

UNAMIR

G3 OPERATIONS/PLANS

3-19 DEC 1994

OPERATURE DVERTURE , OPERATION RETOUR

AND OPERATION HOPE

UNCLASSIFIED

EL/WG JUNE 2009

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

UNARCHIVES

SERIES S-1062

BOX 135

FILE 7

ACC. 1998/0283



File No 5000.65(G3 PLANS)

To: DCOS Ops
From: OIC Op RETOUR
Info: DFC
Date: 19 Dec 94

Sam
to file
Thur
802 OPS
27/12

Subject **OP RETOUR - COORDINATION OF SECURITY PLAN**

1. D Day. D Day for Op RETOUR has been set for 29 Dec 94. The Op will start at Cyanika Camp on that day.
2. ORCs. The first twelve Communes to have ORCs established within them will be:
 - a. South Kigali Prefecture: Ngenda, Gashora, Kanzenze.
 - b. Butare Prefecture: Runyinya, Geshamvu, Kigembi, Niakizu.
 - c. Gitarama Prefecture: Ntongwe, Masango, Murama, Kigoma.
 - d. Kibungo Prefecture: Sake.
3. Security Presence. A UNAMIR security presence should be established at ORCs between D-7 and D-3. The exact date will depend on the date on which the UN Agency/NGO intends to establish the ORC. Units should liaise with Bourgmesteres to agree the date and time from which a UNAMIR presence will be required. Thereafter, continuous coverage of the ORC is the desirable option., depending on resources.
4. Liaison with RPA. Liaison with the RPA will now be required to determine:
 - a. Complementary activity at the camps while the people are being encouraged to leave.
 - b. Searching and screening procedures to be adopted at the camps, while people are being processed onto the vehicles.
 - c. Escorts between camps and ORCs/Home Communes.
 - d. Complementary security activity in ORCs/Home Communes.

5. Next ORCs. Details of the next ORCs to be opened, primarily based on the population distribution for Rukhondo camp, are being developed by UNREO staff. This information will be promulgated as soon as it is ready.

6. Reporting. During Op RETOUR, UNAMIR daily reports on the progress of the operation will be required for the following information:

- a. Any security incidents in camps, on routes, or in ORCs/Home Communes, and how they were resolved.
- b. Number of IDPs who seek security assistance in ORCs/Home Communes, and what assistance was given.
- c. Relations with the RPA, particularly where notably successful or unsuccessful liaison took place.
- d. As available, any new ideas on how Op RETOUR procedures can be improved.

T A P MULLARKEY
Lt Col
OIC Op RETOUR



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502 ops
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22-26 Dec

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② G3 Ops

1. FNA

2. Ensure security for ORC's and communes is estb.


3. Liaison in para 4 is very important if this is to succeed.
Cfm who will take the lead. You through the CLO, or the IOC rep/RPA.

DC
DCOS ops
19.12

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Lt Col
OIC Op RETOUR

MESSAGE FORM FORMULE DE MESSAGE				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION — COTE DE SECURITE				FILE — DOSSIER			
PAGE	DATE — TIME GROUP GROUPE DATE — HEURE			PRECEDENCE PRIORITE	CLASS	SPECAT CAT SPEC	LMF L DIFF	CAI/CIC IAC/ICC	ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER NUMERO DE L'EXPEDITEUR		
1 OF 1 DE	DATE — TIME DATE — HEURE	MONTH MOIS	YEAR ANNEE	ACTION	INFO				OPS 155		
MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS — INSTRUCTIONS D'ACHEMINEMENT DU MESSAGE											
<p>FROM — DE ETHIOBATT</p> <p>TO — A UNAMIR HQ KIGALI//G3 OPS</p> <p>SUBJ: ABSENCE FROM OPS CONFERENCE</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Our OPS O waited for the heli from 0750-0830hrs this morning, but the heli did not arrive. For this reason he couldn't attend the weekly OPS conference. 2. We request you correct this in the future. If there is any changes inform us earlier. 3. Regards <p><u>FOU</u></p> <p style="text-align: right;">②</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><u>SO2 ops</u></p> <p>Please ensure that OP officers are told that only ops officers for ops conference will be present on Monday mornings as scheduled.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">② Roger Sr. G3OPS2 21/12</p>											
DISTRIBUTION — DIFFUSION											
DRAFTER — REDACTEUR						SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS — DIRECTIVES SPECIALES					
NAME — NOM		OFFICE — BUREAU		TEL — TEL.		MOTOROLA M2058B DEC 94 MCPL JACKLIN.					
RELEASING OFFICER — L'OFFICIER APPROBATEUR											
NAME — NOM		OFFICE — BUREAU		TEL — TEL.							
SIGNATURE						SECURITY CLASSIFICATION — COTE DE SECURITE					

FROM CLO

Pb faced during the "hope" operation.

- Lack of LO
- Lack of Interpreters.
- No representative of Prosecutors.
- Lack of mean of mobility (VHC)

Proposition

- Ensure that the CLO and his staff are assigned a dedicated VHC.
- Before the (beginning) operation, make ^{sure} that all the LO and Interpreters are available.

095/A

19 Dec 94

From : INDBATT


To : G3 OPS
UNAMIR HQ


Subject : AFTER ACTION REPORT OF OP HOPE

1. Please refer to your letter No 3000.15/1 (Ops) dated 16 Dec 94.
2. The required information on the above subject is forwarded herewith as per appendix attached to this letter.

sb/

Enclosure: One page.


(PC Roy)
Major
Adjutant
for CO INDBATT



AFTER ACTION REPORT OF OP HOPE

1. Strength of troops participated. 4 Officers and 91 other ranks.

2. Details of weapons captured:-

(a)	Swords	- 2
(b)	Spears	- 2
(c)	Pangas/Machetes	- 28
(d)	Knife long	- 1

3. Problems encountered during planning and execution. Nil.

4. Lessons learnt/Recommendations.

(a) The INDBATT company was not in possession of mine detector and metal detector as the items had not fetched up by then, from India being with the main body of the battalion. These are important equipment for such search operations.

(b) Units should carry defence stores like Concertina Coil for putting up immediate security around the base camp.

(c) HF sets held with the unit failed to keep the continuous communication between the company at operation location and the Battalion HQ at Kigali. The Sets could not communicate at all between 1800 hours to 0600 hours. This aspect needs to be gone into by the unit.

095/A

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
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
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File

Maj

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UNAMIR

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: G3 OPS

Info: DFC, DCOS OPS, and FORCE PM

FROM: Maj J-G Plante
CO Force MP Coy

DATE: 18 Dec 94

SUBJECT: OP OVERTURE-
AFTER ACTION REPORT

REFS: A. OP ORDER 21 OF 8 DEC 94
B. 3000.15/1 (Ops) 16 DEC 94
C. FORCE COMMANDER'S DIRECTIVE ON THE LEGAL JURISDICTION
TO UNAMIR AND RWANDAN AUTHORITIES

G3 OPS

Pls note AAR.

DCOS OPS
19.12

Thurmont
G3 OPS 2
19/12

Chaf. Chaf.
File
out

1. 31 MPs from the MP Coy participated in the Operation while 6 stayed behind to man the Kigali MP Det.
2. During the Operation, we took possession of 44 detainees. They were searched, processed and subsequently turned over to a Public Prosecutor in the Gikongoro Jail on 16 Dec 94. All weapons given to us were also turned over to the Public Prosecutor in Gikongoro on 16 Dec 94. The paper work associated with the detainees and the weapons are being kept by the Force PM.
3. There were no real problem encountered in the planning stage. The Force PM was of great assistance is providing my unit with additional vehicles, route signing markers, etc.
4. In the execution phase, the deployment of my personnel, the route recces, route signing and the subsequent manning of Critical Points for the night moves took place without any incident.

Post-It routing request pad 7664

ROUTING - REQUEST

Please

☐

READ

To

Wefar

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HANDLE

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APPROVE

and

☐

FORWARD

☐

RETURN

☐

KEEP OR DISCARD

☐

REVIEW WITH ME

Date

From

5. However, the logistic support provided to my unit was not adequate. I will list hereunder the most critical personnel or items which were not provided, yet are mandatory for such an operation:

- a. **Interpreters.** I wanted to bring my own from the Kigali MP Det, but I was informed that I would receive some in location. In spite of several requests, we never received any. This resulted that at times we did not know just who we were "booking in" since some detainees had more than one set of ID papers in their possession. We also suspect that at least one of the person arrested could have been a RPA informant;
- b. **Medical Officer.** Although it was very explicit in OP Order No 21 of 8 Dec 94, it took one detainee to be injured for one MO to show up. Yet in the afternoon of 14 Dec, he left to be replaced by two Medical Cpls who also left later in the afternoon. This took place although we had to keep the detainees in our possession until 1500 hrs 16 Dec;
- c. **CIVPOL.** The tasking of CIVPOL at Para 3b(11) of ref A was very clear "Establish liaison with the Government judicial authorities". However, we all know what happened when we tried to hand over our detainees to the Public Prosecutor in Gikongoro. We could not locate him nor did anyone know what we were talking about. Three members of CIVPOL spend two days in our parking lot compound but I still do not know what they were doing nor what were their orders/ mission;
- d. **Lawyer.** From the beginning of the operation on the 14 Dec, at the Detainee Processing Center, the lawyer was of great assistance. However, to my disappointment, he left at 1700 hrs the same day;
- e. **Detainee Processing Center.** In spite of the fact that each item required to build and operate that Center/Cage had been identified by my personnel (see attachment), submitted to UNAMIR HQ and subsequently requested to the Log Cell by the PM, the only thing we received was a Loud Hailer. The followings are additional observations:
 - (1) the Center itself was never constructed. Nicoy who had been tasked to construct the cage, showed up but assumed that the equipment, was going to be delivered by Brown and Root. Consequently, the detainees had to be processed and detained in a "bamboo compound" and without any barbed wire

whatsoever for security. We can only thank God that we did not receive the projected 400. That situation combined with the fact that we could not take the detainees to Gikongoro on the 14 Dec as planned became very delicate not to say dangerous in the evening of 14 Dec when I had to transfer them, by foot, inside a Church for security reasons;

- f. **Plasticuffs.** MPs were sent on an operation where we were expected to have to take custody of perhaps as many as 400 hard core criminals. Yet, we were not supplied with a single pair of handcuffs (granted, some MPs have their issued set). At the last minute, we were able to scrounge some 200 pairs from the Cdn MPs at the Stadium plus we were able to use some that my own Cdn MPs had brought with them, for emergencies, from Canada;
- g. **Food and Water for the Detainees.** Following several urgent requests, the Major in charge of the Adm Base in Butare, himself, delivered those items to the Center. Perhaps worth noting is the fact that the German Rations issued to the detainees were four years past the Expiry Date;
- h. **Evidence/Personal Property Bags.** None were received and all had to be supplied by the Canadians;
- j. **Detainee Evidence Tags.** Same as h. above;
- k. **Detainee Identification Tags.** Same as h. above;
- m. **Polaroid Camera and Films.** We received the Cameras but one box of film arrived only late in the afternoon. We nevertheless took a photograph of each detainee using a private camera belonging to a MP; and
- n. **Paint and Stencil Kits to make Road Signs and Stapler Gun.** None of those articles were ever received.

6. The problems encountered when we were in the process of handling over the detainees to the Gendarmerie in Butare on 15 Dec 94, has been well documented. Again, this embarrassing situation could have been prevented had proper liaison been affected with the Rwandese Civilian Authorities. The detainees would have been promptly handed over to the Public Prosecutor in Gikongoro on 14 Dec as it was supposed to occur instead of being loaded/unloaded, transported to Gikongoro and back and unloaded again.

7. The cooperation I received from the Malawicoy in assisting my unit in providing a shelter to the detainees for the night of 15 Dec is worth of mention.

8. Human Rights, Red Cross and other NGOs representatives including those on a two week Safari, gave the impression of being totally satisfied with the deportment of the MPs towards the detainees during the Operation. Amongst other things, they noted that we always provided meals, water (at one time my own, we had none left), washroom facilities. Furthermore, one detainee needed to take medicine every 8 hours and we ensured that it was done, etc. During the evening of 16 Dec, through an interpreter, I personally explained to everyone that the following morning, they were going to be handed over to the Public Prosecutor in Gikongoro. I also answered some of their questions.

9. Lessons learned/Recommendations.

- a. expect the worst case scenario, never assumed anything do not take anything for granted, double and triple check;
- b. before accepting detainees at a future Detainee Processing Center, a lawyer or someone in authority must verify and be satisfied that the evidence presented against that person/detainee is strong enough to warrant the arrest/detention. Should, however an RPA officer be present during the "screening" and subsequent registration procedures (as it was the case during the most part of the Operation), this procedure could be very delicate since the RPA could interpret our procedures as wanting to substitute ourselves to the Rwandese Judicial System. This could however be overcome with proper Standing Operation Procedures agreed by all concerned prior to the Operation. During this Operation, the MPs were not tasked to screen/question the legality of arrested suspects but to process and detain them pending their transfer to the Public Prosecutor in Gikongoro. We were, however, under the impression that only suspects caught with a weapon such as a rifle, a grenade and other such offensive weapons would be arrested and subsequently brought to our Center.
- b. the Detainee Processing Center can become a major "tourist attraction". I spent most of my time giving personal tours to various UN and non UN agencies than doing my own supervisory job;
- c. the Detainee Record of Search must be filled out by the arresting authorities;
- d. if the MPs are expected to take charge of all seized items such as machetes, knives, etc, this mandate should be written in the Operation Order as a "Task";
- e. the current procedures outlined in Rec C should/must be revised. In spite of the fact that we (UNAMIR) must be seen totally detached from the Gendarmerie and the RPA when it comes to the handing over of detainees to the

Rwandese authorities, the fact that we are presently bound by Ref C to only deal with a Public Prosecutor does not provide for any flexibility. Even here in Kigali, as I have once commented on, the Public Prosecutor does not work after 1600 hrs nor during week ends.

- f. MPs must have large trucks dedicated to the transportation of detainees;
- g. routes should have been signed right from the Stadium in Butare;
- h. we should have a basic minimum of road signing equipment including various "Road Signs" permanently kept at the MP Coy HQ for emergencies. Perhaps the same procedure could apply for the minimum kit required to build a detainee center; and
- j. we are now certain that words had leaked out to the two Camps concerning the coming operation. Without pointing the finger to any individual or organization, based on my years of counter-intelligence work where secrecy is paramount, I strongly believe that most NGOs head of organizations should have been somehow "put in the picture" early in the planning stage of the operation. Of course, this is also dangerous, but it could have contributed to kill/provide explanations for all the rumors that were going around three days prior to D Day. Without the slightest knowledge of what was going to happen, everyone made its own operation/conclusion and it only contributed to make matters worse and provide fuel to the wildest scenarios.

10. **Conclusion.** From my unit's point of view, the operation went well. The deployment, the search, the handling of the detainees was a unique experience. During the process everyone gained valuable experience.

MEMORANDUM

9350-1 (OPS)


18 Dec 94

UNAMIR G3 OPS

AFTER-ACTION REPORT: OP HOPE

Ref: G3 Ops 3000.15/1, 16 Dec 94

1. Find attached the subj report covering participation of 1 CDHSR Signals Squadron and FSO.
2. Any questions or comments on report can be directed to 1 CDHSR Ops O and/or FSO.

 CAPT
P.J. Drew
Capt
A/Ops O
1 CDHSR
2002

ATTACHMENTS: 1

MEMORANDUM

3000.15/1(Ops)

16 Dec 94

OC Sig Sqn

AFTER-ACTION REPORT OP HOPE

Ref: G3 Ops 3000.15/1 16 Dec 94

1. The Force Sig Sqn participated in OP HOPE from 13-15 Dec 94.
2. The Force Sig Sqn provided comms for the OP Tac HQ and to the respective sub-units. Tac HQ consisted of 9 sig pers while ea of the 12 sub-units were supplied with 2 sig pers ea for a total of 24. Total pers involved was 33.
3. During planning stage of OP HOPE, there was little direction fm UNAMIR HQ on what the Tac HQ would consist of in terms of duty staff. The Force Sig O planned for a total of 12 staff officers working out of Tac HQ. It was expected that the HQ would, as a min, have reps fm G1, G2, G3, G4 and MILOB. HAC and NGO reps were also anticipated as using Tac HQ.
4. At the Assy Area sig pers were linked-up with their respective contingents. This went fairly smoothly due to the early depl of the contingents into designated areas within the stadium. The RPA, MILOB and MP Coy, however, did not show up at the Assy Area and could not be contacted as noone knew their loc. The A/FSO kept these sig dets with Tac HQ for the move to the RP.
5. The Op commenced on schedule and comms were established with min probs. The Tac HQ duty staff, however, only consisted of a G1, G2 rep and a G3 cell for a total of 4 pers. At this time, the RPA liaison offr arr and led the assigned two dets out to their battalions. The MILOB and MP dets were also picked up and taken to their respective locs. The duty staff were a little reluctant to use the radio at first but once prompted by the comms staff they got on with the job. It was also noted that MILOB and AUSMED were co-loc and both were within 50m of Tac HQ. These locs probably could have been linked with landline to Tac HQ freeing up two rad dets.
6. It is recommended that future ops plans consider the composition of the Tac HQ in order to more accurately plan for comms requirements. Sub-units must be instructed as to whether they are to supply a rep to Tac HQ and what that rep reqr WRT comms. It must be made clear to all participating contingents what type of comms are being supplied and to what level. As stated, some sub-units were relatively close to Tac HQ and landline could be considered as an option instead of CNR. SB22 switchboards would have been helpful but were considered as redundant prior to in-theatre deployment.

7. Overall, WRT comms, the op went very well with both VHF and HF playing important roles due to the terrain involved. HF was also utilized during the road mov and allowed good control of both convoys to the RPs. The MOTOROLA link to Kigali and Butare worked smoothly and very reliably, while monitoring CH 13 also came in handy WRT logistics questions/probs. The DFC commented that he was pleased with the speed and efficiency of our pers.


T. Long
Lt
2iC Sig Sqn
2014



UNAMIR

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: → G3 OPS

Info: DFC, DCOS OPS, and FORCE PM

FROM: Maj J-G Plante *Plante*
CO Force MP Coy

DATE: 18 Dec 94

SUBJECT: OP OVERTURE-
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7. The cooperation I received from the Malawicoy in assisting my unit in providing a shelter to the detainees for the night of 15 Dec is worth of mention.

8. Human Rights, Red Cross and other NGOs representatives including those on a two week Safari, gave the impression of being totally satisfied with the deportment of the MPs towards the detainees during the Operation. Amongst other things, they noted that we always provided meals, water (at one time my own, we had none left), washroom facilities. Furthermore, one detainee needed to take medicine every 8 hours and we ensured that it was done, etc. During the evening of 16 Dec, through an interpreter, I personally explained to everyone that the following morning, they were going to be handed over to the Public Prosecutor in Gikongoro. I also answered some of their questions.

9. Lessons learned/Recommendations.

- a. expect the worst case scenario, never assumed anything do not take anything for granted, double and triple check;
- b. before accepting detainees at a future Detainee Processing Center, a lawyer or someone in authority must verify and be satisfied that the evidence presented against that person/detainee is strong enough to warrant the arrest/detention. Should, however an RPA officer be present during the "screening" and subsequent registration procedures (as it was the case during the most part of the Operation), this procedure could be very delicate since the RPA could interpret our procedures as wanting to substitute ourselves to the Rwandese Judicial System. This could however be overcome with proper Standing Operation Procedures agreed by all concerned prior to the Operation. During this Operation, the MPs were not tasked to screen/question the legality of arrested suspects but to process and detain them pending their transfer to the Public Prosecutor in Gikongoro. We were, however, under the impression that only suspects caught with a weapon such as a rifle, a grenade and other such offensive weapons would be arrested and subsequently brought to our Center.
- b. the Detainee Processing Center can become a major "tourist attraction". I spent most of my time giving personal tours to various UN and non UN agencies than doing my own supervisory job;
- c. the Detainee Record of Search must be filled out by the arresting authorities;
- d. if the MPs are expected to take charge of all seized items such as machetes, knives, etc, this mandate should be written in the Operation Order as a "Task";
- e. the current procedures outlined in Rec C should/must be revised. In spite of the fact that we (UNAMIR) must be seen totally detached from the Gendarmerie and the RPA when it comes to the handing over of detainees to the

Rwandese authorities, the fact that we are presently bound by Ref C to only deal with a Public Prosecutor does not provide for any flexibility. Even here in Kigali, as I have once commented on, the Public Prosecutor does not work after 1600 hrs nor during week ends.

- f. MPs must have large trucks dedicated to the transportation of detainees;
- g. routes should have been signed right from the Stadium in Butare;
- h. we should have a basic minimum of road signing equipment including various "Road Signs" permanently kept at the MP Coy HQ for emergencies. Perhaps the same procedure could apply for the minimum kit required to build a detainee center; and
- j. we are now certain that words had leaked out to the two Camps concerning the coming operation. Without pointing the finger to any individual or organization, based on my years of counter-intelligence work where secrecy is paramount, I strongly believe that most NGOs head of organizations should have been somehow "put in the picture" early in the planning stage of the operation. Of course, this is also dangerous, but it could have contributed to kill/provide explanations for all the rumors that were going around three days prior to D Day. Without the slightest knowledge of what was going to happen, everyone made its own operation/conclusion and it only contributed to make matters worse and provide fuel to the wildest scenarios.

10. **Conclusion.** From my unit's point of view, the operation went well. The deployment, the search, the handling of the detainees was a unique experience. During the process everyone gained valuable experience.

FROM: CHAO

TO: G3 OPS

DATE: 18 DEC 1994

SUBJECT: HAC AAR - OP HOPE

REF : 3000.15/1 (OPS) DATED 16 DEC 1994

I. AS REQUESTED AT THE REF HAC AAR IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. 2 PERS: COL C.B. YAACHE, CHAO AND
CAPT A DEMERS HAC OPS/LN;

B. N/A;

C. THE UN AGENCIES AND NGOS EXPRESSED THEIR DEEP CONCERN ABOUT THE FACT THAT THEY WERE NEITHER INVOLVED IN THE PLANNING OF THE OPERATION NOR GIVEN EARLY INFORMATION ON THE EXERCISE. THIS COULD HAVE LED TO APATHY ON THE PART OF AGENCIES AND NGOS SHOULD ANY EMERGENCY HUMANITARIAN SITUATION HAVE ARISEN; AND


D. LESSONS LEARNT / RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) THE PROTECTION OF HUMANITARIAN INFRASTRUCTURES (BLDGS, WATER PURIFICATION SYSTEM, ETC...) SHOULD BE CONSIDERED WHEN ASSIGNING OBJECTIVES TO UNITS;

(2) WHEN USING NGO / UN AGENCIES INSTALLATIONS FOR OPERATIONAL PURPOSE (I.E. THE 2 AICF FEEDING CENTERS IN THE CAMP WERE USED FOR THE OPERATION. ONE WAS USED AS AN ASSEMBLY AREA AND ONE WAS USED AS A HOLDING AREA FOR SUSPECTED CRIMINALS). OFFICIAL LETTERS OF EXPLANATION FROM THE FC SHOULD GO OUT, ONCE THE OPERATION IS UNDERWAY, TO THE CONCERNED NGOS (INFO COPY TO UNREO) TO EXPLAIN WHY WE MUST USE THEIR FACILITIES; AND

- (3) CERTAIN TOOLS OF HUMANITARIAN NATURE (I.E. KITCHEN KNIVES AND AXES) WERE SEIZED FROM THE DPs DURING THE SEARCH AND THIS RESULTED IN SOME HARDSHIPS TO THE CONCERNED DPs. IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT ANY FURTHER OPERATIONS OF THIS NATURE SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THIS BASIC LIVING CHARACTERISTIC OF DPs.

2. FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION.



C. B. YAACHE
COL
UNAMIR CHAO

FAX COVER SHEET

UNAMIR SIG SON

UNANIMOUS
SECTOR(4C) CAN SIGS

DTG R 181145Z DEC 94.

FROM: ETHIOBATT 4C

TO. UNAMIR HQ

REMARKS:

NO OF PAGES 2

SENT BY:

AUTH BY:

FT1410 BAST



UNAMIR

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: G3 OPS
Info: DFC, DCOS OPS, and FORCE PM
FROM: Maj J-G Plante
CO Force MP Coy
DATE: 18 Dec 94
SUBJECT: ~~OP OVERTURE~~ *HOPE*
AFTER ACTION REPORT

REFS: A. OP ORDER 21 OF 8 DEC 94
B. 3000.15/1 (Ops) 16 DEC 94
C. FORCE COMMANDER'S DIRECTIVE ON THE LEGAL JURISDICTION
TO UNAMIR AND RWANDAN AUTHORITIES

1. 31 MPs from the MP Coy participated in the Operation while 6 stayed behind to man the Kigali MP Det.
2. During the Operation, we took possession of 44 detainees. They were searched, processed and subsequently turned over to a Public Prosecutor in the Gikongoro Jail on 16 Dec 94. All weapons given to us were also turned over to the Public Prosecutor in Gikongoro on 16 Dec 94. The paper work associated with the detainees and the weapons are being kept by the Force PM.
3. There were no real problem encountered in the planning stage. The Force PM was of great assistance in providing my unit with additional vehicles, route signing markers, etc.
4. In the execution phase, the deployment of my personnel, the route recces, route signing and the subsequent manning of Critical Points for the night moves took place without any incident.

- ③ G3 Ops
1. Take for necessary action.
 2. Include in report and Schedule 2 AAR conference for all staff early in Jan.
- DCOS ops 20-12*

② DCOS OPS

This is a very detailed report. Take note of my annotations and let those concerned know of their failures and steps to correct them in future. I will a conference after we release all the reports.

Pse forward copies to the units for their concerned for their action

20/12 DFC

5. However, the logistic support provided to my unit was not adequate. I will list hereunder the most critical personnel or items which were not provided, yet are mandatory for such an operation:

a. **Interpreters.** I wanted to bring my own from the Kigali MP Det, but I was informed that I would receive some in location. In spite of several requests, we never received any. This resulted that at times we did not know just who we were "booking in" since some detainees had more than one set of ID papers in their possession. We also suspect that at least one of the person arrested could have been a RPA informant;

b. **Medical Officer.** Although it was very explicit in OP Order No 21 of 8 Dec 94, it took one detainee to be injured for one MO to show up. Yet in the afternoon of 14 Dec, he left to be replaced by two Medical Cpls who also left later in the afternoon. This took place although we had to keep the detainees in our possession until 1500 hrs 16 Dec;

c. **CIVPOL.** The tasking of CIVPOL at Para 3b(11) of ref A was very clear "Establish liaison with the Government judicial authorities". However, we all know what happened when we tried to hand over our detainees to the Public Prosecutor in Gikongoro. We could not locate him nor did anyone know what we were talking about. Three members of CIVPOL spend two days in our parking lot compound but I still do not know what they were doing nor what were their orders/ mission;

d. **Lawyer.** From the beginning of the operation on the 14 Dec, at the Detainee Processing Center, the lawyer was of great assistance. However, to my disappointment, he left at 1700 hrs the same day;

e. **Detainee Processing Center.** In spite of the fact that each item required to build and operate that Center/Cage had been identified by my personnel (see attachment), submitted to UNAMIR HQ and subsequently requested to the Log Cell by the PM, the only thing we received was a Loud Hailer. The followings are additional observations:

- (1) the Center itself was never constructed. Nicoy who had been tasked to construct the cage, showed up but assumed that the equipment, was going to be delivered by Brown and Root. Consequently, the detainees had to be processed and detained in a "bamboo compound" and without any barbed wire

CO Ausmed
to explain.

CIVPOL Commission
to explain it
was true.

Well done
Ausmed, I
witnessed it myself.

This was
an obvious mistake
Mgmr be corrected
next time.

whatsoever for security. We can only thank God that we did not receive the projected 400. That situation combined with the fact that we could not take the detainees to Gikongoro on the 14 Dec as planned became very delicate not to say dangerous in the evening of 14 Dec when I had to transfer them, by foot, inside a Church for security reasons;

Clay 0/64
to order
DCos ops
How do we
connect this?

Clay 0
Why are we
keeping them
and issued them
to detainees.

Clay 0

f.

Plasticuffs. MPs were sent on an operation where we were expected to have to take custody of perhaps as many as 400 hard core criminals. Yet, we were not supplied with a single pair of handcuffs (granted, some MPs have their issued set). At the last minute, we were able to scrounge some 200 pairs from the Cdn MPs at the Stadium plus we were able to use some that my own Cdn MPs had brought with them, for emergencies, from Canada;

g.

Food and Water for the Detainees. Following several urgent requests, the Major in charge of the Adm Base in Butare, himself, delivered those items to the Center. Perhaps worth noting is the fact that the German Rations issued to the detainees were four years past the Expiry Date;

h.

Evidence/Personal Property Bags. None were received and all had to be supplied by the Canadians;

j.

Detainee Evidence Tags. Same as h. above;

k.

Detainee Identification Tags. Same as h. above;

m.

Polaroid Camera and Films. We received the Cameras but one box of film arrived only late in the afternoon. We nevertheless took a photograph of each detainee using a private camera belonging to a MP; and

n.

Paint and Stencil Kits to make Road Signs and Stapler Gun. None of those articles were ever received.

6. The problems encountered when we were in the process of handling over the detainees to the Gendarmerie in Butare on 15 Dec 94, has been well documented. Again, this embarrassing situation could have been prevented had proper liaison been affected with the Rwandese Civilian Authorities. The detainees would have been promptly handed over to the Public Prosecutor in Gikongoro on 14 Dec as it was supposed to occur instead of being loaded/unloaded, transported to Gikongoro and back and unloaded again.

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LINE 1			
LINE 2			
LINE 3			GR
LINE 4			MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS
LINE 5			SIC/ORIG NO
PRECEDENCE - ACTION ROUTINE	PRECEDENCE - INFO ROUTINE	DATE - TIME GROUP 1171630 B DEC 94	E3L/I40/OPS/1104
ROUTING INDICATORS	From: AUSMED ASC UNAMIR (RWANDA) To: HQ UNAMIR FOR G3 OPS FILE (FOR OPS) Info: HQ UNAMIR FOR FMEDO		

SUBJ: POST ACTION REPORT - OP HOPE.


1. STRENGTH OF TROOPS INVOLVED.
 - a. MEDICAL AND PROTECTION ELM - 50.
 - b. AME TEAM - 3.
2. PRISONERS AND WEAPONS CAPTURED. NOT APPLICABLE.
3. PATIENTS TREATED.
 - a. UNAMIR - 12
 - b. CIVILIAN - 42
4. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED DURING PLANNING PHASE.
 - a. NIL.
 - b. PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE FROM OPERATING IN THE AREA AND THE HELO RECON ASSISTED GREATLY.
5. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED DURING EXECUTION.
 - a. A DAY WAS WASTED IN THE ASSY AREA. ONLY TASK FOR THE DAY WAS TO PRODUCE ANOTHER NOMINAL ROLL FOR TAC HQ.
 - b. THE ORDER OF MARCH CHANGED.
 - c. THE MED FACILITY WAS 20 MINUTES DRIVE FROM THE LZ. THIS COULD HAVE RESULTED IN UNNECESSARY DELAYS AND ALSO MEANT THE AME TEAM COULD

Thurmont
630852
20/12

PAGE NO 1	DRAFTER'S NAME AND TITLE J.J. FREWEN SO3 OPS		PHONE O2	REF FILE NO 613 - 1 - 3	
NO OF PAGES 2	RELEASER'S NAME AND TITLE AS ABOVE		BRANCH/UNIT AUSMED		DATE 17 DEC 94
FOR OPS USE	R	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR
					SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

NOT BE UTILISED AS ADDITIONAL STAFF AT THE MED FACILITY IF THE WORKLOAD HAD BEEN HIGHER.

- d. LOCATION OF LZ GIVEN IN VERBAL WAS DIFFERENT TO THE OPORD.
 - e. BNS DID NOT USE THE ALLOCATED NICKNAMES/CONTROL MEASURES AND SUBSEQUENTLY THE MED FACILITY COULD NOT MONITER PROGRESS OF THE OP.
 - f. NO REDEPLOYMENT ORDERS WERE ISSUED, PARTICULARLY ROUTES AND ORDER OF MARCH.
 - g. THE HELO PILOTS INDICATED THEY WOULD NOT LAND INSIDE THE CORDON AREA.
6. LESSONS LEARNT/ RECOMMENDATIONS.
- a. DAILY ORDERS AT SCHEDULED TIMES ARE NECESSARY.
 - b. CONVOY AND MOVEMENT ORDERS ARE NECESSARY.
 - c. MINIMUM TIME SHOULD BE SPENT IN THE ASSY AREA.
 - d. MED FACILITY AND LZ SHOULD BE CO-LOCATED AND IF NECESSARY A MED ELM CAN BE DEPLOYED FORWARD TO REDUCE EVAC TIME.

PAGE NO 2		DRAFTER'S NAME AND TITLE J.J. FREWEN SO3 OPS				PHONE 02		REF FILE NO 613 - 1 - 3			
NO OF PAGES 2		RELEASER'S NAME AND TITLE AS ABOVE				BRANCH/UNIT AUSMED		SIGNATURE 		DATE 17 DEC 94	
FOR OPS USE	R	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	D	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED



To: SRSG, DFC
From: Force PM/SO2 G1 Discipline
Info: ED, MA/FC, ~~DCOS Ops~~, DCOS Sp
Date: 17 Dec 94
File: FPM/5
Subject: OPERATION HOPE

1. As you are aware, between 1000 hrs and 1500 hrs yesterday, I handed to the public prosecutor at Gikongoro the 44 persons who were detained by UNAMIR troops during Op HOPE. I attach, for your information, a copy of the Handover Proforma bearing 3 signatures:

- a. My own, as a representative of UNAMIR.
- b. That of Aloys Havugiyaremye, the Public Prosecutor.
- c. That of Major Philbert, the 2IC of RPA Alpha Mobile 2 - the most senior member of the RPA available in Gikongoro at the time. He was present at the beginning of the handover process only but was asked - and happy to comply with my request - to sign the document to ensure the RPA's recognition and acceptance of the process of handing the detainees to the lawful civil authority.

2. I intend to visit the Public Prosecutor several times over the next week or two in order to confirm that the filtering of detainees is proceeding in a proper and expeditious manner - and according to the verbal undertakings made to me by him and by Major Philbert. I will keep you informed.

M. Cuthbert-Brown

M CUTHBERT-BROWN
Maj
Force PM/SO2 G1 Disc

ANNEX G TO LEGAL
JURISDICTION
APPLICABLE TO UNAMIR
AND RWANDAN
AUTHORITIES
DATED 1994

HAND OVER PROFORMA

1. MAJOR MARK CUTHBERT-PROZIN (1), A MILITARY MEMBER OF
UNAMIR/MINUAR HAVE HANDED OVER THE FORTY FOUR PERSONS WHOSE NAMES (2)
TO THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR OF ARE LISTED ON THE ATTACHED SCHEDULE (3)
GIKONKORO

SIGNED THIS DAY 16TH OF DECEMBER 19 94

Mark Cuthbert-Prozin
UNAMIR

OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR
DEPT. HANCOCK, RICHARD D. ROY
10/12

- (1) Insert here the name of the UNAMIR person conducting the hand over
- (2) Insert here the name of the person being handed over
- (3) Insert here the name of the Prosecutor's Office.

10/12
RPA REPRESENTATIVE

UNAMIR MP COY
REGISTER OF INMATES

UNAMIR MP COY
REGISTRE DES DÉTENU

LOCATION OF SERVICE PRISON/DETENTION BAR
ENDROIT DE LA PRISON MILITAIRE/CASERNE DE
DISCIPLINAIRE DE L'UNITÉ

DATE	REGISTER NUMBER NUMERO DE REGISTRE	IN-ENTRÉE	NAME - NOM / INITIALS	UNIT - UNITÉ / ADDRESS	TIME OUT HEURE CLEMENT	BY SENTENCE PEINE	MP IN
14/DEC/94	1	(1)	KABANZA JEAN BERTH	44			
	2	(2)	MATCHUMI				
	3	(3)	KABILISE FAUSTIC				
	4	(4)	MAKAYAKAZI JOSEPH				
	5	(5)	DNAESABA JUVENIL				
	6	(6)	KARERANGABO VENUSTE				
	7	(7)	NYIRANKIMDI				
	8	(8)	MBYAYINGABO PREVANT				
	9	(9)	MUBENGI TIA CAUSUS				
	10	(10)	GAKUBA				
	11	(11)	BIGIRIMANA INNOCENT				
	12	(12)	NTAKIRUTIMANA ERADE				
	13	(13)	NZEYIMANA MARTIN				
	14	(14)	NAGITEIMANA ANANZA				
	15	(15)	KAMANZI FRIPE				
	16	(16)	NYAGARUNJA				
	17	(17)	CASIRABO EMILE				
	18	(18)	NYILIMANA CHARLIE				

UNAMIR MP COY
REGISTER OF INMATES

UNAMIR MP COY
REGISTRE DES DÉTENU

LOCATION OF SERVICE PRISON/DETENTION BARRACK/UNIT
ENDROIT DE LA PRISON MILITAIRE/CASERNE DE DETENTION/D
DISCIPLINAIRE DE L'UNITÉ

DATE	REGISTER NUMBER NUMÉRO DE REGISTRE	TAG NO	NAME - NOM / INITIALS	IMMATURE MINORÉ DU 18	UNIT - UNITÉ / ADDRESS	TIME OUT ELEMENT	BY	MP INT.
	19	(22)	GAKUMBA EMMANUEE					
	20	(23)	HAUGAIMANA PAUL					
	21	(24)	KUREMISHA FREDRICK					
	22	(25)	BUSARABINE VINCENT					
	23	(26)	RWAGASANA AUGUST					
	24	(27)	GAKUANA JANUIGR					
	25	(28)	SENTWALI LEONARD					
	26	(30)	LCPL HAKIZIMANA ANASTAS					
	27	(31)	KURANGA EMMANUEL					
	28	(32)	YAMURAGIYE J.					
	29	(33)	KUKAJIRO FRANCIS					
	30	(34)	NGENZU VARISTE					
	31	(35)	HASHIMANA HORONSIGU					
	32	(36)	MAZIMAK					
	33	(37)	MATERO NGWIGI					
	34	(38)	KARIRAMANZI TASSIEN					
	35	(39)	HEGEMANA					
	36	(40)	ORRYATTO FORALE					

REGISTER OF INMATES

REGISTRE DES DÉTENUÉS

LOCATION OF SERVICE PRISON/DETENTION BARRACK
ENDROIT DE LA PRISON MILITAIRE/CASERNE DE
DISCIPLINAIRE DE L'UNITE

DATE	REGISTER NUMERO DE REGISTRE	SIN 705-100	IN - ENTRÉE		UNIT - UNITÉ / ADDRESS	TIME OUT ELEMENT ELEMENT	BY OFFICER FBI	MP INT DATE INITIALS LIBRARY
			NAME - NOM / DOB INITIALS	DOB				
37	(41)	NIRINE MANA	JEAN					
38	(42)	UZIRABEOBA	JEAN					
39	(43)	MUDABUNIKWA	SILVESTER					
40	(44)	SHUMBUSHA	VIA TEOR					
41	(45)	MUEHINEBE	VANCE					
42	(46)	NAZIROBERTA	FRANCIS					
43	(47)	MAZIMANA	ANDRE					
44	(48)	MESIGARO	STEFANO					

3000.15/1/OPS

FROM: UNAMIR HQ OPS

TO: SECTOR 3

SECTOR 4A N

SECTOR 4A S

SECTOR 6

MILOB GP HQ

DATE: 17 DEC 94

SUBJECT: OP RETOUR

1. Op RETOUR is an operation planned for the return of IDPs to their home communes. The operation aims at relocating IDP population, mainly concentrated in the Prefecture of GIKONGORO to their home communes, principally in the Prefectures of Gitarama, Butare and South Kigali.

2. The mentioned operation will be preceded by an information campaign to be conducted in the targeted camps commencing 19 Dec 94.

3. Four teams consisting of representatives from Rwandese government ministries, UN agencies, NGOs and UNAMIR will be deployed as follows:

- a. KIBEHO and NDAGO (4AS).
- b. CYANIKA and RUKONDO (4AN).
- c. BIVUMU, BOHORU, RURAMBA and RWAMIKO (4AN).
- d. KAMANA and MUNINI (4AS).

4. Units responsible for the Sector in which the above mentioned camps are allocated are requested to provide the following to each deployed team:

- a. 1 x LO.
- b. Military Escort (strength depending on security situation in camp).

5. Both military elements mentioned in para 4a and 4b will need to be self sufficient in terms of:

- a. Transport.

c. Accommodation.

6. Briefings will be conducted on a daily basis by the team coordinators located in Gikongoro. All teams are required to attend an initial briefing to be held at the UNREO Field Office located in Gikongoro on 20 December starting at 1230 hrs. The point of contact at this briefing will be the UNREO Field Officer in Gikongoro, Mr Tim Meisburger.

7. Attached are Concept for Security Operations and Information Plan for your necessary attention.

**CONCEPT FOR SECURITY OPERATIONS
IN SUPPORT OF
OPERATION RETOUR**

General

1. The aim of Operation RETOUR is for the displaced persons and refugees of Rwanda to return home from the camps which they currently occupy. In essence, the concept provides for:
 - a. The preparation of Home Communes;
 - b. The establishment of conditions in the Camps which are conducive to voluntary vacation;
 - c. The safe movement of IDPs/refugees to overnight way stations (OWS);
 - d. Processing and provisioning of IDPs/refugees in OWSs; and
 - e. Movement to Home Communes or Open Relief Centres (ORC).
2. A fundamental component of the operation is to ensure that adequate security is provided in order to:
 - a. Prevent intimidation and harassment in Camps by extremists;
 - b. Enhance confidence amongst the population;
 - c. Encourage voluntary relocation to Home Communes; and
 - d. Reduce the conditions for violence in home communes during the community reintegration process.

Outline Tasks

3. Allocated tasks are as follows:
 - a. Provide security in Home Communes;
 - b. Provide a strong security presence on the camps;
 - c. Establish a high security environment in the OWSs;
 - d. Provide route security between Camps, OWSs and Home Communes or ORCs; and
 - e. Provide a reactive security capability during the Operation.

Mission

4. UNAMIR is to provide security in support of Operation RETOUR.

Concept

5. The provision of security will be effected as follows:
 - a. IDP Camps Camp security will be provided by the force which is responsible for the sector in which the target camp is located;
 - b. OVS OVS security will be provided by the force which is responsible for the sector in which the target camp is located;
 - c. Escort IDP convoy escort will be provided by the force which is responsible for the sector in which the target camp is located. The escort, augmented by a RPA liaison element, will remain with the convoy from the originating camp to the destination Commune/ORC. A Ready Reaction Force is to be established in all sectors through which the convoy is transiting;
 - d. Route Security Route security will be provided by RPA troops;
 - e. Commune/ORC Commune/ORC security will be provided by the force which is responsible for the sector in which the destination commune/ORC is located.

Relocation Schedule

6. Efforts to encourage IDPs to relocate will be concentrated on the camps identified in the schedule detailed at Annex A.

Execution

7. Upon advice from the Op RETOUR Task Force that the schedule at Annex A is to be executed, UNAMIR will issue orders to the responsible troops to carry out the tasks outlined at Paragraph 5 above. In the event that the troops to task requirements exceed the capacity of the in place force, troops from the adjacent sector will be tasked to reinforce.

ANNEX A

OP RETOUR - PHASE 2 SCHEDULE

CAMP/DAYS FROM D	0	+5	+10	+15	+20	+25	+30	+35	+40	+45	+50	+55
CYANIKA (27,000)												
RUHKONDO (50,000)												
KIZI (2,500)												
KINAZI (2,500)												
MUGANO (3,000)												
KANYINYA ((4,000)												
NYASISUYA (1,000)												
KARAMBI (2,000)												
BUHORO (3,000)												
GISUNZA (3,500)												
NYAMIRA (1,500) (Note 1)												
KIBEHO (75,000) (Note 2)												
NDAGO (55,000)												
MUNINI (12,000)									43			
KARANA (21,000)									43	47		
BUSANZE (9,000)										47-9		
MUSABEYA (14,000)										49	53	
REFUGEES												+

Notes:

1. All these smaller camps scheduled on a concurrent basis.
2. From D+20 movement figures assumed to double from 3,000 per day to 6,000 per day.

information campaign / idps issue

Monday 19 December and Tuesday 20 December 1994 a.m.

Visits to local authorities to inform them on the info campagne in South-Kigali, Butare, Gikongoro, Gitarama and Kibungo.

Tuesday 20 December / p.m.

Visits to camps begin:

Team 1: Kibeho and Ndago
Team 2: Cyanika and Rukondo
Team 3: Kamana and Munini
Team 4: Bivumu and Bohoro

Wednesday 21 December 1994 THRU Sunday 1st of January 1995

a.m. Team 1: Kibeho and Ndago
Team 2: Cyanika and Rukondo
Team 3: Kamana and Munini
Team 4: Ruramba and Rwanika

p.m. Team 1: Kibeho and Ndago
Team 2: Cyanika and Rukondo
Team 3: Kamana and Munini
Team4: Bivumu and Bohoro

Every evenings at 18h00 the 4 team members will be meeting at UNREO Field Office in Gikongoro to exchange members from one team to the other as well as informations.

IF necessary or possible, the teams will be rotated by December 25th. The exchange of information will be done the same night between the 2 groups of teams at UNREO field office.

Each teams will be composed as follow:

1 rep. of Min. of Rehabilitation
1 rep. of Min. of Justice
1 rep. of Min. of Defence
1 rep. of Min. of Interior
1 rep. of Human Rights

1 rep. of UNDP / for 1 team only
1 rep. of LWF / for 1 team only

To be part of some team on an irregular basis:

1 rep. of local authorities (Prefet, bourgmesters, chief of sectors, etc.)
1 elderly person from home communes
1 returnee from camp now in home communes

Monday, 2 January at Amohoro Stadium in Kigali at 14h00

All actors of this mission are requested for a final evaluation

Thems of the information campaign

Security: In the camp, convoys, on the road and upon arrival, monitoring system, arrest procedures, mines awareness

Food assistance: procedures -- communes level, rations, etc.

ORCs: What are they?, emphasis on its temporary status, services offered, etc.

Health and Water: Health and water situation in home communes, utilisation of existing structures, etc.

Unaccompanied Children/ family: Importance of keeping the families together, assistance for needy families at home communes level, do not leave your kids behind, keeping children/families together until we find real families, etc.

campagne d'information / dossier des PDI

Lundi 19 decembre et mardi 20 decembre 1994 a.m.

Visites aux autorites locales pour les informer de la campagne d'information dans les camps dans les prefectures du Sud-Kigali, Butare, Gitarama, Gikongoro et Kibungo.

Mardi 20 decembre / p.m.

Debut des visites dans les camps:

Equipe 1: Kibeho et Ndago
Equipe 2: Cyanika et Rukondo
Equipe 3: Kamana et Munini
Equipe 4: Bivume et Bohoro

Mercredi 21 decembre AU dimanche 1er janvier 1995

a.m. Equipe 1: Kibeho et Ndago
Equipe 2: Cyanika et Rukondo
Equipe 3: Kamana et Munini
Equipe 4: Bivumu et Bohoro

Tous les soirs a 18h00 les 4 equipes se rencontreront au bureau-terrain UNREO de Gikongoro pour echanger informations et membres d'equipe entre elles.

SI cela s'avere necessaire et/ou possible, une rotation des equipes aura lieu le dimanche 25 decembre. L'echange d'information entre les 8 equipes se fera ce soir-la au bureau-terrain UNREO de Gikongoro.

Chaque equipe sera composee de la maniere suivante:

1 rep. du Min. de la Rehabilitation
1 rep. du Min. de la Justice
1 rep. du Min. de la Defense
1 rep. du Min. de l'Interieur
1 rep. des Droits Humains
1 rep. du PNUD / pour 1 equipe seulement
1 rep. de LWF / pour 1 equipe seulement

Sur un base irreguliere:

1 rep. des autorites locales (Prefet, bourgmestre, chef de secteur, etc.)
1 "vieux sage" des communes d'origine.

1 PDI de retour dans sa commune

Lundi 2 janvier 1995

Tous les acteurs de cette campagne devront se presentes au Stade Amohoro a Kigali a 14h00, porte # 10 pour une evaluation finale de la campagne.

Themes de la campagne:

Securite: dans les camps, en convois, sur la route et a l'arrivee, systeme de surveillance et procedures d'arrestations et sensibilisation aux mines

Assistance alimentaire: procedures -- voies communales, rations, etc.


Sante et eau: situation des secteurs de sante et d'eau dans les communes d'origine, utilisation des structures communales deja en place, etc.

Enfants non-accompagnes/familles: l'importance de garder la famille unie -- ne laissez pas vos enfants derriere vous, assistance dans les communes pour les familles necessiteuses, les noyaux enfants/famille seront respectes jusqu'au retracement des familles veritables, s'il y a lieu, etc.

LINE 1			
LINE 2			
LINE 3			GR
LINE 4			MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS
LINE 5			
PRECEDENCE - ACTION ROUTINE	PRECEDENCE - INFO ROUTINE	DATE - TIME GROUP 1171630 B DEC 94	SIC/ORIG NO E3L/140/OPS 11104
ROUTING INDICATORS	From: AUSMED ASC UNAMIR (RWANDA) To: HQ UNAMIR FOR G3 OPS FILE (FOR OPS) Info: HQ UNAMIR FOR FMEDO		

SUBJ: POST ACTION REPORT - OP HOPE.

1. STRENGTH OF TROOPS INVOLVED.
 - a. MEDICAL AND PROTECTION ELM - 50.
 - b. AME TEAM - 3.
2. PRISONERS AND WEAPONS CAPTURED. NOT APPLICABLE.
3. PATIENTS TREATED.
 - a. UNAMIR - 12
 - b. CIVILIAN - 42
4. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED DURING PLANNING PHASE.
 - a. NIL.
- PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE FROM OPERATING IN THE AREA AND THE HELO RECON ASSISTED GREATLY.
5. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED DURING EXECUTION.
 - a. A DAY WAS WASTED IN THE ASSY AREA. ONLY TASK FOR THE DAY WAS TO PRODUCE ANOTHER NOMINAL ROLL FOR TAC HQ.
 - b. THE ORDER OF MARCH CHANGED.
 - c. THE MED FACILITY WAS 20 MINUTES DRIVE FROM THE LZ. THIS COULD HAVE RESULTED IN UNNECESSARY DELAYS AND ALSO MEANT THE AME TEAM COULD


PAGE NO 1		DRAFTER'S NAME AND TITLE J.J. FREWEN SO3 OPS				PHONE 02		REF FILE NO 613 - 1 - 3			
NO OF PAGES 2		RELEASER'S NAME AND TITLE AS ABOVE		BRANCH/UNIT AUSMED		SIGNATURE 		DATE 17 DEC 94			
FOR OPS USE	R	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	D	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

NOT BE UTILISED AS ADDITIONAL STAFF AT THE MED FACILITY IF THE WORKLOAD HAD BEEN HIGHER.

- d. LOCATION OF LZ GIVEN IN VERBAL WAS DIFFERENT TO THE OPORD.
- e. BNS DID NOT USE THE ALLOCATED NICKNAMES/CONTROL MEASURES AND SUBSEQUENTLY THE MED FACILITY COULD NOT MONITER PROGRESS OF THE OP.
- f. NO REDEPLOYMENT ORDERS WERE ISSUED, PARTICULARLY ROUTES AND ORDER OF MARCH.
- g. THE HELO PILOTS INDICATED THEY WOULD NOT LAND INSIDE THE CORDON AREA.

6. LESSONS LEARNT/ RECOMMENDATIONS.

- a. DAILY ORDERS AT SCHEDULED TIMES ARE NECESSARY.
- b. CONVOY AND MOVEMENT ORDERS ARE NECESSARY.
- c. MINIMUM TIME SHOULD BE SPENT IN THE ASSY AREA.
- d. MED FACILITY AND LZ SHOULD BE CO-LOCATED AND IF NECESSARY A MED ELM CAN BE DEPLOYED FORWARD TO REDUCE EVAC TIME.

PAGE NO 2		DRAFTER'S NAME AND TITLE J.J. FREWEN SO3 OPS				PHONE 02		REF FILE NO 613 - 1 - 3			
NO OF PAGES 2		RELEASER'S NAME AND TITLE AS ABOVE				BRANCH/UNIT AUSMED		SIGNATURE 		DATE 17 DEC 94	
FOR OPS USE	R	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	D	DATE	TIME	SYSTEM	OPERATOR	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

2 JAA5ZYUW UCCVVDH0449 3511653-UUUU--UCCVVDA.

ZNR UUUUU

R 171653Z DEC 94

FM SECTOR 5 KABALI//TUNBATT COMD//

TO UNHQ KIGALI//G3 OPS//

BT

UNCLAS TUN REP

NR 702/TUNBATT HQ/G3 ON 17 DEC 94.

REF: UNCLAS OPS 3000.15/1

SUBJ: AFTER ACTION REPORT OF OP HOPE

PLEASE BE INFORMED THAT:

1. STRENGTH OF TROOPS THAT PARTICIPATED IN OP HOPE WAS 262 PERSONS.

2. NO DETAILS OF CRIMINALS, ONLY TRADITIONAL AGRICULTURAL TOOLS HAD BEEN CONFISCATED: MACHETES 137 - AXES 15 - SPEARS 5 - SCYTHES 12 - BAYONETS 7 - SWORDS 5.

3.A. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED DURING PLANNING:

*ALL THE ORDERS WERE WRITTEN IN ENGLISH AND FULL OF ABBREVIATIONS IN THAT CASE REQUIRES LONG TIME AND MISTAKES MAY BE COMMITTED.

**OPERATION ORDER WAS ARRIVED VERY LATE WHILE THE OTHER ORDERS ARRIVED AFTER THE DEPARTURE TO BUTARE, THAT DELAY CAUSED A VERY BAD PREPARATION FOR THE OPERATION.

***AS THE RECCE FOR FC HAD BEEN DELAYED WE WAITED VAINLY FOR INSTRUCTIONS TO DO IT BUT THEY NEVER ARRIVED, SO THE OPERATION ORDER HAD BEEN BASED ONLY ON ABSTRACT FACTS.

****DURING A, @ THE PERIOD OF PLANIFICATION, WE NOTED A TOTAL ABSENCE FOR THE TACTICAL HQ, SO WE WERE SURPRISED TO RECEIVE A MESSAGE FROM ZAMBATT OFFERING US HIS KIND SERVICE TO TRANSPORT US TO BUTARE, WHILE IT IS THE JOB OF G3 OF TACTICAL HQ TO COORDINATE BETWEEN THE FORCES.

B. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED DURING THE EXECUTION:

*COMMUNICATION WAS VERY CROWDED

**THE APPROCHING ~~P~~ASE WAS NOT RELATED TO A TACTICAL SITUATION
BECAUSE OF THE NUMBER OF TROOPS LOADED BY TRUCK. THAT FACT IMPEDES
TROOPS IN CASE OF ATTACK.

***BEING PROVIDED ONLY BY 7 TRUCKS, REQUIRED FROM US TO USE ADDITIONAL BEDFORD, AND SINCE THSES LAST R, CKS ARE VERY OLD AND VERY SLOW, W. PUT TWO WHOLE DAYS TO TRIP GO AND BACK TO BUTARE WITH AN AVERAGE OF 25 KM/H, SO THE TROOPS TRAVELLING IN VERY CONDITION WERE ALREADY TIRED WHEN ARRIVED TO BUTURE.

****THE TIME SPENT IN THE ASSEMBLY AREA WAS VERY LONG AND MADE TROOPS VERY STRESSED, IN ADDITION GROUPING A LARGE NUMBER OF SOLDIERS IN SUCH A CLOSED AREA WAS VERY DANGEROUS.

*****LACK OF CLEAR INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT KIND OF WEAPONS SHOULD BE CONFISCATED, BEFORE ENTERING IN THE OPERATION, LET SOME POCKETS CLEANED FORM TRADITIONAL ARMS.

*****THE RPA TEAM WAS DISPROPORTIONAL WITH THEFORCE, SO THE ONLY 3 RPA SOLDIERS ON 7 HAD BEEN ALLOCATED TO TUNBATT. THESE SOLDIERS HAD NO IDEA ABOUT THE MISSION AND DIDN'T KNOW THE CRIMINALS.

*****FORTUITUS OBSERVATIONS COMING FROM THE HQ AND TELLING THE TROOPS WERE NOT DOING THE JOB VERY WELL, WAS DISCOURAGING.

4. LESSONS LEARNED RECOMMENDATION:

*BEFORE DETERMINING PARTICIPATING UNITS, IT IS SUITABLE TO DETERMINE THE MEANS THAT UNAMIR CAN PROVIDE.

**A SUCH OPERATION REQUIRES A LONG AND SECRET PREPARATION TO DON'T ALARM CRIMINALS AND AVOID A FAILURE.

***NOBODY KNOWS BETTER HOW TO USE HIS TROOPS THAN THE COMMANDER, SO IT WAS REALLY SURPRISING AND SORRY TO DON'T COOPERATE IN THE ELABORATION OF THE OPERATION.

****IT IS SUFFICIENT TO BE CONVINCED THAT THIS OPERATION WAS BEEN DONE IN COOPERATION WITH RPA, IT IS NECESSARY TO CONVINCE OPPOSITE FORCES BY THE RIGHT WAY OF THE OPERATION. NOW IT IS EXPECTED REPRISAL FROM THE RGF AND MILITIA.

BT

#0449

From: G3 OPS

File No: 3000.15/1(Ops)

To: TAC HQ BUTARE
GHANBATT
ETHIOBATT
FRAFBATT
ZAMBATT
TUNBATT
INDBATT
NICOY
MILOB GP HQ
AUSMED
CANSIGS
CIVPOL
CLO
HRL
HAC
MP COY
G3 AIR OPS
G4
FSO
G3 ENGRS

[Signature]
G3 OPS2

Date: 16 DEC 94

Subject: AFTER ACTION REPORT OF OP HOPE

1. You are requested to forward a brief after action report on the above mentioned OP. Report to include the following:
 - a. Strength of troops that participated.
 - b. Details of criminals and weapons captured (if applicable).
 - c. Problems encountered during planning and execution stages.
 - d. Lessons learnt/Recommendations.
2. Report to reach UNAMIR HQ not later than 18 Dec
2. For your necessary action..

Post-it routing request pad 7664

ROUTING - REQUEST

Please

☐ READ

☐ HANDLE

☐ APPROVE

and

☐ FORWARD

☐ RETURN

☐ KEEP OR DISCARD

☐ REVIEW WITH ME

To W. J. H. L.

a week.

Date _____ From _____



OPERATION HOPE

* Over the last several weeks, there had been an increase in the number of violent acts such as machete killings, attacks, beatings and threats in and around the Kibeho and Ndago camps of south western Rwanda. Although UNAMIR troops are mandated to protect displaced Rwandans in Camps and that they actively patrol these areas, criminal elements monitor UN movement and rarely commit violent acts in our presence.

* UNAMIR therefore decided to be pro-active and disarm and arrest possible criminals by occupying the camps and by conducting a cordon and search operation from 4:30 a.m. wednesday, Dec 14 to 8:00 a.m. on Dec 15, 1994. UNAMIR confiscated over 1 000 war like weapons of all kind and arrested 43 potential criminals, in a non violent fashion. All suspected criminals were interviewed and registered with relevant humanitarian agencies.

* A total of 1552 United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda troops, military observers and support staff participated in operation Hope.

<u>Contributing Contingents</u>		<u>Weapons confiscated</u>	
Ethiopia	302	Machetes	810
Ghana	238	Spears	58
Tunisia	202	Axes	190
French African Contingent	134	Bayonets	4
Zambia	161	7.62 rounds	21
Nigeria	140	Magazines	1
India	95	Swords	5
Australia	50	Knives	214
Canada	36	Harpoon	16
Military Observers	79	Sickles	10
Military Police	37		
HQ Staff	21		

* UNAMIR has reason to believe that some criminals were informed well in advance that this operation was to take place and therefore left the camps prior to our arrival.

* "The operation was successfully completed without any violence. The camps have been cleansed of the intimidatory influence of the extremists", reported the SRSG, Ambassador Shaharyar Khan to UNNY. "

* UNAMIR intends to maintain a presence in those two camps in an attempt to create a climate of confidence and security among the displaced and discourage criminals from returning.



FACT SHEET

THE NUMBERS GAME

UNAMIR

HAS RENDERED THE KIGALI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT OPERATIONAL

IS TRAINING RWANDAN GENDARMES

HAS IMMUNISED OVER 60 000 RWANDANS

HAS TREATED WELL OVER 170 000 RWANDAN PATIENTS AND CONTINUES TO TREAT AN AVERAGE OF WELL OVER 300 PATIENTS A DAY

HAS TRANSPORTED WELL OVER 45 000 INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS BACK TO THEIR COMMUNES

HAS CLEARED SEVERAL THOUSANDS OF UNEXPLODED MUNITIONS (2 820)

HAS LAUNCHED MINE AWARENESS PROGRAMS FOR LOCAL COMMUNITIES

IS PROVIDING SECURITY AT VARIOUS LOCATIONS AND IS PRESENT IN MOST OF THE DP CAMPS IN SOUTH WESTERN RWANDA

IS CONDUCTING DAY CLINICS IN VARIOUS AREAS OF THE COUNTRY TO ASSIST THE LOCAL MEDICAL AUTHORITIES IN RETRAINING OF MEDICAL STAFF

HAS REPAIRED ELECTRICITY LINES, BRIDGES, ROADS, INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEM AND WATER SERVICES FOR VARIOUS TOWNS AND COMMUNES

HAS ESCORTED HUNDREDS OF HUMANITARIAN AID CONVOYS

HAS CONDUCTED CORDON & SEARCH OPERATION IN CAMPS AND CONFISCATED OVER 1000 OFFENSIVE WEAPONS AND ARRESTED 43 POSSIBLE CRIMINALS

MESSAGE FORM FORMULE DE MESSAGE				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION — COTE DE SECURITE				FILE — DOSSIER	
PAGE	DATE — TIME GROUP GROUPE DATE — HEURE			PRECEDENCE PRIORITE	CLASS	SPECAT CAT SPEC	LMF L DIFF	CAT/CIC TAG/ICO	ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER NUMERO DE L'EXPEDITEUR
	DATE — TIME DATE — HEURE	MONTH MOIS	YEAR ANNEE						
OF DE	150806	Dec	94	ACTION	INFO				
MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS — INSTRUCTIONS D'ACHEMINEMENT DU MESSAGE									
<div style="position: relative;"> <div style="position: absolute; top: 10px; left: 10px;"> <p>Hope @</p> <p>DCOS OPS</p> <p>Executive Director</p> <p>G3 ←</p> <p>G2</p> <p>500</p> <p>DD</p> </div> <div style="position: absolute; top: 10px; right: 10px; font-size: 24px;"> <p>3000.15</p> </div> <div style="position: absolute; bottom: 10px; left: 10px;"> <p>Codeword Bingo Passed sub units are departing location now.</p> </div> <div style="position: absolute; bottom: 10px; right: 10px; border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> <p>Thunt</p> <p>430932</p> <p>15/12</p> </div> </div>									
DISTRIBUTION — DIFFUSION									
DRAFTER — RÉDACTEUR					SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS — DIRECTIVES SPECIALES <div style="font-family: cursive; font-size: 1.2em;"> RX on MOTOROLA 150806 DEC94 CPL MILBAC </div>				
NAME — NOM OFFICE — BUREAU TEL — TEL									
RELEASING OFFICER — L'OFFICIER APPROBATEUR									
NAME — NOM OFFICE — BUREAU TEL — TEL					SECURITY CLASSIFICATION — COTE DE SECURITE				
SIGNATURE									

3000-15/1

MESSAGE FORM FORMULE DE MESSAGE				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION — COTE DE SÉCURITÉ				FILE — DOSSIER	
PAGE	DATE — TIME GROUP GROUPE DATE — HEURE			PRECEDENCE PRIORITÉ	CLASS	SPECAT CAT SPEC	LMF L DIFF	CAI/CIC IAG/ICG	ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER NUMÉRO DE L'EXPÉDITEUR
OF DE	DATE — TIME DATE — HEURE	MONTH MOIS	YEAR ANNÉE	ACTION	INFO				
	151725Z	Dec	94	RR					6PS 15C
MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS — INSTRUCTIONS D'ACHEMINEMENT DU MESSAGE									
<p>FM DE ETIOPBATT / Cyawguu / TO UNAMIR HQ KIGALI INFO UNTACHQ / BUTARE /</p> <p>1. OUR TROOPS WHO TOOK PART IN OP OVERATURE ARRIVED SAFELY AT 1500HRS. Coy LEFT FOR THEIR HQ'S.</p> <p>2. SITREP CORRECTION 280 AXES.</p> <p>DO Hand over to G3 Ops Jy 14 capt</p> <p>Thunt G3 Ops 2 1512</p>									
DISTRIBUTION — DIFFUSION									
DRAFTER — RÉDACTEUR					SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS — DIRECTIVES SPÉCIALES				
NAME — NOM		OFFICE — BUREAU		TEL — TÉL					
RELEASING OFFICER — L'OFFICIER APPROBATEUR									
NAME — NOM		OFFICE — BUREAU		TEL — TÉL					
SIGNATURE					SECURITY CLASSIFICATION — COTE DE SÉCURITÉ				

①

3000.15/1

HQ UNAMIR

From: Major A.K. Moore, PM Op RETOUR

To: D COS OPS

For Information: G3 Plans, G2 Ops

Date: 15 Dec 94

Subject: REQUEST FOR SUPPORT FOR OP RETOUR

Introduction

1. As part of the next phase of Op RETOUR there exists a requirement for an information campaign to be conducted within the camps that are to be targeted in the immediate future. The current information plan calls for liaison visits to be conducted within the camps by representatives of government ministries, UN agencies, NGOs and UNAMIR. The visits are currently being coordinated within the IOC and are due to start on Monday 19 December 1994.

Phase 1 - Monday 19 December/Tuesday 20 December

2. There exists a requirement to brief the local Milobs and Sector Commanders on the information and security requirement within their respective areas for Op RETOUR. Enclosed are copies of the Information Plan, in English and French, and the Security Concept which need to be distributed to the areas responsible for the following prefectures:

- a. South Kigali,
- b. Butare,
- c. Gitarama,
- d. Gikongoro, and
- e. Kibungo.

② G3 Ops

- 1. Take for action.
- 2. See G3 Plans staff for
 - a. copy of Op Retour concept; and
 - b. copy of Op Retour security concept.
- 3. Keep me informed.

[Signature]
DCS Ops
16.12

3. The aim of the enclosed documents is to provide information to the Milobs and Sector Commanders on the aspects associated with the Information Plan and Security Concept. It is requested that this information be disseminated before 1200 hrs 20 December.

Phase 2 - Tuesday 20 December/Monday 2 January

4. Four teams of the same composition will visit camps as designated below on a continual basis to execute the information plan before the movement of the first IDP, currently scheduled for 29 December. The teams will consist of representatives from government ministries, UN agencies, NGOs and UNAMIR and will be deployed as follows:

- a. Kibeho and Ndago; 4A(S)
- b. Cyanika and Rukondo; 4A(N)
- c. Kamana and Munini; and 4A(S)
- d. Bivumu, Bohoro, Ruramba and Rwamika. 4A(N) A 4A(N)

5. It is requested that the following support be provided to each of the deployed teams:

a. One liaison officer from the unit responsible for the sector in which the camps are located. and

b. A military escort to be structured according to the perceived threat in the area in which the camp is located.

6. Both military elements will need to be self sufficient in terms of:

(a) transport,

(b) rations and water, and

(c) accommodation.

7. Full briefings will be conducted on a daily basis by the team coordinators located in Gikongoro. All teams are required to attend an initial briefing to be held at the UNREO Field Office located in Gikongoro on 20 December starting at 1230 hrs. The point of contact at this briefing will be the UNREO Field Officer in Gikongoro, Mr Tim Meisburger.

8. The details required for the preparation of the security plan will be forwarded in the near future.

9. For your consideration.

A.K. Moore

A.K. Moore

MAJ

PM OP Retour

Ext: 11171 UNAMIR

15 Dec 94

From: G3 OPS

File No: 3000.15/1(Ops)

To: TAC HQ BUTARE ✕
GHANBATT +
ETHIOBATT +
FRAFBATT +
ZAMBATT +
TUNBATT
INDBATT
NICOY
MILOB GP HQ
AUSMED
CANSIGS
CIVPOL
CLO
HRL
HAC
MP COY
G3 AIR OPS
G4
FSO
G3 ENGRS

[Handwritten signature]
G3 OPS2

Date: 16 DEC 94

Subject: **AFTER ACTION REPORT OF OP HOPE**

1. You are requested to forward a brief after action report on the above mentioned OP. Report to include the following:

- a. Strength of troops that participated.
 - b. Details of criminals and weapons captured (if applicable).
 - c. Problems encountered during planning and execution stages.
 - d. Lessons learnt/Recommendations.
2. Report to reach UNAMIR HQ not later than 18 Dec 94.
2. For your necessary action..

15/1

HQ UNAMIR

From: Major A.K. Moore, PM Op RETOUR**To:** D COS OPS**For Information:** G3 Plans, G2 Ops**Date:** 15 Dec 94**Subject:** REQUEST FOR SUPPORT FOR OP RETOUR**Introduction**

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Phase 1 - Monday 19 December/Tuesday 20 December

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- b. Butare,
- c. Gitarama,
- d. Gikongoro, and
- e. Kibungo.

② G3 Ops

1. Take for action.
2. See G3 Plans staff for
 - a. copy of Op Retour concept; and
 - b. copy of Op Retour security concept.
3. Keep me informed.

[Signature]
DCOS OPS
16.12

3. The aim of the enclosed documents is to provide information to the Milobs and Sector Commanders on the aspects associated with the Information Plan and Security Concept. It is requested that this information be disseminated before 1200 hrs 20 December.

Phase 2 - Tuesday 20 December/Monday 2 January

4. Four teams of the same composition will visit camps as designated below on a continual basis to execute the information plan before the movement of the first IDP, currently scheduled for 29 December. The teams will consist of representatives from government ministries, UN agencies, NGOs and UNAMIR and will be deployed as follows:

- a. Kibeho and Ndago; 4A(S)
- b. Cyanika and Rukondo; 4A(N)
- c. Kamana and Munini; and 4A(S)
- d. Bivumu, Bohoro, Ruramba and Rwamika. 4A(N) 4 4 4

5. It is requested that the following support be provided to each of the deployed teams:

a. One liaison officer from the unit responsible for the sector in which the camps are located. and

b. A military escort to be structured according to the perceived threat in the area in which the camp is located.

6. Both military elements will need to be self sufficient in terms of:

a. transport,

b. rations and water, and

c. accommodation.

7. Full briefings will be conducted on a daily basis by the team coordinators located in Gikongoro. All teams are required to attend an initial briefing to be held at the UNREO Field Office located in Gikongoro on 20 December starting at 1230 hrs. The point of contact at this briefing will be the UNREO Field Officer in Gikongoro, Mr Tim Meisburger.

8. The details required for the preparation of the security plan will be forwarded in the near future.

9. For your consideration.



A.K. Moore

MAJ

PM OP Retour

Ext: 11171 UNAMIR

15 Dec 94

MESSAGE FORM FORMULE DE MESSAGE				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION — COTE DE SECURITE UNCLAS				FILE — DOSSIER	
PAGE	DATE — TIME GROUP GROUPE DATE — HEURE			PRECEDENCE PRIORITE	CLASS	SPECAT CAT SPEC	LMF L DIFF	CAI/CIC IAG/ICG	ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER NUMERO DE L'EXPEDITEUR
	DATE — TIME DATE — HEURE	MONTH MOIS	YEAR ANNEE	ACTION	INFO				
1 OF 1 DE	150709	DEC	94	P	R				
MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS — INSTRUCTIONS D'ACHEMINEMENT DU MESSAGE									
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div style="width: 60%;"> <p>FROM — DE HOPE 0/96B</p> <p>TO — A UNHQ/OPS</p> <p style="margin-left: 40px;">DCOS OPS ←</p> <p style="margin-left: 40px;">EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR</p> <p style="margin-left: 40px;">G3</p> <p style="margin-left: 40px;">G2</p> <p style="margin-left: 40px;">SDD</p> <p style="margin-left: 40px;">DD</p> <p>SUBJ: S.R FOR OP HOPE COVERING PERIOD 141800 TO 150600B DEC 94.</p> <p>① <u>GEN SITUATION</u> IN OP AREA WAS CALM THROUGH OUT THE NIGHT. OPERATION WERE SUCCESS.</p> <p>② <u>FACTIONAL ACT</u> RPA NTR</p> <p>③ RGF NTR</p> <p>④ WEAL POPULATION NUMBER DETAINED SUSPECTED HAS INCREASE TO 45.</p> <p>⑤ <u>OWN FORCES</u> = MORAL HIGH + READY TO RTN TO RESPEC TIVE SECTORS.</p> </div> <div style="width: 35%; text-align: center;"> <p style="font-size: 1.5em;">3500.15</p> <p style="font-size: 1.5em;">Thunt</p> <p style="font-size: 1.5em;">430PS2</p> <p style="font-size: 1.5em;">15/12</p> </div> </div>									
DISTRIBUTION — DIFFUSION									
DRAFTER — REDACTEUR					SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS — DIRECTIVES SPECIALES				
NAME — NOM		OFFICE — BUREAU		TEL — TEL	<p>RX MODROUA AT 065842S</p> <p>BY DUTY RAS OP.</p> <p>CPL ASUNCION</p>				
RELEASING OFFICER — L'OFFICIER APPROBATEUR									
NAME — NOM		OFFICE — BUREAU		TEL — TEL					
SIGNATURE					SECURITY CLASSIFICATION — COTE DE SECURITE				

DRAFT

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS NY
BARIL, MILAD UNATIONS
OO: (212) 963 9053

FROM: SHAHARTAR KHAN
SRSG UNAMIR
(250) 84265

DATE: 15 DEC 94

SUBJECT: OP HOPE

1. OP HOPE WAS EXTREMELY SUCCESSFUL WITH NO CASUALTIES DURING THE OPERATION. RPA PROVIDED 2 BNS AND COOPERATED WELL BY NOT INTERFERING WITH OUR SEARCH. THEY KEPT THEIR ROLE OF IDENTIFICATION AND TRIED NOT TO WITCH HUNT. POPULATION IN THE CAMPS REMAINED CALM.

2. A TOTAL OF 1552 TROOPS PLUS SUPPORT/CONTRACTOR STAFF PARTICIPATED IN OP ~~HOPE~~ HOPE AS FOLLOWS:

A. GHANBATT	288
B. ETHIOBATT	302
C. FRAFBATT	134
D. TUNBATT	202
E. ZAMBATT	161
F. INDRATT	95
G. NICOT	140
H. MILOB	79
I. MILPOL	37
J. AUSMED	50
K. CAMSIGS	36
L. UNAMIR HQ STAFF	21

3. A TOTAL OF 43 SUSPECTS WERE ARRESTED AND DETAINED FOR VARIOUS OFFENCES DURING THE SEARCH. ALL DETAINEES WILL BE HANDOVERED

TO THE PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE IN THE PRESENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS TEAMS AND ICRC TODAY.

THE RED CROSS REPRESENTATIVE VIEWED THE HOLDING AND PROCESSING AREA AND WAS SATISFIED WITH WHAT HE SAW.

4. AFTER COMPLETION OF THE OPERATION, THE FOLLOWING WEAPONS WERE CONFISCATED:

- A. MACHETES - 810
- B. SPEARS - 58
- C. AXES - 190
- D. BAYONETS - 04
- E. AMMO - 21 x 7.62MM
- F. MAGAZINES - 1 x AK47
- G. SWORDS - 05
- H. KNIVES - 214
- I. HARPOON - 16
- J. SICKLES - 10

THERE WERE NO GRENADES CONFISCATED IN THE CAMPS DURING THE OPERATION.

5. CONCLUSION. THE OPERATION WAS A GREAT SUCCESS LOOKING AT THE NUMBER ^{OF} WEAPONS CONFISCATED AND THE NUMBER OF SUSPECTS DETAINED. THE COOPERATION RECEIVED FROM THE DPS IN BOTH CAMPS ENHANCED THE COMPLETION OF THE OPERATION IN GOOD TIME. THE DPS ALSO ASSISTED IN THE IDENTIFICATION OF TWO FRGF SOLDIERS. UNAMIR TROOPS WHO TOOK PART IN THE OPERATION HAVE STARTED REPORTING BACK ^{TO THEIR} LOCATIONS AND THEIR MORALE IS HIGH.

MESSAGE FORM FORMULE DE MESSAGE				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION — COTE DE SECURITE UNCLAS				FILE — DOSSIER			
PAGE OF DE	DATE — TIME GROUP GROUPE DATE — HEURE			PRECEDENCE PRIORITE		CLASS	SPECAT CAT SPEC	LMF DIFF	CAI/CIC IAC/ICC	ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER NUMERO DE L'EXPEDITEUR	
	DATE — TIME DATE — HEURE	MONTH MOIS	YEAR ANNEE	ACTION	INFO						
1	150709	DEC	94	P	R						
MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS — INSTRUCTIONS D'ACHEMINEMENT DU MESSAGE											
<p>HOPE 0/96B UNHQ/OPS DCOS OPS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR G3 ← G2 SDD DD</p> <p>3050.15</p> <p>Threat G3 OPS 2 15112</p> <p>SUBJ: S.R FOR OP HOPE COVERING PERIOD 141800 TO 150000Z DEC 94.</p> <p>① <u>GEN SITUATION</u> IN OP AREA WAS CALM THROUGH OUT THE NIGHT. OPERATION WERE SUCCESS.</p> <p>② <u>FACIIONAL ACT</u> RPA NTR</p> <p>③ RGF NTR</p> <p>④ LOCAL POPULATION NUMBER DETAINED SUSPECTED HAS INCRGASE TO 45.</p> <p>⑤ <u>OWN FORCES</u> = MORAL HIGH + READY TO RTN TO RESPEC- TIVE SECTORS.</p>											
DISTRIBUTION — DIFFUSION											
DRAFTER — RÉDACTEUR						SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS — DIRECTIVES SPECIALES					
NAME — NOM		OFFICE — BUREAU		TEL — TÉL		RX MOTOROLA AT 0658423 BY DUTY RAD OP.					
RELEASING OFFICER — L'OFFICIER APPROBATEUR						CPL LUNICION					
NAME — NOM		OFFICE — BUREAU		TEL — TÉL		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION — COTE DE SECURITE					
SIGNATURE											

DO NOT STAPLE. PLEASE, FOLD OR SMUDGE — NE PAS BROCHER, PLIER, FROISSER OU MARQUER

MESSAGE FORM FORMULE DE MESSAGE				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION — COTE DE SECURITE				FILE — DOSSIER	
PAGE	DATE — TIME GROUP GROUPE DATE — HEURE			PRECEDENCE PRIORITE	CLASS	SPECAT CAT SPEC	LMF L DIFF	CAI/CIC IAC/ICC	ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER NUMERO DE L'EXPEDITEUR
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	14 19 16 B	DEC	94						
MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS — INSTRUCTIONS D'ACHEMINEMENT DU MESSAGE									
<p>TAC HQ OP HOPE 3500.15</p> <p>UNAMIR HQ KIGALI // OPS // DR KABIR</p> <p>SUBJ: SITREP FOR OP HOPE 131800-141800 B DEC 94e</p> <p><u>GENERAL:</u></p> <p>1. OP HOPE was extremely successful with no casualties during the OPs</p> <p><u>FRACTIONAL ACTIVITIES:</u></p> <p>2. RPA provided 2 Battalions and cooperated well by not interfering with our search. They kept to their role of identification and tried not to witch hunt.</p> <p>3. RGF, 2 persons were identification as former RGF members and were apprehended.</p> <p>4. <u>CIVILIAN POPULATION:</u></p> <p>Population in the camps remained calm and friendly throughout. In 1 particular case they identified an EX-RGF soldier who tried to hide.</p> <p>5. <u>OWN FORCES</u></p> <p>A total of 1552 troops participated in OP HOPE as follows;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) AUSMED 50 b) CANSIGS 33 c) ETHIOBATT 302 d) GHANBATT 238 e) FRAF BATT 134 f) INDBATT 95 g) NICOY 140 									
DISTRIBUTION — DIFFUSION									
DRAFTER — REDACTEUR					SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS — DIRECTIVES SPECIALES				
NAME — NOM		OFFICE — BUREAU			TEL — TEL		G3		
RELEASING OFFICER — L'OFFICIER APPROBATEUR									
NAME — NOM		OFFICE — BUREAU			TEL — TEL				
SIGNATURE					SECURITY CLASSIFICATION — COTE DE SECURITE				

DO NOT STAPLE, CREASE, FOLD OR SMUDGE — NE PAS BROCHER, PLIER, FROISSER OU MACULER

Thunt
G3 OPS2
15/12

MESSAGE FORM FORMULE DE MESSAGE				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION — COTE DE SECURITE				FILE — DOSSIER		
PAGE	DATE — TIME GROUP GROUPE DATE — HEURE			PRECEDENCE PRIORITE		CLASS	SPECAT CAT SPEC	LMF L DIFF	CAI/CIC IAC/ICO	ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER NUMERO DE L'EXPEDITEUR
	DATE — TIME DATE — HEURE	MONTH MOIS	YEAR ANNEE	ACTION	INFO					
2 OF 2 DE	141916B	DEC	94							
MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS — INSTRUCTIONS D'ACHEMINEMENT DU MESSAGE										
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div style="width: 20%;"> <p>DO NOT STAPLE, CREASE, FOLD OR SMUDGE — NE PAS BROCHER, PLIER, FROISSER OU MACULER</p> </div> <div style="width: 80%;"> <p>h) TUNBATT 202</p> <p>i) ZAMBATT 161</p> <p>j) MIL POL 37</p> <p>k) MIL OB 79</p> <p>l) UNAMIR HQ STAFF 21</p> <p>6. A total of 30 suspects were arrested for various offences, by own forces during the Search & Break down of weapons confiscated during the search are as follows;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Machetes 810 b) Spears 58 c) Axes 190 d) Bayonets 4 e) 7.62MM ammo 21 f) Magazine AK47x1 g) Swords 5 h) Knives 214 i) Harpoon 16 j) Sickles 10 <p>7. Morale of troops very high</p> <p>EOM</p> </div> </div>										
DISTRIBUTION — DIFFUSION										
DRAFTER — RÉDACTEUR						SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS — DIRECTIVES SPÉCIALES				
NAME — NOM		OFFICE — BUREAU		TEL — TÉL		MOTOROLA 141916B DEC 94 MCL JACKLIN				
RELEASING OFFICER — L'OFFICIER APPROBATEUR										
NAME — NOM		OFFICE — BUREAU		TEL — TÉL						
SIGNATURE						SECURITY CLASSIFICATION — COTE DE SECURITE				

File: 5000.59 (Plans)

To: Project Manager Operation Retour

For Information:

DFC

G3 Ops

G3 Plans

From: DCOS OPS, HQ UNAMIR

Date: 14 December 1994

Subject: Operation Retour Security

1. Enclosed, for your clearance, is the HQ UNAMIR concept for security operations in support of Op Retour.
2. Upon receipt of your further guidance, a detailed plan will be developed to accord with the specific requirements of the operation.

Enclosure:

1. Concept for Security Operations in Support of Operation Retour

Seen
file

SA2 OPS
27/12

**CONCEPT FOR SECURITY OPERATIONS
IN SUPPORT OF
OPERATION RETOUR**

General

- ✓ 1. The aim of Operation RETOUR is for the displaced persons and refugees of Rwanda to return home from the camps which they currently occupy. In essence, the concept provides for:
 - a. The preparation of Home Communes;
 - b. The establishment of conditions in the Camps which are conducive to voluntary vacation;
 - c. The safe movement of IDPs/refugees to overnight way stations (OWS);
 - d. Processing and provisioning of IDPs/refugees in OWSs; and
 - e. Movement to Home Communes or Open Relief Centres (ORC).
- ✓ 2. A fundamental component of the operation is to ensure that adequate security is provided in order to:
 - a. Prevent intimidation and harassment in Camps by extremists;
 - b. Enhance confidence amongst the population;
 - c. Encourage voluntary relocation to Home Communes; and
 - d. Reduce the conditions for violence in home communes during the community reintegration process.

Outline Tasks

3. Allocated tasks are as follows:
 - a. Provide security in Home Communes;
 - b. Provide a strong security presence on the camps;
 - c. Establish a high security environment in the OWSs;
 - d. Provide route security between Camps, OWSs and Home Communes or ORCs; and
 - e. Provide a reactive security capability during the Operation.

Mission

- ✓ 4. UNAMIR is to provide security in support of Operation RETOUR.

Concept

5. The provision of security will be effected as follows:
 - a. IDP Camps Camp security will be provided by the force which is responsible for the sector in which the target camp is located;
 - b. OVS OVS security will be provided by the force which is responsible for the sector in which the target camp is located;
 - c. Escort IDP convoy escort will be provided by the force which is responsible for the sector in which the target camp is located. The escort, augmented by a RPA liaison element, will remain with the convoy from the originating camp to the destination Commune/ORC. A Ready Reaction Force is to be established in all sectors through which the convoy is transiting;
 - d. Route Security Route security will be provided by RPA troops;
 - e. Commune/ORC Commune/ORC security will be provided by the force which is responsible for the sector in which the destination commune/ORC is located.

Relocation Schedule

6. Efforts to encourage IDPs to relocate will be concentrated on the camps identified in the schedule detailed at Annex A.

Execution

7. Upon advice from the Op RETOUR Task Force that the schedule at Annex A is to be executed, UNAMIR will issue orders to the responsible troops to carry out the tasks outlined at Paragraph 5 above. In the event that the troops to task requirements exceed the capacity of the in place force, troops from the adjacent sector will be tasked to reinforce.

ANNEX A

OP RETOUR - PHASE 2 SCHEDULE

CAMP/DAYS FROM D	0	+5	+10	+15	+20	+25	+30	+35	+40	+45	+50	+55
✓ CYANIKA (27,000) 4A(S) Zam												
✓ RUHKONDO (50,000) 4A(N) Zam												
✓ KIZI (2,500) Sect 4A(S) Zam												
✓ KINAZI (2,500) 4A(S)												
✓ MUGANO (3,000) - 4A(S)												
✓ KANYINYA ((4,000) ?												
✓ NYASISUYA (1,000) ?												
✓ KARAMBI (2,000) - 3												
✓ BUHORO (3,000) - 3A												
✓ GISUNZA (3,500) - 4A												
✓ NYAMIRA (1,500) (Note 1)												
✓ KIBEHO (75,000) (Note 2) - 4A(S)												
✓ NDAGO (55,000) - 4A(S)												
✓ MUNTINI (12,000) - 4A(S)												
✓ KARANA (21,000) -												
✓ BUSANZE (9,000) - 3A												
✓ MUSABEYA (14,000) - 4A(N)												
REFUGEES												

Notes:

1. All these smaller camps scheduled on a concurrent basis.
2. From D+20 movement figures assumed to double from 3,000 per day to 6,000 per day.

KANAZI
SECT 4C

File: 5000.59 (Plans)

To: Project Manager Operation Retour

For Information:

DFC

G3 Ops

G3 Plans

From: DCOS OPS, HQ UNAMIR



Date: 14 December 1994

Subject: Operation Retour Security

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1. Concept for Security Operations in Support of Operation Retour

**CONCEPT FOR SECURITY OPERATIONS
IN SUPPORT OF
OPERATION RETOUR**

General

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2. A fundamental component of the operation is to ensure that adequate security is provided in order to:
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 - c. Encourage voluntary relocation to Home Communes; and
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5. The provision of security will be effected as follows:
 - a. IDP Camps Camp security will be provided by the force which is responsible for the sector in which the target camp is located;
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 - c. Escort IDP convoy escort will be provided by the force which is responsible for the sector in which the target camp is located. The escort, augmented by a RPA liaison element, will remain with the convoy from the originating camp to the destination Commune/ORC. A Ready Reaction Force is to be established in all sectors through which the convoy is transiting;
 - d. Route Security Route security will be provided by RPA troops;
 - e. Commune/ORC Commune/ORC security will be provided by the force which is responsible for the sector in which the destination commune/ORC is located.

Relocation Schedule

6. Efforts to encourage IDPs to relocate will be concentrated on the camps identified in the schedule detailed at Annex A.

Execution

7. Upon advice from the Op RETOUR Task Force that the schedule at Annex A is to be executed, UNAMIR will issue orders to the responsible troops to carry out the tasks outlined at Paragraph 5 above. In the event that the troops to task requirements exceed the capacity of the in place force, troops from the adjacent sector will be tasked to reinforce.

ANNEX A

OP RETOUR - PHASE 2 SCHEDULE

CAMP/DAYS FROM D	0	+5	+10	+15	+20	+25	+30	+35	+40	+45	+50	+55
CYANIKA (27,000)												
RUHKONDO (50,000)												
KIZI (2,500)												
KINAZI (2,500)												
MUGANO (3,000)												
KANYINYA ((4,000)												
NYASISUYA (1,000)												
KARAMBI (2,000)												
BUHORO (3,000)												
GISUNZA (3,500)												
NYAMIRA (1,500) (Note 1)												
KIBEHO (75,000) (Note 2)												
NDAGO (55,000)												
MUNINI (12,000)									43			
KARANA (21,000)									43	47		
BUSANZE (9,000)										47-9		
MUSABEYA (14,000)										49	53	
REFUGEES												+

Notes:

1. All these smaller camps scheduled on a concurrent basis.
2. From D+20 movement figures assumed to double from 3,000 per day to 6,000 per day.

POINTS GIVEN CO'S DURING
DFC'S BRIEFING ON 14 DEC 94

? 1. COO TAC HQ BUTARE

- a. Lack of coord between Force HQ & Tac HQ during the planning stage. Emphasised need to exchange ideas.
- b. Lack of resources at assy area like electricity, toilets etc.
- c. No unit reps landed up at assy area to ensure facilities ready when units moved in.
- d. Route marking by MPs needed improvement.

2. HAC

- a. NGOs concerned about op timings - leakage of information.
- b. Initial pace of search was very slow.
- c. Lack of ablution facilities in op area.

? 3. DCMO

- a. 12 teams deployed and 3 teams in res.
- b. Initial 2 hrs of search was slow.
- c. NGOs very apprehensive of outcome of op.

4. ZAMBATT. Prior knowledge of op was available with locals.

5. TUNBATT

- a. Adequate no of vehs not provided for tp lifting.
- b. Contingent Comds must be incorporated in all such future ops.

? 6. FRAFBATT

- a. Recce of obj area not carried out due to bad condition of roads and indecent weather.
- b. Good ex for the tps.

7. GHANBATT

- a. Initial start was slow because RPA LO's did not marry up in time.

b. Recommended award for tps.

8. ETHIOBATT

a. Gave details of suspects arrested and weapons captured.

b. Wpns like rifles/grens were not found on objs.

7 9. NICOY

a. Duration of stay at assy area war far too long.

b. RPA made arrests directly instead of only identifying them and handing them over to UNAMIR tps.

10. CLO Did not receive requisite no of interpreters nor tpt for the op.

11. AUSMED

a. Amount of time spent in assy area was far too long.

b. No significant incident of injury during the conduct of the op.

12. FORCE PROVOST MARSHAL

a. Lack of coord between logs and tpt.

b. Engr stores to constr detainee facility never fetched op.

13. CO RPA

a. Op was very successful.

b. Expressed regret for arrests made directly by RPA pers.

7 14. IND BATT

POINTS GIVEN CO'S DURING
DFC'S BRIEFING ON 14 DEC 94

1. COO TAC HQ BUTARE
 - a. Lack of coord between Force HQ & Tac HQ during the planning stage. Emphasised need to exchange ideas.
 - b. Lack of resources at assy area like electricity, toilets etc.
 - c. No unit reps landed up at assy area to ensure facilities ready when units moved in.
 - d. Route marching by MPs needed improvement.
2. HAC
 - a. NGOs concerned about op timings - leakage of information.
 - b. Initial pace of search was very slow.
 - c. Lack of ablution facilities in op area.
3. DCMO
 - a. 12 teams deployed and 3 teams in res.
 - b. Initial 2 hrs of search was slow.
 - c. NGOs very apprehensive of outcome of op.
4. ZAMBATT. Prior knowledge of op was available with locals.
5. TUNBATT
 - a. Adequate no of vehs not provided for tp lifting.
 - b. Contingent Comds must be incorporated in all such future ops.
6. FRAFBATT
 - a. Recce of obj area not carried out due to bad condition of roads and indecent weather.
 - b. Good ex for the tps.
7. GHANBATT
 - a. Initial start was slow because RPA LO's did not marry up in time.

- b. Recommended award for tps.
- 8. ETHIOBATT
 - a. Gave details of suspects arrested and weapons captured.
 - b. Wpns like rifles/grens were not found on objs.
- 9. NICOY
 - a. Duration of stay at assy area war far too long.
 - b. RPA made arrests directly instead of only identifying them and handing them over to UNAMIR tps.
- 10. CLO Did not receive requisite no of interpreters nor tpt for the op.
- 11. AUSMED
 - a. Amount of time spent in assy area was far too long.
 - b. No significant incident of injury during the conduct of the op.
- 12. FORCE PROVOST MARSHAL
 - a. Lack of coord between logs and tpt.
 - b. Engr stores to constr detainee facility never fetched op.
- 13. CO RPA
 - a. Op was very successful.
 - b. Expressed regret for arrests made directly by RPA pers.

POINTS GIVEN BY CO'S DURING
DFC'S BRIEFING ON 14 DEC 94

1. COO Tac HQ Butare

- (a) ^{Lack} ~~Lack~~ of ^{coord} ~~coop~~ between Force HQ & Tac HQ during ^{the planning stage} ~~ptg~~ stage. Emphasised need to exchange ideas.
- (b) Lack of resources at assy area like electricity, toilets etc.
- (c) No unit reps landed up at assy area to ensure facilities ready when units moved in.
- (d) Route marking by MPs needed improvement.

2. HAC

- (a) NGOs concerned about op timings — leakage of info.
- (b) Initial pace of search was very slow.
- (c) Lack of ablution facilities in op area.

3. Dy CMD

- (a) 1 ^{deployed} ~~2~~ teams dply & 3 teams in res.
- (b) Initial 2 hrs ^{was slow} ~~lost~~ of search ^{by units}.
- (c) NGOs very apprehensive of outcome of op.

4. ZAMBATT

- × (a) ~~Task of securing releasepts given to two contingents. Task~~
- (b) Prior knowledge of op was available with locals.

5. TUNBAT7

- (a) Adequate no of vehs not provided for tp lifting.
- (b) Contingent cars must be incorporated in all such future ops.

6. FRAF BAT7

- (a) Recce of obj area not carried out due to bad condition of roads & inclement weather.
- (b) Good ex for the tps

7. GHANBAT7

- (a) Initial start slow because RPA LDs did not marry up in time.
- (b) Recommended award for tps.

8. ~~MYP~~ ETHIOBAT7

- (a) Gave details of suspects arrested & wpns captured.
- (b) Wpns like rifles / guns not found on obj.

9. NICOY

- (a) Duration of stay at assy area far too long.
- (b) RPA made arrests directly instead of only identifying them & handing them over to UNAMIR tps.

10. CHD. Did not receive requisite no of interpreters nor tpt for the op

11. AUSMED

- (a) Amount of time spent in assy area was far too long.
- (b) No significant incident of injury during the conduct of the op.

12. Force Provost Marshal

- (a) Lack of coord between Regs 2 & 6pt.
- (b) Engor stores to consto detainee facility never fetched up.

13. CO RPA

- (a) Op very successful.
- (b) Expressed regret for arrests made directly by RPA pers.

**CONCEPT FOR SECURITY OPERATIONS
IN SUPPORT OF
OPERATION RETOUR**

General

1. The aim of Operation RETOUR is for the displaced persons and refugees of Rwanda to return home from the camps which they currently occupy. In essence, the concept provides for:
 - a. The preparation of Home Communes;
 - b. The establishment of conditions in the Camps which are conducive to voluntary vacation;
 - c. The safe movement of IDPs/refugees to overnight way stations (OWS);
 - d. Processing and provisioning of IDPs/refugees in OWSs; and
 - e. Movement to Home Communes or Open Relief Centres (ORC).
2. A fundamental component of the operation is to ensure that adequate security is provided in order to:
 - a. Prevent intimidation and harassment in Camps by extremists;
 - b. Enhance confidence amongst the population;
 - c. Encourage voluntary relocation to Home Communes; and
 - d. Reduce the conditions for violence in home communes during the community reintegration process.

Outline Tasks

3. Allocated tasks are as follows:
 - a. Provide security in Home Communes;
 - b. Provide a strong security presence on the camps;
 - c. Establish a high security environment in the OWSs;
 - d. Provide route security between Camps, OWSs and Home Communes or ORCs; and
 - e. Provide a reactive security capability during the Operation.

Mission

4. UNAMIR is to provide security in support of Operation RETOUR.

Concept

5. The provision of security will be effected as follows:
- a. IDP Camps Camp security will be provided by the force which is responsible for the sector in which the target camp is located;
 - b. OVS OVS security will be provided by the force which is responsible for the sector in which the target camp is located;
 - c. Escort IDP convoy escort will be provided by the force which is responsible for the sector in which the target camp is located. The escort, augmented by a RPA liaison element, will remain with the convoy from the originating camp to the destination Commune/ORC. A Ready Reaction Force is to be established in all sectors through which the convoy is transiting;
 - d. Route Security Route security will be provided by RPA troops;
 - e. Commune/ORC Commune/ORC security will be provided by the force which is responsible for the sector in which the destination commune/ORC is located.

Relocation Schedule

6. Efforts to encourage IDPs to relocate will be concentrated on the camps identified in the schedule detailed at Annex A.

Execution

7. Upon advice from the Op RETOUR Task Force that the schedule at Annex A is to be executed, UNAMIR will issue orders to the responsible troops to carry out the tasks outlined at Paragraph 5 above. In the event that the troops to task requirements exceed the capacity of the in place force, troops from the adjacent sector will be tasked to reinforce.

OP RETOUR - PHASE 2 SCHEDULE

CAMP/DAYS FROM D	0	+5	+10	+15	+20	+25	+30	+35	+40	+45	+50	+55
CYANIKA (27,000)												
RUHKONDO (50,000)												
KIZI (2,500)												
KINAZI (2,500)												
MUGANO (3,000)												
KANYINYA ((4,000)												
NYASISUYA (1,000)												
KARAMBI (2,000)												
BUHORO (3,000)												
GISUNZA (3,500)												
NYAMIRA (1,500) (Note 1)												
KIBEHO (75,000) (Note 2)												
NDAGO (55,000)									43			
MUNINI (12,000)									43	47		
KARANA (21,000)										47-9		
BUSANZE (9,000)										49	53	
MUSABEYA (14,000)												
REFUGEES												

Notes:

1. All these smaller camps scheduled on a concurrent basis.
2. From D+20 movement figures assumed to double from 3,000 per day to 6,000 per day.

MESSAGE FORM FORMULE DE MESSAGE				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION — COTE DE SECURITE				FILE — DOSSIER	
PAGE	DATE — TIME GROUP GROUPE DATE — HEURE			PRECEDENCE PRIORITE	CLASS	SPECAT CAT SPEC	LMF L DIFF	CAI/CIC IAC/ICC	ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER NUMERO DE L'EXPEDITEUR
1 OF 1 DE	DATE — TIME DATE — HEURE	MONTH MOIS	YEAR ANNEE	ACTION	INFO				
	14/6498	DEC	94	0					
MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS — INSTRUCTIONS D'ACHEMINEMENT DU MESSAGE									
<p>FROM — DE HOPE Ø FM SENIOR MILITARY POLICE 2000.15</p> <p>TO — A UNAMIR HQ KIGALI // OPS</p> <p>1. Request the Duty Officer link up with CIUPOL staff. Have them contact the Public Prosecutor and get him to our HQ as soon as possible, latest tomorrow morning, preferably by helicopter.</p> <p>2. TREAT AS URGENT.</p> <p><u>EDM</u></p> <p>1650</p> <p>CIUPOL & G3ops informed & D Cosops</p> <p>Thump G3ops 14/12</p>									
DISTRIBUTION — DIFFUSION									
DRAFTER — RÉDACTEUR					SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS — DIRECTIVES SPECIALES				
NAME — NOM		OFFICE — BUREAU		TEL — TÉL.	NOTAKOLA 14/6498 DEC 94 MCPL JACKIN.				
RELEASING OFFICER — L'OFFICIER APPROBATEUR									
NAME — NOM		OFFICE — BUREAU		TEL — TÉL.					
SIGNATURE					SECURITY CLASSIFICATION — COTE DE SECURITE				


MESSAGE FORM FORMULE DE MESSAGE				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION — COTE DE SECURITE				FILE — DOSSIER		
PAGE 1 OF 1	DATE — TIME GROUP GROUPE DATE — HEURE			PRECEDENCE PRIORITE		CLASS	SPECAT CAT SPEC	LMF L DIFF	CAI/CIC IAC/ICC	ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER NUMERO DE L'EXPEDITEUR
	DATE DATE	TIME HEURE	MONTH MOIS	YEAR ANNEE	ACTION	INFO				
	14	1657B	DEC	94	0					
MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS — INSTRUCTIONS D'ACHEMINEMENT DU MESSAGE										
<p>FROM — DE <i>HOPE Ø</i></p> <p>TO — A <i>UNAMIR HQ/OPS</i></p> <p>1. Reference Public Prosecutor, also request an ICRC and Human Rights representative join himo</p> <p>2. Australian Legal officer with visit tonight to discuss thiso</p> <p>3. Request you contact 93H to arrange transporto</p> <p><i>EOM</i></p> <p><i>1655</i></p> <p><i>Dcos ops G3ops w/mad</i></p>										
DISTRIBUTION — DIFFUSION										
DRAFTER — RÉDACTEUR						SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS — DIRECTIVES SPECIALES				
NAME — NOM		OFFICE — BUREAU		TEL — TEL		<i>MOTROLA</i> <i>14 1657B DEC 94</i> <i>MCPL JACKLIN</i>				
RELEASING OFFICER — L'OFFICIER APPROBATEUR										
NAME — NOM		OFFICE — BUREAU		TEL — TEL						
SIGNATURE						SECURITY CLASSIFICATION — COTE DE SECURITE				

19.20

FROM: CIVPOL COMMISSIONER
TO: DUTY OFFICER UNAMIR OPS
SUBJECT: INVITATION OF PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
KIGALI

D.T.O.: 141840/12/94

REF YOUR MESSAGE X MOTOROLA
14-1649 B 1294X KIGALI PUBLIC
PROSECUTOR COULD NOT BE
REACHED X EFFORTS TO GET
PRISONS GUARDS TO ASSIST
IN LOCATING HIS RESIDENCE X
WERE PROVED ABORTIVE X
SUBJECT WILL BE CONTACTED
ON OR BEFORE 0800 HOURS
OF 15-12-94.


FOR: CIVPOL COMMISSIONER. CPMT KIGALI I

MESSAGE FORM FORMULE DE MESSAGE				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION — COTE DE SECURITE				FILE — DOSSIER		
PAGE	DATE — TIME GROUP GROUPE DATE — HEURE			PRECEDENCE PRIORITE		CLASS	SPECAT CAT SPEC	LMF L DIFF	CAI/CIC IAC/IOC	ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER NUMERO DE L'EXPEDITEUR
1 OF DE 2	DATE — TIME DATE — HEURE	MONTH MOIS	YEAR ANNEE	ACTION	INFO					
	14/19/60	DEC	94							
MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS — INSTRUCTIONS D'ACHEMINEMENT DU MESSAGE										
<p>FROM — DE TAC HQ OP HOPE 3000.15</p> <p>TO — A UNAMIR HQ KIGALI // OPS // DR KABIR</p> <p>SUBJ: SITREP FOR OP HOPE 131800-141800 B DEC 94</p> <p><u>GENERAL:</u></p> <p>1. OP HOPE was extremely successful with no casualties during the OPs</p> <p><u>FRACTIONAL ACTIVITIES:</u></p> <p>2. RPA provided 2 Battalions and cooperated well by not interfering with our search. They kept to their role of identification and tried not to witch hunt.</p> <p>3. RGF, 2 persons were identification as former RGF members and were apprehended.</p> <p>4. <u>CIVILIAN POPULATION:</u> Population in the camps remained calm and friendly throughout. In 1 particular case they identified an EX-RGF soldier who tried to hide.</p> <p>5. <u>OWN FORCES</u> A total of 1552 troops participated in OP HOPE as follows;</p> <p>a) AUSMED 50 b) CANSIGS 3336 c) ETHIOBATT 302 d) GHANBATT 238 e) FRAFBATT 134 f) INDBATT 95 g) NICOF 140</p>										
DISTRIBUTION — DIFFUSION										
DRAFTER — REDACTEUR						SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS — DIRECTIVES SPECIALES				
NAME — NOM		OFFICE — BUREAU		TEL — TEL		DCOS OPS				
RELEASING OFFICER — L'OFFICIER APPROBATEUR										
NAME — NOM		OFFICE — BUREAU		TEL — TEL						
SIGNATURE						SECURITY CLASSIFICATION — COTE DE SECURITE				

MESSAGE FORM FORMULE DE MESSAGE				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION — COTE DE SECURITE				FILE — DOSSIER		
PAGE	DATE — TIME GROUP GROUPE DATE — HEURE			PRECEDENCE PRIORITE		CLASS	SPECAT CAT SPEC	LMF L DIFF	CAI/CIC IAC/ICC	ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER NUMERO DE L'EXPEDITEUR
	DATE — TIME DATE — HEURE	MONTH MOIS	YEAR ANNEE	ACTION	INFO					
2 OF 2 DE	141916B	DEC	94							
MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS — INSTRUCTIONS D'ACHEMINEMENT DU MESSAGE										
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div style="width: 15%;"> <p>DO NOT STAPLE, CREASE, FOLD OR SMUDGE — NE PAS BROCHER, FRONTER, FROISSER OU MACULER</p> </div> <div style="width: 85%;"> <p>h) TUNBATT 202</p> <p>i) ZAMBATT 161</p> <p>j) MILPOL 37</p> <p>k) MILOB 79</p> <p>l) UNAMIR HQ STAFF 21</p> <p>6. A total of 30 suspects were arrested for various offences, by our forces during the search. Break down of weapons confiscated during the search are as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Machetes 810 b) Spears 58 c) Axes 190 d) Bayonets 4 e) 7.62MM ammo 21 f) Magazine AK-47 x 1 g) Swords 5 h) Knives 214 i) Harpoon 16 j) Sickles 10 <p>7. Morale of troops very high.</p> <p>EOM</p> </div> </div>										
DISTRIBUTION — DIFFUSION										
DRAFTER — REDACTEUR						SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS — DIRECTIVES SPECIALES				
NAME — NOM		OFFICE — BUREAU		TEL — TEL		MOTOROLA 141916B DEC 94 MCPL JACKLIN				
RELEASING OFFICER — L'OFFICIER APPROBATEUR										
NAME — NOM		OFFICE — BUREAU		TEL — TEL						
SIGNATURE						SECURITY CLASSIFICATION — COTE DE SECURITE				



①

24 Dec 94

UNAMIR

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: Force PM
INFO: DCOS Sp and DCOS Ops
FROM: Maj J-G Plante
CO Force MP Coy
DATE: 6 Dec 94
SUBJECT: OP OVERTURE
REF: WNGO, 5 DEC 94
FILE: 3006.2(CO MP Coy), 6 Dec 94

③ SO2 G3 Ops

1. Please info PM, Nicos
Eugene tasked to assist
2. however PM will have
to contact G4 for their
rec requirements.

AFG
8/12

1. I have reviewed the Ref and as requested, I submit the following data.
2. If things work out, by the time OP OVERTURE begins, beyond the 17 MPs I already have, I should have received another 26:
 - a. Tunisia 11;
 - b. Malawi 5; and
 - c. Ghana 10.
3. There are however many "unknowns" regarding those 27 MPs. For instance, yesterday I met the five who had just arrived from Malawi. None had personal weapon, MP Armband, handcuff, sleeping bag, helmet, flak jacket, etc. As for their state of training, I have no idea.
4. As soon as I secure accommodation, I will get the 11 Tunisians MPs presently in Gisenyi to report to Kigali. As for the ten Ghanaians, I expect them to arrive in Kigali sometime this week.

② G3 Ops

1. PLS discuss with PM
2. See my notes.

Roger Sir.
Ashford G3 OPS DCOS 7/12

5. Based on those figures, I should be able to deploy a Platoon(+) of around 30 to 33 MPs.

6. As we discussed on 5 Dec 94, in the WNGO, the MP Coy(-) tasks are combined with CIVPOL. This is not acceptable since we are two separate units with totally different missions. For instance, one is armed, the other is not. In the OP ORDER itself, I would like to see my own tasks spelled out very clearly.

7. Now, I have two questions:

a. *yes!* will we be using the same **Rules of Engagement** than those presently being applied? For instance, what procedures will we follow in the eventuality that a prisoner or a group of prisoners attempt to escape? and

b. para 3C of Ref identifies one pl to provide security for the "detainee cage." I presume that this is over and above my own MPs, who among other duties, will be doing just that. If that pl is in fact in location for security duties, then it should be Under Command of the MP Coy.

In sp might be more acceptable due to not a limitation

8. Annex A provides a very rough diagram of the "Field Detention Facility." Its size should be according to the number of prisoners that UNAMIR HQ foresees at any one time under our responsibility. I presume that its exact location and its construction will be will be UNAMIR HQ responsibility.

9. Annex B outlines the equipment required for the MP Coy.

10. Submitted as requested.


Suggest MPs liaise with GH to see what is possible

who can be tasked:

- MP Coy
- Secur Pl
- Engrs from?
Nicoy / Indbott

OP OVERTURE

MP COY FIELD DETENTION



NOT DRAWN TO SCALE

OP OVERTURE

EQUIPMENT REQUIRED BY MP COMPANY

Vehicles:

8

**Equipment necessary to construct the
Field Detention:**

Rolls of Barbed Wire	50
Steels pickets	300
Rolls of wires	5
Pairs gloves b/w	20
Rolls of hessian (for toilet)	5
Hammer sleeve	2
Sledge hammer	3
Rolls of wires; flexible	2
Pliers	4
Saw	2
Nails 2 1/2'	200
Roll of Mine Tape	1

Prisoner Registration Forms:
(supplied by UNAMIR HQ)
to be filled out in 2
copies.

1000

*who?
why not MP?
initiative?*

**Necessary food and water
for the prisoners:**

?

Office Equipment:

Hand-cuffs plastic	500
Typewriter	1
Polaroid camera	2
Films	50
Loud hailer	2
Batteries for L/H	24
Cutter for plastic hand-cuffs	2
First-Aid Kit	2
Glow Sticks (boxes)	2
Box of rubber gloves	2
Flashlights	10

Generator and flood lights:	1
(in the event that prisoners need to be kept overnight)	
Necessary sleeping tents for 35 MPs:	
Lanterns (Coleman)	3
Coleman stove	1
Helmets	30
Flak jackets	30
Blankets	50
Tent for area to process prisoners:	1
Folding tables	3
Chairs	10
Plastic Identification Tags:	10000
(one will be attached to the prisoner and a second one (with the same number) will be fixed to his/her property/evidence bag)	
Sand bags to be used for:	
(property/evidence bag)	500
Road Signing Equipment:	
Wooden pickets	100
Road Signs (types ??)	200
Stapler Gun	2
Roll of Gun Tape	2

FROM:

UNAMIR HQ (OPS)

File No: 3000.15(Ops)

TO:

GHANBATT
ETHIOBATT
FRAFBATT
ZAMBATT
TUNBATT
NICOY
MILOB HQ
AUS MED
CANSIG
CIVPOL
CLO
HRL
FMO
HAC
MP COY
G3 AIR OPS
G4
FSO
RPA LO

DATE: 5 Dec 94

SUBJECT: WNGO

1. SIT.

A. As a result of increased criminal activity and intimidation in Sectors 3 and 4A, NGO ops have been suspended in some areas. Mil info reveals extremist and criminal elements are operating from DP camps in Sector 4A and in some cases there is sufficient evidence to the fact that armed elements are using the DP Camps, specifically Kibeho and Ndago, as hide-outs from where they conduct killings in the outlying communes.

B. In order to create a security environment which will diminish the random killings in the western portion of Sector 3A and to encourage DPs to return to their homes, it is anticipated that the removal of undesirable is essential. This may eventually sufficiently motivate the moderate inhabitants to abandon the camps and return to their communes.

2. MSN. To clear the criminal elements from Kibeho and Ndago DP camps in order to establish a security environment which will encourage DP repatriation.

3. EXECUTION

A. GENERAL OUTLINE. UNAMIR will conduct a cordon and search op in cooperation with the RPA. Two RPA bns will form the outer cordon. Seven UNAMIR companies will form the inner cordon and conduct the search with RPA identification and liaison teams. A linear oriented search

will be conducted con-currently by all UNAMIR companies commencing at Kibeho. A single UNAMIR Coy will be inserted at Ndago as a blocking force. A two pl spares element will be loc at Kibeho. A prelim op to increase the UN presence in the camps will be conducted during the planning period.

B. GP

(1). Tunbatt.

(A) Gp.

- (i) Inf Bn less two coys.
- (ii) One RPA liaison Team per inf pl.
- (iii) One MILOB team per inf coy and one in Bn HQ.
- (iv) One interpreter per inf pl and one in Bn HQ.

(2) Ethiobatt.

(A) Gp.

- (i) Inf Bn less two coys.
- (ii) One RPA liaison Team per inf pl.
- (iii) One MILOB team per inf coy and one in Bn HQ.
- (iv) One interpreter per inf pl and one in Bn HQ.

(3). Ghanbatt.

(A) Gp.

- (i) Inf Bn less two coys.
- (ii) One RPA liaison Team per inf pl.
- (iii) One MILOB team per inf coy and one in Bn HQ.
- (iv) One interpreter per inf pl and one in Bn HQ.

(4) Frafbatt.

(A) Gp.

- (i) One indep inf coy (TChad coy).

- (ii) One RPA liaison team per inf pl.
- (iii) Under Comd one MILOB team each.
- (iv) One interpreter per inf pl and one at coy HQ.

(5) Zambatt.

(A) Gp.

- (i) One indep inf coy.
- (ii) One RPA liaison team per inf pl.
- (iii) Under Comd one MILOB team each.
- (iv) One interpreter per inf pl and one at Coy HQ.

(6) Nicoy.

(A) Gp.

- (i) One indep Coy less two pls.
- (ii) One RPA liaison team per pl.
- (iii) One MILOB team.
- (iv) One interpreter per inf pl and one at Coy HQ.

C. TASKS.

- (1) Be prep to clear objectives of unauthorised weapons, equipment and stores and arrest criminal elements.
- (2) One coy to provide a blocking force at Ndago Camp.
- (3) One coy to be prep to estb preliminary presence with one coy starting forthwith.
- (4) One bn to be prep to secur FUP.
- (5) One bn to be prep to maintain a post op presence in camps until relieved by Zambatt.
- (6) One pl to act as Force Res elm/secur for Tac HQ.
- (7) One pl to provide Force RRF.
- (8) One pl to provide secur for detainee cage.

D. GP AND TASKS.

(1) MILOB HQ.

(A) Gp - Provide upto 20 MILOB teams.

(B) Tasks.

(i) Establish preliminary presence in Camps.

(ii) Conduct liaison between Tac HQ, Un Agencies & NGOs and local authorities and monitor proceedings.

(iii) Maintain post operation presence in the Camps.

(iv) Estb Milob Coord HQ coloc with Tac HQ.

(2) MP COY(-)/CIVPOL Det.

(A) Gp - Provide 15 dets.

(B) Tasks.

(i) Route marking/traffic control.

(ii) Establish, secure and man detainee screening/holding facility.

(3) CANSIGS.

(A) Gp - No change.

(B) Task.

(i) Provide comd, con, security and max tpt resources for Op Homeward originating at Kibeho camps.

(ii) Estb and man Tac HQ.

(4) CLO.

(A) Gp - No change.

(B) Tasks.

(i) Maintain constant liaison with RPA.

(ii) Provide one interpreter to each pl size elm and all unit and subunit HQs.

(iii) Prepare Liaison Plan.

(5) FMO.

(A) Gp - No change.

(B) Tasks.

(i) Estb cas clearing post at KIBEHO.

(ii) Estb cas clearing post at NDAGO on O.

(iii) Arrange treatment and evacuation of cas.

(iv) Conduct medical screening of detainees.

(v) Provide internal security.

(6) G4 - Augment first line tpt resources to transport troops, detainees, rations and water.

(7) HAC.

(A) Gp - No change.

(B) Task.

(i) To determine destination communes of IDPs.

(ii) Coord Op Homeward with UN agencies and NGOs.

(7) RPA.

(A) Gp.

(i) Two RPA Bns.

(ii) RPA liaison teams to each pl size elm and all levels of HQ.

(iii) 60 security pers (alloc 2 per LO).

(B) Tasks.

(i) Provide outer cordon at camps at KIBEHO and NDAGO.

(ii) Arrest and disarm escapees.

(iii) Provide Liaison and security teams.

(iv) Identify criminals/wanted persons.

(v) Conduct screening process under UN supervision.

(vi) Escort detainees from cage to

designated detention facility under UN supervision.

(vii) Provide post ops security.

E. COORD INSTR

(1). TIMINGS

(A) Planning.

(i) D-Day - 14 Dec 94 - Op commences.

(ii) Ni D-1 - 13/14 Dec - Mov to blocking/cordon posn/FUP.

(iii) D-1 - 13 Dec - Mov to assy area complete.

(iv) D-2 - 12 Dec - Commence Mov to assy area.

(v) D-3 - 11 Dec Coy comd O Gp.

(vi) D-4 - 10 Dec Coy level recon.

(vii) D-5 - 9 Dec DFC/Bn comd recon.

(B) Operational.

(i) H - 3 hrs - Outer cordon in posn.

(ii) H - 1 hr - FUP secure.

(iii) H - 30 mins - occupy FUP/blocking force in posn.

(iv) H hr - 1st light D Day.

(v) H+1 hr - Holding/screening facility established.

(C) Milob and Ghanbatt to increase visibility and presence forthwith to establish mounted and dismounted patrols consisting of 10 teams and coy str, respectively, by 12 Dec 94.

(2) AXIS OF SEARCH. Main road KIBEHO/NDAGO.

(3) Assy Area. BUTARE.

(4) EOD. All units to be prepared to carry out EOD tasks. G3 Ops will coord explosives and max utilization of all aval mine detectors.

(5) Recce. Restricted to Coy R Gp level. Min vehs.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

- A. Admin instr will be issued separately by 10 Dec 94.
- B. All tps will carry combat rations and water for 48 hrs.
- C. Accn in personal shelters.
- D. Dress. Helmets and Flak jackets for all tps involved in search, security and blocking ops.

5. Command and Signals.

A. Loc of HQ. TAC HQ - KIBEHO. Milob HQ Det coloc with Tac HQ. Alternate - Tac HQ Butare.

B. Control. One C and C helo will be dedicated to TAC HQ.

C. Communications.

(1) Comm plan will be fwd by 10 Dec 94. Incl allotment of frequencies and call signs.

(2) 2 x Motorola and spare batteries will be issued to RPA BHQ for the duration of the op.

D. Issue of OPORD and FC's O Gp 090930 Dec 94 at UNAMIR HQ.

E. OPSEC is paramount.

6. Acknowledge.



To: CO Force MP Coy
From: Force PM/SO2 G1 Discipline
Info: DCOS Sp, **G3 Ops** (less attachment)
Date: 3 Dec 94
File: FPM/5
Subject: OPERATION OVERTURE

Seen
4
6/12

Thunt
G3OPS2

1. I attach a copy of the current plan for Op OVERTURE - which I received this morning and about which an Op Order is now being produced. Please accept this as a warning order for the MP Company to provide traffic control (including route signing), a detainee processing facility and security duties (including the transfer of perhaps as many as 400 detainees between the detainee processing centre and the Public Prosecutor's office in Gikongoro) for the Op. I will provide more details in due course.
2. Please note that although the plan carries no security classification (because it has been issued to the RPA), it is extremely sensitive and requires the utmost security. Information on the subject must not be allowed to leak out to the community or to the camps.

M. Cuthbert-Brown

M CUTHBERT-BROWN
Maj
Force PM/SO2 G1 Disc