, therefore, be given the appropriate financial back-up for resettlement, etc.

13. Recommendations.

1. The report outlines the cost, complexities and difficulties of mounting an operation in the camps. It indicates the political issues involved on both sides of the frontier and the need for a simultaneous, synchronized approach. It is recommended that all these factors be assessed by a high-level team to visit the region to chalk out a plan of action for the Security Council to consider.
2. My personal inclination is for a security force to be assigned to the region with a view, through its very presence, to gradually diminish and suppress the influence of the Interahamwe and to back-up the local administrations and the UN agencies operating in the camps. This presence would be aimed at nullifying the intimidation which inhibits the freedom of choice of category d) refugees.
3. This force should not be part of UNAMIR and should have an independent mandate. It should address the moral issues of refugees being allowed freedom of choice.
4. Simultaneously, the Rwandese government should be persuaded to adopt a campaign for political reconciliation at all levels and a welcoming attitude to returnees with appropriate measures for re-settlement for which it must be provided financial support.
5. The issue of separation should be left open and taken in hand only if there is a willingness by categories a) and b) to move, thereby reducing the cost of transfer to acceptable proportions.

14. Regards.

---

FM: UNAMIR HQ//DFC//

File Reference:  
1000.1(DFC)G/10

Date: Dec 8, 1994

TO: Sector 1 Comd  
Sector 2 Comd  
Sector 3 Comd  
Sector 4A Comd  
Sector 4B Comd  
Sector 4C Comd  
Sector 5 Comd  
CO Ausmed  
CO Cancon  
CO Ethiobatt  
CO Frafbatt  
CO Ghanbatt  
CO Indbatt  
CO Malawicoy  
CO Malicoy  
CO Nibatt  
CO Tunbatt  
CO Zambatt  
Dist List A, B

THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM THE RWANDAN  
AUTHORITIES AND IS TO BE ENFORCED BY ALL UNAMIR PERSONNEL

Subject: Handing out items and money directly to children on the streets

The Government is grateful for the assistance the International Community is  
extending to the people of Rwanda in an effort to save livelihoods.

There are however, reports of immediate concern regarding well wishers who  
distribute biscuits, sweets, petty cash directly to children on streets. This is not the best  
way to rehabilitate children.

What might be a good-will gesture is turning into an unfortunate national problem.  
Many children are increasingly attracted to streets and are now beginning to beg and hang  
around International Community presence hoping to get some handouts.

The Government is appealing to all concerned to kindly stop this act immediately.  
In the best interest of children, any assistance to children should be channelled through  
relevant institutions or organisations.

Among the priorities and preoccupation of the Government is to address children  
needs/protection.

We hope that the International Community will work with the Government in this  
endeavour. Providing preventative measures to stop children from becoming street  
parasites would be one step in the right direction.

**Thank you very much for your Co-operation.**

**Yours Sincerely**

**Jacques BIHOZAGARA**

**MINISTER OF REHABILITATION  
AND SOCIAL REINTEGRATION**

**NATIONS UNIES**  
**HAUT COMMISSARIAT**  
**POUR LES RÉFUGIÉS**



*Délégation pour le Rwanda*

**UNITED NATIONS**  
**HIGH COMMISSIONER**  
**FOR REFUGEES**

Télégrammes: HICOMREF  
Télex: 22558 HCNUR RW  
Téléphone 64 26/24 96

KIGALI B.P. 867

RWA/HCR/0518

1 September 1994

Sir,

I would like to inform you that since 23/08/1994, UNHCR has established a permanent presence in Cyangugu. The main tasks of our officers there are to prepare for the return of rwandese refugees from Zaire, and until such return takes place, to participate to the assistance activities for internally displaced persons in the prefecture. Because of the still volatile security situation prevailing in Cyangugu, I would be much grateful if it could be possible for UNAMIR troops stationed there to provide security to my colleagues in the following fields :

- armed guards during the night for the staff house
- setting up of a common security channel on the vhf system
- escort for the UNHCR convoys transporting returnees from Cyangugu to Butare.

I am fully aware that UNAMIR has a limited capacity but I feel that in the present situation this request is justified and I am thanking you in advance for your urgent attention.

I avail myself of this opportunity to reiterate to you, Sir, the assurances of my very high consideration.

②

D/SC/3

Can we support this?

H/14

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'W. R. Urusa'.

W. R. Urusa  
Representative

Brigadier General Tousignant  
UNAMIR  
Kigali

---



MEMORANDUM

9850-1

3 Sept 94

FC (thru DFC/COS)

REFUGEE RETURN

Ref: Rwanda Presidential letter dated 1 Sep 94 (attached)

1. The majority of concerns and issues in the letter at ref are outside of UNAMIR force's control or influence. Security of Tanzanian and Zairean refugee camps, the repatriation of refugees and the human rights issues are clearly outside UNAMIR's mandate for its military force. Those issues should be addressed by UNREO, UNHCR and other NGO's.

2. With respect to the establishment of safe corridors for the return of refugees, it should be noted that there is an NGO/humanitarian aspect as well as a military force/security aspect associated. In so much that it is my assessment that the current deployment, tasks and situation precludes the military force from assuming any additional tasks without receiving additional troop reinforcement beyond those currently authorized/planned.


3. Prior to considering the creation of safe corridors, UNAMIR should confirm the required information and determine feasibility of the following:

- a. routes and location where corridors are required (ie: in all sectors or just in Sector 4);
- b. whether refugee flow warrants this extraordinary measure;
- c. final destination of refugees (to avoid "Kigali DP" situation from worsening);
- d. assistance avail from IOM, UNHCR and other NGO's to screen/move refugees/DP's and establish "way stations"; and
- e. establishment of collection pts at border and the provision of tpt, secur, escort is sufficient to BBGNU and achievable/practical for UNAMIR and NGO's.

FC  
I agree with the pertinent issues  
raised by DCE's ops. I have  
asked if my MA to convene  
a meeting of the officials  
page 2 para 4 for us to look  
through the matter.  
H 04/9  
PFC

4. Suggest a meeting chaired by DFC/COS with DCOS OPS, DCOS SP, HAC, UNREO and SRSG rep be convened to resolve some of the issues in para 3 to determine feasibility and way ahead.

5. Furthermore, the attached letter should be referred to UNDP/UNREO in order to address the non-military issues.



J. Arp  
Col  
DCOS OPS

Attachement: 1



UNAMIR - MINUAR

11/Plane  
DCOS GP

TO: Distribution List

FROM: LCol P. Desnoyers *[Signature]* ①

DATE: 16 September 1994

SUBJECT: REFUGEES/DISPLACED PERSONS  
RETURN HOME

### BACKGROUND

1. Numerous quantities have been mentioned with regard to the amount of refugees/displaced Rwandans ~~within~~ and outside Rwanda. Suffice it to say that the exact number is well above one million persons or the equivalent of more than 25,000 vehicle-load of 40 persons per vehicle. Very little movement is currently observed coming from the refugee/displaced persons camps. The camps are themselves contributing to the instability of the country. Many UNAMIR vehicle resources are now available pending the arrival of the main bodies of contingents and the now routine weekly resupply concept adopted for the Force.

### AIM

2. To propose a military option to assist the relief agencies in the relocation of the refugees/displaced Rwandans.

### FACTORS

3. The following ~~facturs~~ factors are considered in the assessment of options:
- a. Will to Return Home. The will to return home depends on the following aspects:
- (1) Security. Will it be safe for them to return home?
  - (2) Humanitarian Assistance Dependency. The humanitarian effort has been very ~~successfull~~ so far; over one hundred camps have been established and are being resupplied and supported by various relief agencies. Are the refugees/displaced persons becoming dependant on the relief effort itself? Will the rain season permit the continuation of the uninterrupted provisioning of support/relief?
  - (3) A ~~propaganda~~ campaign to reassure and encourage people to return to their home is essential to the success of this task:

### ② G3 Plans

1. Pls review & discuss
  2. Need tasking ① to accomplish.
- [Signature]*

? Can  
DFD/COS req  
RPA LAs Prefect reps  
to simplify  
checks, coord  
& destination

- b. Health Conditions. The health conditions in these camps are not ideal and, in some cases, contagious diseases could be spread in non-afflicted areas if the sick are not contained and treated first. **A medical screening is required prior to moving any refugees/displaced persons;**
- c. RPA Verifications. Currently, verifications are conducted at check points which slows down the movement process because of the offloading and loading of personnel on the vehicles. **These verifications should be done with the full participation of the authorities, including the receiving prefects, at the initial loading points (at the camps themselves);**
- d. Final Destinations. Because almost 90% of the Rwandan population were rural-based, it must be assumed that most of the refugees/displaced persons should not be returned to cities/villages. **Close coordination is required with the selected receiving prefectures to ensure that correct moves are made;**
- e. Road Conditions. The conditions of the roads are very difficult, either because of hills or dirt surfaces, which limits the selection of the vehicles that are capable of performing the task of moving people. This situation will worsen shortly with the arrival of the rain season. **Movement and use of military-type vehicles should be restricted to those areas not accessible to other types;**
- f. UNHCR/IOM Staging. Staging is an important step of the return home of refugees/displaced persons. It ensures that they are provided with the essential ingredients to start up in their home as well as ensuring that they arrive at their final destinations during daylight hours. **Close coordination is required with the UNHCR/IOM staging areas;**
- g. Mass Population Effect. This factor cannot be underestimated following its effect during the war. **The more concentrated the relocation effort for refugees/displaced persons the more chances are that all those in the targeted areas will want to return home;**
- h. Location of Camps. Camps are located throughout the country but most are concentrated in sector 4 (for those within Rwanda), estimated at well over half a million persons;
- i. Available UNHCR/IOM Resources. These agencies have mainly hard surface resources including 50 passenger buses; and
- j. Available UNAMIR Resources. Until the arrival of ZAMBATT and TUNBATT and while BRITCON is available, the following assets are available:
  - (1) 50 x Bedford 4T trucks (British and Brown and Root drivers) - 3 have been allocated to sector 5 for the movement of refugees/displaced persons,
  - (2) 50 x DAF trucks (Zambian drivers),



- (3) 10 x ISUZU/MAN trucks (Brown and Root drivers), and
- (4) a transport company/squadron command and control element (BRITCON).

#### OPTIONS

4. Considering the factors, all the options considered must have the following criteria:

- Spokesman a. A propaganda campaign sponsored by the government in cooperation with UNAMIR;
- DFC/COS?/FMO b. The presence of prefecture, RPA and medical authorities at loading points;
- CHAC c. Staging at a UNHCR/IOM base; and
- CHAC d. Coordination with NGOs bringing relief aid to camp to ensure the transfer of the aid is done concurrently with the transfer of persons.

5. Option A - Split the UNAMIR Vehicle Resources under Sector Control.

This option ensures that all sectors get a proportionate quantity of vehicles in accordance with the number of refugees/displaced persons in their sectors. The coordination is *Lack of con* difficult as most refugees/displaced persons will have to cross between sectors.

6. Option B - Retain Centralized Control in KIGALI. This option ensures the broadest view of the situation but enhances the coordination problem of Option A with the involvement of all sectors (5) and prefectures (12).

7. Option C - Focus on One Area which has a High Contration of Persons.

This option favours one area over the others but provides the following advantages:

- a. Simplifies coordination;
- b. Accelerates the planned movements; and
- c. Provides the potential generator for mass population movement within that area.

#### CONCLUSION

8. Though UNAMIR has resources available to assist in the relocation of refugees/displaced persons, its number is relatively small compared to the total requirements. Nevertheless, there is a potential impact that a concentrated effort on a selected area could have on the remainder of the population.

## RECOMMENDATION

9. Option C in sector 4 A with the following details:
- a. task each sector (1, 4B and 4C) to provide 3 x trucks with drivers for the movement of refugees/displaced persons; *(within sector)*
  - b. provide sector 2 with 3 x trucks with drivers for the movement of refugees/displaced persons (sector 5 already has 3 x trucks);
  - c. provide all other available trucks (up to 100) for the movement of refugees/displaced persons from sector 4A - the GIKONGORO Prefecture (350,000 in 28 camps) - to sector 3 - the BUTARE and GITARAMA prefectures;
  - d. locate these transport assets in the BUTARE area to be in proximity to the UNHCR/IOM staging base and one of the prefects involved (30 minutes from GIKONGORO and 60 minutes from GITARAMA);
  - e. task BRITCON with the coordination requirements of all parties involved; and
  - f. locate the command and control element of this task in the current TAC HQ location for ease of communication and liaison.
10. This task should be assigned as soon as possible as the rain season is already starting and the main bodies of new contingents are scheduled to arrive shortly.

## DISTRIBUTION LIST

### Action

CHAC

### Information

FC  
DCOS Ops  
DCOS Sp  
G3 Plans  
G4 Log

\* Mtg 1000hrs  
20 Sep 94.  
at TAC HQ to coord  
\* Need coord instr  
w/ timings.  
\* Info Tac HQ

*File: contingency plans*

*G3 PLANS*

UNITED NATIONS  
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES  
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

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DATE: 16 September 1994

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### AIM

2. To propose a military option to assist the relief agencies in the relocation of the refugees/displaced Rwandans.

### FACTORS

3. The following factors are considered in the assessment of options:
- a. Will to Return Home. The will to return home depends on the following aspects:
    - (1) Security. Will it be safe for them to return home?
    - (2) Humanitarian Assistance Dependency. The humanitarian effort has been very successful so far; over one hundred camps have been established and are being resupplied and supported by various relief agencies. Are the refugees/displaced persons becoming dependant on the relief effort itself? Will the rain season permit the continuation of the uninterrupted provisioning of support/relief?
    - (3) A propaganda campaign to reassure and encourage people to return to their home is essential to the success of this task:

- b. Health Conditions. The health conditions in these camps are not ideal and, in some cases, contagious diseases could be spread in non-afflicted areas if the sick are not contained and treated first. **A medical screening is required prior to moving any refugees/displaced persons;**
- c. RPA Verifications. Currently, verifications are conducted at check points which slows down the movement process because of the offloading and loading of personnel on the vehicles. **These verifications should be done with the full participation of the authorities, including the receiving prefects, at the initial loading points (at the camps themselves);**
- d. Final Destinations. Because almost 90% of the Rwandan population were rural-based, it must be assumed that most of the refugees/displaced persons should not be returned to cities/villages. **Close coordination is required with the selected receiving prefectures to ensure that correct moves are made;**
- e. Road Conditions. The conditions of the roads are very difficult, either because of hills or dirt surfaces, which limits the selection of the vehicles that are capable of performing the task of moving people. This situation will worsen shortly with the arrival of the rain season. **Movement and use of military-type vehicles should be restricted to those areas not accessible to other types;**
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#### OPTIONS

4. Considering the factors, all the options considered must have the following criteria:

- a. A propaganda campaign sponsored by the government in cooperation with UNAMIR;
- b. The presence of prefecture, RPA and medical authorities at loading points;
- c. Staging at a UNHCR/IOM base; and
- d. Coordination with NGOs bringing relief aid to camp to ensure the transfer of the aid is done concurrently with the transfer of persons.

5. Option A - Split the UNAMIR Vehicle Resources under Sector Control.  
This option ensures that all sectors get a proportionate quantity of vehicles in accordance with the number of refugees/displaced persons in their sectors. The coordination is difficult as most refugees/displaced persons will have to cross between sectors.

6. Option B - Retain Centralized Control in KIGALI. This option ensures the broadest view of the situation but enhances the coordination problem of Option A with the involvement of all sectors (5) and prefectures (12).

7. Option C - Focus on One Area which has a High Contration of Persons.  
This option favours one area over the others but provides the following advantages:

- a. Simplifies coordination;
- b. Accelerates the planned movements; and
- c. Provides the potential generator for mass population movement within that area.

#### CONCLUSION

8. Though UNAMIR has resources available to assist in the relocation of refugees/displaced persons, its number is relatively small compared to the total requirements. Nevertheless, there is a potential impact that a concentrated effort on a selected area could have on the remainder of the population.

## RECOMMENDATION

9. Option C in sector 4 A with the following details:
  - a. task each sector (1, 4B and 4C) to provide 3 x trucks with drivers for the movement of refugees/displaced persons;
  - b. provide sector 2 with 3 x trucks with drivers for the movement of refugees/displaced persons (sector 5 already has 3 x trucks);
  - c. provide all other available trucks (up to 100) for the movement of refugees/displaced persons from sector 4A - the GIKONGORO Prefecture (350,000 in 28 camps) - to sector 3 - the BUTARE and GITARAMA prefectures;
  - d. locate these transport assets in the BUTARE area to be in proximity to the UNHCR/IOM staging base and one of the prefects involved (30 minutes from GIKONGORO and 60 minutes from GITARAMA);
  - e. task BRITCON with the coordination requirements of all parties involved; and
  - f. locate the command and control element of this task in the current TAC HQ location for ease of communication and liaison.
10. This task should be assigned as soon as possible as the rain season is already starting and the main bodies of new contingents are scheduled to arrive shortly.

## DISTRIBUTION LIST

### Action

CHAC

### Information

FC  
DCOS Ops  
DCOS Sp  
G3 Plans  
G4 Log

In a meeting between the UNHCR Ms. Sadako Ogata, the WFP Executive Director Ms. Catherine Bertini, the UNICEF deputy Executive Director Karin Sham Poo, the UNDP Assistant Administrator Ms. merlin Johnson-Sileaf and the DHA Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Mr. Peter Hansen, a broad understanding was reached on the allocation of responsibilities between the UN Agencies for the Rwanda Emergency. Individual UN Agencies were identified as sectorial or cross-sectorial reference point for the effective management of the humanitarian intervention.

#### Overall Coordination -- UNREO/DHA

1. Coordination of humanitarian relief assistance in Rwanda
2. Elaboration of strategies and contingency plans
3. Field monitoring, situation and needs assessments
4. Interaction with local authorities
5. Liaising with military contingent commanders and UNAMIR Force Commander
6. Security procedures and communications

#### Sectoral and Cross-sectoral Focal/Reference Points

##### UNHCR

1. Operational coordination of relief activities outside Rwanda
2. Repatriation planning, establishment of way-stations and (*inter-alia* with IOM) organisation of onward transportation of refugees to home communities
3. Air transportation
4. Shelter materials/basic relief items
5. Protection monitoring (in coordination with the High Commissioner for Human Rights)

##### UNICEF

1. Water and Sanitation
2. Health and Nutrition
3. Unaccompanied minors and orphans
4. Non-food relief items
5. Education
6. Psycho-social needs

##### WFP

1. Food and rations
2. Land transportation
3. Storage
4. Food for work

##### FAO

1. Agriculture
2. Livestock

UNAMIR  
Force HQ  
C Plans

22 August 1994

5000.11(Plans)

TO: COL YAACHE (HAC)

SUBJECT: RETURN OF DISPLACED PERSONS/REFUGEES


Reference:

A. Discussion G3 Plans/Col Yaache of 22 Aug 94.

1. Mr Wally Amundson of ADRA (business card attached) has suggested a method to effect the subject matter.

2. The proposal would require the transportation of selected individuals to their homes and the provision of radio facilities in order for them to speak directly to their families in camps. It is anticipated that a positive message would encourage the return of the affected families and instil confidence in others.

3. For your consideration.

  
AD BRIMELOW  
Lt Col  
G3 Plans

**REPORT FOR PROPOSED**

**REFUGEE CAMP**

**GRID 1820 8320**

## PROPOSED AID STATION

### References:

Map Series Z723  
Sheets 16, 17, 23, 24

Grid Ref 1820 8320

### Existing Buildings

There are two buildings on site:

- 1) Church. Door pad locked good state of repair
- 2) Two storey house with out buildings. Good state of repair.

### Water

There is no running water on site.

### Power

There is no power supply.

### Access

Straight forward route from main road. MLC  
40.

### Work on Site Req'd



Improve entry-exit points, dig latrines, clean and maintain buildings.

### Stores/Plant Required

1 x JCB  
Tentage for 500  
Water tower (distribution set)  
10 x latrines  
generator and lighting set

### Summary

The site is adequate for an aid/refugee camp however some work is required by plant and manpower. The only drawback to the site is the lack of hard cover.



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TACHE - CODN - GRC - AVERT

**OPERATIONS**

TASK - NDOC - RCMP - WNG

NATIONAL DEFENCE OPERATIONS CENTREFACSIMILE COVER SHEET

**FROM:** LIEUTENANT COMMANDER J.Y. BASTIEN  
NDOC  
TEL: (613) 996-7540 FAX (613) 992-7015  
STU III (613) 996-0203 FAX (613) 996-9669

**TO:** LCOL M. AUSTDAL  
EA/FC UNAMIR  
TEL: 011-871-156-1306 FAX: 011-871-156-1307

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS ~~TWO~~ PAGES

4

**SUBJECT:** CANADIAN CONSULAR AFFAIRS

**REF:** TELECON LCDR BASTIEN/EXTOTT CONSULAR AFFAIRS 31 MAY 94

1. TWO CONSULAR ISSUES HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO MY ATTENTION. EXTERNAL AFFAIRS WOULD BE MOST GRATEFUL FOR ANY ASSISTANCE OR LIGHT YOU MIGHT BE ABLE TO SHED ON THE FOLLOWING SITUATIONS:

- A. EXTOTT CONTINUES TO SEARCH FOR TWO RWANDANS, FORMERLY EMPLOYED IN THE CANADIAN OFFICE IN KIGALI. THEY ARE JOSÉPHINE GAHANGAYIRE AND ABDU HAGUMANASZAIRO. THEY WERE APPARENTLY "REMOVED" FROM THE HOTEL MILLES COLLINES THIS WEEKEND AND THEIR CURRENT WHEREABOUTS ARE UNKNOWN. THESE TWO INDIVIDUALS HAVE BEEN APPROVED AS CANADIAN IMMIGRANTS. THEIR VISA DOCUMENTATION HAS BEEN APPROVED AND IS AWAITING ONLY THEIR SAFE EXIT FROM RWANDA TO NAIROBI.
- B. THE ATTACHED LIST ENUMERATES THE 25 NUNS AND NOVICES OF THE SOEURS DU BON PASTEUR WHO HAVE ALSO BEEN APPROVED AS CANADIAN IMMIGRANTS. THEIR VISAS ALSO AWAIT THEM IN NAIROBI. THE NUNS ARE BELIEVED TO BE IN THE VICINITY OF THE AIRPORT.

2. THESE ARE FAIRLY HIGH PROFILE ISSUES OVER HERE. WHILE THE IMPORTANCE OF UN IMPARTIALITY IS APPRECIATED AND UNDERSTOOD, ANY EFFORTS THAT YOU OR THE CANADIAN CONTINGENT COULD MAKE WOULD BE GREATLY APPRECIATED.

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Department of Foreign Affairs  
and International Trade



Ministère des Affaires étrangères  
et du Commerce international

125 Sussex Drive  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0G2

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May 31, 1994

Lieutenant Commander Yves Bastien  
Maritime Desk Officer  
National Defence Operations Centre  
National Defence Headquarters  
Major General George R. Pearkes Building  
101 Colonel By Drive  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0K2

Dear Commander Bastien:

~~PORT~~  
STBD

I want to extend my thanks for your exemplary co-operation in the lengthy and difficult evacuation in Rwanda. While the largest part of the work is done we continue to search for two Rwandan locally engaged staff members, of our Canadian office in Kigali, Joséphine Gahongayire and Abdu Hagumanaszairo. They were removed from the Milles Collines Hotel this week-end, but their current whereabouts is not known to us. Any assistance you, through your excellent contacts in UNAMIR can render would be greatly appreciated. As you are aware, all their visa documentation is approved and awaiting only their safe exit from Rwanda to Nairobi.


Another group which continues to concern us greatly is the twenty five Rwandan sisters of the Bon Pasteur religious order (list attached). They may still be near the Kigali airport. Their documentation for entry into Canada is also all in order should UNAMIR be able to assist their departure.

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- 2 -

Please advise us of any developments or reports on these persons.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "P. Giguère", with a horizontal line extending to the right.

Pierre Giguère  
Director General  
Consular Affairs Bureau

UMUSHUMBA-MWIZA - KIGALI - RWANDA

SOEURS RWANDAISES ET JEUNES FILLES EN FORMATION

	NOM	PRÉNOMS
1.	AKABUNTU	Daphrose
2.	BUZUBAYIRA	Béatrice
3.	KANGABE,	S. Démétrie
4.	KAYITESI	S. Marguerite
5.	MUJAWAHARYIA	Bernadette
6.	MUJAGANYJE,	Epiphane
7.	MUJAWAYEZU	Vestine
8.	MUKAHATEGEKIMANA	M.-Christine
9.	MUKAKABARE	Dative
10.	MUKAKIRIBI,	S. Primitive
11.	MUKANGARAMBE	Jacqueline
12.	MUTETELI	Béata
13.	MUKAMUSONI	Francine
14.	MUKANYANDWI	Béata
15.	NYIRAHANA,	S. Vénantie
16.	UWAYEZU	S. Marie-Goretti
17.	MUKASHEMA,	S. M. Esperance
18.	NYIRAREMERA,	S. Joséphine
19.	MWANAYIRE	S. Enatha
20.	NYIRANTWALI	Marie-Madeleine
21.	UMUGIRANEZA	Pascalie
22.		Anatholie
23.		Démétrie
24.		Marie-Goretti
25.		Eustache

JAYS



TIM  
**McKENNA'S**  
SUNshine Girl

## Serving notice

Linda, a bartender, is an avid Jays fan who is hoping that Toronto's boys of summer will serve up a winning combination.

